People v. Dabbs

• Decision Date: 18 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 109698.,109698.
• Citation: 940 N.E.2d 1088,346 Ill.Dec. 484,239 Ill.2d 277
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,v.Gregory DABBS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

239 Ill.2d 277

940 N.E.2d 1088

346 Ill.Dec. 484

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Gregory DABBS, Appellant.

No. 109698.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 18, 2010.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Def., Johannah B. Weber, Deputy Def., Michelle A. Zalisko, Asst. Appellate Def., of Office of State Appellate Def., of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.Lisa Madigan, Atty. Gen., of Springfield and Stewart J. Umholtz, State's Atty., of Pekin (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor Gen., Michael M. Glick, Erica Seyburn, Asst. Attorneys Gen., of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

After a jury trial in the circuit court of Tazewell County, defendant Gregory Dabbs was convicted of domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(1) (West 2006)) against his girlfriend. At trial, his ex-wife was permitted to testify pursuant to section 115–7.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115–7.4 (West 2008)) that he had physically abused her. Defendant argued on appeal that section 115–7.4 of the Code is unconstitutional. His conviction was affirmed, with one justice dissenting. 396 Ill.App.3d 622, 335 Ill.Dec. 782, 919 N.E.2d 501. We granted leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (210 Ill.2d R. 315). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Amy DeWeese went to the police station on April 28, 2008, to report that she had been battered by defendant, who was then her boyfriend. The police officer who interviewed her testified that DeWeese reported defendant had battered and threatened to kill her several days earlier. She had not reported the incident sooner because he would not allow her to leave the house. The officer testified that she appeared “distraught, quite shaken up and nervous” and that she had a black eye and bruises on her arms.

The officer further testified that when he went to defendant's home, defendant admitted having an “argument” with DeWeese

[346 Ill.Dec. 488 , 940 N.E.2d 1092]

and stated that she became “hysterical,” requiring him to restrain her, which caused bruises on her arms. Defendant was arrested and charged with domestic battery and unlawful restraint.

Prior to trial, the State moved to admit evidence of a prior incident of domestic violence committed by defendant against his ex-wife, Katie Bailey, as permitted by section 115–7.4 of the Code. After a hearing, the trial court allowed the motion.

Defendant also filed a pretrial motion, seeking to bar DeWeese's testimony at trial on the basis that she suffered from a mental illness that rendered her incompetent to testify. The trial court ruled that DeWeese was competent to testify, but that she could be cross-examined regarding her mental illness.

At trial, DeWeese testified that she had moved in with defendant in February 2008, after having dated him for about three years. She acknowledged that she had been diagnosed with delusional disorder, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality disorder. She stated that her mental illness did not interfere with her ability to testify truthfully.

DeWeese testified that after she and defendant returned home after a trip to the video store on Saturday, April 26, 2008, she went to bed while he stayed up and drank beer. She estimated that he consumed an entire case of beer. After midnight, she was awakened by defendant sitting on her chest, with his knees pinning down her arms. He shouted at her and called her names and said that he wanted to kill her. He began to calm down and went to the kitchen to get her some water. When he returned, he became angry again and poured the water in her face. Then he dragged her by the hair into the bathroom, where he pushed her head into the toilet, hitting her head on the rim of the bowl. He told her he wanted to teach her a lesson. Eventually, he calmed down, and they talked.

On Sunday, DeWeese and defendant went to breakfast and then remained home together until that evening, when she went to her ex-husband's house to visit her children. She returned to the home she shared with defendant. On Monday, she went to work and to school before she went to the police station.

Katie Bailey testified that she had previously been married to defendant. Before their marriage, he once got very drunk and struck her repeatedly with a belt. She got away from him and drove to the police station. Defendant was arrested.

Defendant testified that he was “really drunk” when he repeatedly struck Bailey with a belt. With regard to the attack on DeWeese, he explained that she was mentally ill and frequently talked to people who were not there. She believed that her doctors had implanted a device in her brain and that they wanted to kill her. Defendant described her as “delusional.”

As for the events of April 26–27, defendant described returning from the video store and DeWeese's going to bed while he watched television and drank about six beers. The next morning, they went out for breakfast and came home. According to defendant, DeWeese returned from her visit to her ex-husband's house in tears, claiming that her ex-husband had hit her. She went directly to bed. The next day, defendant went to work as usual. When the officer came to question him, he admitted that he and DeWeese had argued about money on Saturday night. He denied telling the officer that he had restrained DeWeese to calm her.

The jury found defendant guilty of domestic battery and the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison.

[940 N.E.2d 1093 , 346 Ill.Dec. 489]

On appeal, defendant argued that section 115–7.4 of the Code is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The appellate court relied on our decision in People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 177, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003) (finding section 115–7.3 of the Code constitutional) to conclude that section 115–7.4 is constitutional. 396 Ill.App.3d 622, 335 Ill.Dec. 782, 919 N.E.2d 501.

ANALYSIS

As a common law rule of evidence in Illinois, it is well settled that evidence of other crimes is admissible if relevant for any purpose other than to show a defendant's propensity to commit crimes. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill.2d 127, 135–36, 291 Ill.Dec. 615, 824 N.E.2d 191 (2005). Such purposes include but are not limited to: motive ( People v. Moss, 205 Ill.2d 139, 156, 275 Ill.Dec. 444, 792 N.E.2d 1217 (2001) (evidence that defendant previously sexually assaulted child properly admitted to show his motive for murder of child and her mother)), intent ( Wilson, 214 Ill.2d at 141, 291 Ill.Dec. 615, 824 N.E.2d 191 (evidence that teacher previously touched other students in similar manner properly admitted to show intent in prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of students)), identity ( People v. Robinson, 167 Ill.2d 53, 65, 212 Ill.Dec. 256, 656 N.E.2d 1090 (1995) (evidence that defendant previously attacked other similar victims in similar manner properly admitted under theory of modus operandi to show identity of perpetrator in prosecution for armed robbery and armed violence)), and accident or absence of mistake ( Wilson, 214 Ill.2d at 141, 291 Ill.Dec. 615, 824 N.E.2d 191 (evidence that teacher previously touched other students in similar manner properly admitted to show lack of mistake in prosecution for aggravated criminal sexual abuse of students)).¹

Even if offered for a permissible purpose, such evidence will not be admitted if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Moss, 205 Ill.2d at 156, 275 Ill.Dec. 444, 792 N.E.2d 1217. The admissibility of other-crimes evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision on the matter will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Wilson, 214 Ill.2d at 136, 291 Ill.Dec. 615, 824 N.E.2d 191.

The rationale for this rule is not that a defendant's bad character, as evinced by other bad acts, is irrelevant when he is charged with a crime. Rather, the rule is grounded in the concern that such evidence proves too much. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 170, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). As a matter of jurisprudential policy, the rule expresses

[346 Ill.Dec. 490 , 940 N.E.2d 1094]

the concern that while “evidence of bad character would not be irrelevant, * * * particularly in the setting of the jury trial, the dangers of prejudice, confusion and time-consumption outweigh the probative value.” K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 752–53 (6th ed.2006).

The common law rule has been abrogated in part by the statute challenged by defendant. Section 115–7.4 of [239 Ill.2d 285] the Code, titled “Evidence in domestic violence cases,” provides:

“(a) In a criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.

(b) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(c) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown.

(d) In a criminal case in which evidence is offered under this Section, proof may be made by specific instances of conduct, testimony as to reputation, or testimony in the form of an expert opinion, except that the prosecution...