People v. Curtis
| Citation | 112 N.E. 54,217 N.Y. 304 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. CURTIS. |
| Decision Date | 29 February 1916 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
Raymond J. Curtis was convicted in the county court of a violation of the Highway Law and such conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division (168 App. Div. 935,153 N. Y. Supp. 1132), which also affirmed a judgment of the county court overruling a demurrer to the indictment, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Claude B. Alverson, District Attorney, of Watertown, for respondent.
By the first count of the indictment the grand jury of Jefferson county accused the defendant of the crime of violating subdivision 3 of section 290 of the Highway Law of the state of New York, committed as follows: On October 11, 1913, at the city of Watertown,, in said county and state, the said Raymond J. Curtis wrongfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, while operating an automobile, through his own culpability, caused injury to the property and person of one Brainard W. Cole, and the said Raymond j. Curtis then and there well knowing that injury had been caused to such person and property with wrongful, unlawful, and felonious intent did leave the place of said injury without giving his name, address, or license number to the said Brainard W. Cole or to any other person at the scene of the injury, and wrongfully and unlawfully failed to report said injury to the nearest police station or judicial officer.
The second count of the indictment is in all respects like the first, except that it charges the injury to have been caused by accident.
[1] The demurrer attacked the indictment as insufficient because it omitted to state that the injury was caused or that the accident occurred on a public highway or on a public highway of any sort. A majority of the members of the court are of the opinion that this objection was not well taken or that the omission is not serious enough to warrant a reversal on that ground. Under these circumstances it does not seem worth while to discuss the alleged insufficiency of the indictment.
[2] The prosecution grew out of a collision between an automobile driven by the defendant and a milk wagon driven by Brainard W. Cole. All the witnesses who testified to the circumstances of the accident agree that it was caused by the skidding of the automobile. There were two other persons in the car with the defendant, Martin D. Gilligan and Charles W. H. Lytton. Immediately after the collision occurred the defendant stopped his automobile and Gilligan and Lytton went back to the scene of the accident. Gilligan testified that he ascertained that Cole had not been hurt, and upon returning to the automobile he so informed the defendant, adding that there was no need of remaining there. Lytton, on the other hand, swore that when he came back and got into the car he said: ‘That man is pretty badly hurt.’ He admitted, however, that he did not know whether the defendant heard him make this statementor not. The defendant himself testified that when Gilligan came back he told him that the man had been thrown from the wagon but was not hurt, and that no damage had been done at all. The defendant thereupon said to Gilligan: ‘Make mighty sure he isn't hurt.’ Gilligan then went back to the place where Cole was and almost immediately returned, saying that ‘the man was not hurt, but was merely mad and scared.’ The defendant positively denied that Lytton said anything to him when he got into the car or after he got in. ‘When I left the scene of the accident,’ he said,
This brief statement of the evidence serves to show that the case was a close one on the facts, and that its determination depended largely upon the knowledge which the defendant had as to the consequences of the collision. His position upon the trial was that having been assured by his companions that nothing serious had happened as the result of the collision, he did not regard it as an accident which it was his duty to report to the authorities under the statute. There was very little basis in the evidence for questioning the truthfulness of his statement to this effect except the testimony of Lytton, and, as has already been pointed out, Lytton would not swear that the defendant heard what he said to the effect that the man was pretty badly hurt.
It was essential to a conviction under either or both counts of the indictment that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt not only that an injury had been caused to ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Miller v. Trans Oil Co.
...State, 184 Wis. 651, 200 N.W. 394 (Sup.Ct.1924), criticized by 2 Wigmore, supra, § 382, n. 10, as 'unsound'; cf. People v. Curtis, 217 N.Y. 304, 112 N.E. 54, 56 (Ct.App.1916). On the second point--having in view especially that the accident happened quite soon after Hollyer saw the car--we ......
-
People v. Curtis
...App. Div. 935,153 N. Y. Supp. 1132), but reversed by this court for errors in the admission of evidence, and a new trial ordered (217 N. Y. 304, 112 N. E. 54, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 586). The second also resulted in a judgment of conviction, which was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Divisio......
-
People v. Magyar
...else, so he walked back to the scene. While there, he saw the policeman to whom he reported the accident. In People v. Curtis, 217 N.Y. 304, 307-308, 112 N.E. 54, 56, the Court 'It was essential to a conviction under either or both counts of the indictment that the jury should be satisfied ......
-
Commonwealth v. Murmi
...N. E. 362, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 682;State v. Verrill, 120 Me. 41, 112 Atl. 673;State v. Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl. 482;People v. Curtis, 217 N. Y. 304, 112 N. E. 54, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 586. As it could have been found that he knowingly collided with the girl and went away without complying wi......