People v. Cummings

• Citation: 2014 IL 115769,6 N.E.3d 725,379 Ill.Dec. 397
• Decision Date: 20 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 115769.,115769.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Derrick A. CUMMINGS, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

2014 IL 115769
6 N.E.3d 725
379 Ill.Dec. 397

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,
v.
Derrick A. CUMMINGS, Appellee.

No. 115769.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 20, 2014.

[6 N.E.3d 727]

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, and Trish Joyce, State's Attorney, Morrison (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Richard T. Leonard, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Sean Conley, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION
Justice THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The narrow issue in this case is whether a police officer violated the fourth amendment when, after stopping a van solely because it was registered to a woman with an outstanding arrest warrant, he asked the male driver for a driver's license. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court of Whiteside County's decision to grant defendant Derrick Cummings' motion to suppress evidence. 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On January 27, 2011, the defendant received a citation for driving while license suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d) (West 2010). The State later charged him by information with that offense, a Class 4 felony. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence.

¶ 4 At the hearing on that motion, the defendant testified that on the evening he was ticketed, he was driving a van owned by a woman named Pearlene Chattic on a four-lane road in the City of Sterling. A marked police squad car pulled alongside the van at a stop sign. The defendant proceeded through the intersection, and the police officer followed him for several minutes before activating the squad car's lights. According to the defendant, he had not violated any traffic laws. The citations that he received were unrelated to the movement or the condition of the van.

¶ 5 Officer Shane Bland of the Sterling Police Department testified that on the evening the defendant was ticketed, he was on patrol when he encountered a van driving in front of his squad car. According to Officer Bland, “It appeared that the registration on the vehicle had expired.” Officer Bland checked the van's registration. He learned that the registration was valid, but also that the van's owner, Chattic, was “wanted on a warrant.” Officer Bland pulled next to the van at a stop sign and attempted to identify the driver as Chattic, but “the driver pinned themselves [ sic ] back in the seat,” obstructing his view. He was unable to determine whether the driver was a woman or a man.

¶ 6 Officer Bland testified that the driver proceeded through the intersection, and he activated his squad car's emergency

[6 N.E.3d 728]

lights. Officer Bland exited the squad car and approached the van. Before he spoke to the driver, he determined that the driver was a man. Officer Bland stated that he asked the defendant for a driver's license and proof of insurance and he explained why he stopped the van. The defendant had no license. If he had produced a license and proof of insurance, Bland would have let him go. According to Officer Bland, asking for a license and proof of insurance is “standard operating procedure” when a car has been curbed.

¶ 7 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Officer Bland testified that he knew Chattic was a woman. Officer Bland acknowledged that his written report of the incident indicated as he pulled next to the van, its driver looked at him. He insisted, however, that he could not see the driver's face. Officer Bland stated that the only reason he stopped the van was Chattic's arrest warrant. He did not observe any other violations of law by the driver or the van. Officer Bland repeated that before he spoke to the driver, he determined the driver was a man. Bland first requested a driver's license and proof of insurance as a matter of routine. After the defendant said he did not have a license, Officer Bland explained the reason for the stop.

¶ 8 The trial court granted the motion. The court stated that here the facts were not disputed, but the issue was complicated by the applicable case law. The court observed:

“[T]his was easy, * * * this was not because [Officer Bland] * * * saw a traffic violation, this was not because he thought that [the defendant] was somebody who was wanted. This was really simple. He was looking for Pearlene Chattic and he clearly can see this is not Pearlene Chattic. And I commend him for not trying to sugar coat that at all * * * because he just said, * * * I could tell right away it wasn't her.

* * * [O]nce he makes that determination on a very simple reason for the stop, I think going anywhere further with that, without further explanation to an individual who * * * clearly had to believe that he was not free to leave, I think that's going one step [beyond].”

After the trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider, the State appealed pursuant to Rule 604. Ill. S.Ct. R. 604 (eff. July 1, 2006).

¶ 9 The appellate court affirmed. 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162. The court initially noted the parties did not dispute that the purpose of the stop—determining whether the driver of the van was Chattic—was initially lawful, but only that the request for the defendant's license after that purpose dissipated violated the fourth amendment. Id. ¶ 11. The appellate court stated, “Although it may be common protocol for police to request a person's driver's license anytime a motorist has been lawfully stopped, that request must be analyzed through the lens of constitutional reasonableness, mindful that a lawful seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time needed to complete the stop.” Id. ¶ 12 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), and People v. Harris, 228 Ill.2d 222, 319 Ill.Dec. 823, 886 N.E.2d 947 (2008)). The court continued, “Except where there is articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or the vehicle is unregistered, or that either the motorist or vehicle is in violation of the law, stopping and detaining a motorist in order to check his credentials is unreasonable under the fourth amendment.” 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, ¶ 12, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). Here, as

[6 N.E.3d 729]

soon as Officer Bland determined that Chattic was not the driver of the van, any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity vanished, and seizure became unlawful because there was no longer a fourth amendment justification for the stop. 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, ¶ 13, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162. The appellate court discussed People v. Bradley, 292 Ill.App.3d 208, 226 Ill.Dec. 323, 685 N.E.2d 426 (1997), upon which the State relied, and concluded it was wrongly decided. 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, ¶ 14, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162.

¶ 10 Justice Wright dissented. Justice Wright insisted that a police officer may approach a driver to explain the basis for a traffic stop and to request the driver's license, even after reasonable suspicion has dissipated. Id. ¶ 24 (Wright, P.J., dissenting) (citing People v. Hernandez, 2012 IL App (2d) 110266, ¶ 5, 362 Ill.Dec. 45, 972 N.E.2d 760, citing Bradley, 292 Ill.App.3d at 211, 226 Ill.Dec. 323, 685 N.E.2d 426). Justice Wright reasoned that Officer Bland was justified in detaining the defendant very briefly to insure he had a valid license and could lawfully drive away. 2013 IL App (3d) 120128, ¶ 24, 368 Ill.Dec. 692, 984 N.E.2d 1162 (Wright, P.J., dissenting). According to Justice Wright, Bland did not unduly prolong the stop by quickly asking the defendant to identify himself. Id. ¶ 25 (citing People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill.App.3d 707, 714, 233 Ill.Dec. 928, 701 N.E.2d 1202 (1998)).

¶ 11 We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). A trial court's fact findings should be reviewed only for clear error, and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. But where, as here, those facts are not disputed, the trial court's ultimate ruling that suppression was warranted should be reviewed de novo. Id.

¶ 14 The legal principles that guide our analysis in this case are familiar and well-established. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the States under the fourteenth amendment, protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV; Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. That amendment safeguards individuals from arbitrary government action, and generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause. People v. Jones, 215 Ill.2d 261, 269, 294 Ill.Dec. 129, 830 N.E.2d 541 (2005) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)).

¶ 15 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement in cases involving diminished expectations of privacy or minimal intrusions on privacy, where a warrantless search or seizure may be reasonable. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001). Such cases include...