People v. Safunwa

Decision Date20 October 1998
Docket NumberNo. 3-97-0745,3-97-0745
Parties, 233 Ill.Dec. 928 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Albert SAFUNWA, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Frederick F. Cohn, Chicago, for Albert Safunwa.

Joseph E. Birkett, Du Page County State's Atty., Wheaton, and Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, and Cynthia N. Schneider, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Presiding Justice GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Albert Safunwa, was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 1996)) and sentenced to 24 months' probation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress the drug evidence that formed the basis of his conviction. At the suppression hearing, Officer Matthew Block of the United States Marshal Service testified that, on September 30, 1996, he and his partner were in search of a fugitive named Kenny Ladipo. Ladipo was wanted on a federal warrant for the distribution of heroin. In an attempt to locate Ladipo, Block and his partner were conducting surveillance at the home of Ladipo's wife in Melrose Park. Although Block had never seen Ladipo before, he did have a photograph of the fugitive.

During surveillance, Block observed a white BMW parked in the home's driveway with an individual sitting inside. A short time later, another vehicle arrived at the house. At this time, the drivers of both vehicles exited the cars and walked to the rear of the house. After 15 to 20 minutes, the driver of the BMW returned to his car and pulled out of the driveway.

Block and his partner decided to follow the B.M.W. because its driver matched the approximate height, weight, and age descriptions of Ladipo. In actuality, however, the vehicle was not being driven by Ladipo, but by the defendant, Albert Safunwa. They followed the vehicle for approximately half an hour. At one point, they were able to pull up next to the B.M.W. at a red light and get a closer look at the driver. Based upon this observation, Block believed that the driver matched the photograph of Ladipo. Specifically, Block noted that both individuals had the same type of mustache and the same hairstyle. As Block continued to follow the B.M.W., he ran a check on the vehicle's license plates and discovered that it was registered to the defendant.

Block testified that he and his partner proceeded to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in Lombard. At the time they stopped the vehicle, Block acknowledged that he did not have a search warrant for the vehicle or an arrest warrant for the defendant. Block also acknowledged that he had not observed the vehicle commit any traffic violations prior to the stop. After stopping the vehicle, Block asked the defendant for his driver's license and the defendant handed him a traffic citation bearing his name.

At that point, Block conducted a computer search to verify the defendant's identity and to see if the license was valid. This computer search took approximately 30 seconds. The search revealed that the defendant's license had been suspended. Block acknowledged that, at the time he ran the computer check, he did not suspect that the defendant was driving on an invalid license or that the defendant had committed any other crime. Block also was unable to indicate in what manner the license check would have given him any further information in determining whether the defendant was in fact Ladipo.

Block subsequently arrested the defendant for driving with a suspended license. Following his arrest, the defendant was taken to a local police station and searched. During the search, the police apparently discovered the drug evidence at issue.

On September 10, 1997, the trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court found that the officers had a reasonable basis for stopping the car, based on the similarity between the defendant's and Ladipo's appearance. Although the trial court noted that a close inspection of the photograph demonstrated that Ladipo and the defendant were different individuals, it nonetheless ruled that the police were justified in running a search on the defendant's license, commenting:

"[A]fter a valid contact between police and a citizen[,] a request for a drivers license and check on the license is allowable so long as it is of a momentary intrusion and of limited duration. Here the evidence shows that the detention and intrusion [were] quite minimal--some sixty to ninety seconds. The public interest in allowing the license check outweighs the minimal intrusion on the defendant[;] for this reason his motion is denied."

In so ruling, the trial court noted that section 6-112 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-112 (West 1996)) requires all drivers to be in immediate possession of their licenses and to display the license upon request from authorized personnel. The trial court noted that this statute would have no meaning if officers were not permitted to check the tendered license's validity.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the police obtained the drug evidence as a result of an illegal search and seizure. Specifically, the defendant argues that the officers had no basis to stop his vehicle because they had already determined that the vehicle was not registered to Ladipo and because the defendant was clearly not the person in the photograph. Additionally, the defendant argues that, once the marshals stopped the car and realized that he was not Ladipo, they had no right to hold him to check the validity of the license.

Ordinarily, a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Krueger, 175 Ill.2d 60, 64, 221 Ill.Dec. 409, 675 N.E.2d 604 (1996). The trial court's determination regarding factual matters, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the witnesses' testimony, is entitled to deference by a reviewing court. People v. Moore, 286 Ill.App.3d 649, 652, 221 Ill.Dec. 897, 676 N.E.2d 700 (1997). However, when there is no question of fact, we will review de novo the trial court's ultimate determination as to whether there existed reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and probable cause to conduct a search. People v. Branch, 295 Ill.App.3d 110, 112, 229 Ill.Dec. 625, 692 N.E.2d 398 (1998). In this case, the trial court made the specific finding that, upon a close inspection, the defendant did not resemble Ladipo's photograph. As there has been no showing that such a finding was erroneous, we will abide by this determination and will only concern ourselves with the pertinent legal questions. See Branch, 295 Ill.App.3d at 112, 229 Ill.Dec. 625, 692 N.E.2d 398.

Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6; People v. Fulton, 289 Ill.App.3d 970, 973, 225 Ill.Dec. 210, 683 N.E.2d 154 (1997). Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905-06 (1968), the fourth amendment permits minimally intrusive investigatory stops of people when there is a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See also 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 1996). The length and scope of the detention "must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S.Ct. at 1878, 20 L.Ed.2d at 904, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1652, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 794 (1967) (Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., concurs). The investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill.App.3d 159, 163, 208 Ill.Dec. 549, 649 N.E.2d 605 (1995).

We agree with the trial court that the initial stop of the defendant's vehicle was valid, as the officers had a reasonable belief that the defendant was Ladipo. The defendant matched the approximate height, weight, and age descriptions of Ladipo, and the officers observed him enter the home of Ladipo's wife. When Block pulled up alongside the defendant's vehicle at a traffic light, he also observed that the defendant had the same type of mustache and hairstyle as Ladipo. Based on such circumstances, we believe that the officers reasonably believed that the defendant was Ladipo and therefore had a justifiable basis to stop his car and request identification. Sufficient probability, rather than certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the fourth amendment. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110-11, 28 L.Ed.2d 484, 489-90 (1971) (when officers have probable cause to arrest one party and they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, then arrest of the second party is valid for purposes of fourth amendment search and seizure analysis).

However, as noted by the trial court, our analysis does not end here. We must also determine whether it was permissible for the officers to detain the defendant and run a check on his license even after he provided them with identification indicating that he was not Ladipo. As noted above, the trial court found that a close inspection of the photograph of Ladipo and the defendant would have shown that they were different individuals.

We note that, when a police officer stops a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, the officer may briefly detain the driver to request a valid driver's license and run a warrant check on the license. Branch, 295 Ill.App.3d at 113, 229 Ill.Dec. 625, 692 N.E.2d 398; Koutsakis, 272 Ill.App.3d at 163, 208 Ill.Dec. 549, 649 N.E.2d 605. In the instant case, however, Block acknowledged that the defendant had not committed any traffic...

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  • People v. Cummings
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 20, 2014
    ...did not unduly prolong the stop by quickly asking the defendant to identify himself. Id. ¶ 25 (citing People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill.App.3d 707, 714, 233 Ill.Dec. 928, 701 N.E.2d 1202 (1998)). ¶ 11 We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).¶ ......
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    ...whose appearance was found by the trial court to be "actually quite similar" to the passenger. In People v. Safunwa , 299 Ill. App. 3d 707, 710, 233 Ill.Dec. 928, 701 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 (1998), relied upon by both defendant and the State, albeit for different reasons, the Second District fou......
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    ...in his possession, Schmitt had a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify extending the stop. See People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill.App.3d 707, 713, 233 Ill.Dec. 928, 701 N.E.2d 1202 (1998) (holding that circumstances warranted the extension of a detention where the defendant did not produce a f......
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    ...the validity of the arrest is not affected by the mistake." Gwin, 49 Ill.2d at 258-59, 274 N.E.2d 43. In People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill.App.3d 707, 233 Ill.Dec. 928, 701 N.E.2d 1202 (1998), this court cited Hill with approval in the context of a traffic stop involving a mistake in identificatio......
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