People v. Dacy

• Decision Date: 11 March 1970
• Docket Number: Cr. 16767
• Citation: 85 Cal.Rptr. 57,5 Cal.App.3d 216
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lee DACY, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 57

85 Cal.Rptr. 57

5 Cal.App.3d 216

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Robert Lee DACY, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 16767.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

March 11, 1970.

Joseph Amato (by appointment of the Court of Appeal), Santa Ana, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., William V. Ballough, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

FLEMING, Associate Justice.

By information Robert Lee Dacy was charged with kidnapping for ransom Mrs. Joanne Stalford (Count I) and her four-year-old son Stanley (Count II). (Pen.Code, § 209.) The information also charged that Stanley had been subjected to bodily harm, that defendant had been armed with a concealable deadly weapon, and that defendant had four prior felony convictions (three were admitted and one was subsequently dismissed).

The kidnapping began with the kidnapper's entry into the Stalfords' house under false pretenses, his movement of Mrs. Stalford at gun point into a walk-in closet, where she was left bound and gagged with tape, the disappearance of the kidnapper with young Stanley, and his demand for $250,000 ransom; and it ended with an abortive attempt to collect the ransom, a high-speed automobile chase by FBI agents, exchanges of gunfire, the ramming of the kidnapper's car, and the capture of the kidnapper and the rescue of young Stanley. Defendant was identified as the kidnapper by Mrs. Stalford, by the Stalford gardeners, and by the FBI agents who captured him. Defendant also fully confessed the kidnapping.

The jury found defendant guilty on both counts, and on Count II he was sentenced to life inprisonment without possibility of parole. Execution of sentence on Count I was stayed.

On appeal, defendant contends his confession should have been excluded from evidence because at the time he gave it he had been incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to silence and to counsel. Immediately after his capture defendant was taken to a hospital with a broken leg and facial cuts. En route to the hospital and twice after his arrival he was advised of his rights, and his replies indicated he fully understood them. He was questioned by FBI agents from 7:10 a.m. to 7:30 a.m., and questioning was then suspended so he could be treated by Dr. Robert Nelson, a hospital physician. Dr. Nelson gave defendant a Darvon tablet and a ten-milligram injection of morphine. (Darvon is an analgesic, non-narcotic pain reliever which may make the patient a little drowsy; ten milligrams of morphine is half a full therapeutic dose.) Questioning resumed at 8:00 a.m. and continued until 9:04 a.m. All witnesses, including Dr. Nelson, testified that after defendant had been treated he seemed calm, coherent, and lucid, and exhibited neither sluggishness nor euphoria. Defendant himself testified he was under the effects of sedation, but in view of the evidence that his dosage was mild and that he did not appear sedated, his testimony is insufficient to establish as a matter of law that he was incapable of intelligently waiving his rights. The mere fact of ministration of drugs does not establish an impairment of capacity so as to render a confession inadmissible. (People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 906, 59 Cal.Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869.)

Defendant concedes that the evidence of kidnapping was overwhelming. He contends, however, that the proof that Stanley suffered bodily harm during his kidnapping was legally insufficient, or if sufficient, so meager that three occurrences to which he refers could easily have prejudiced him on that issue.

To assess defendant's claims of prejudice we must first consider the sufficiency and weight of the evidence that Stanley suffered bodily harm as a consequence of the kidnapping. During his abduction Stanley received the following injuries--cuts on his arm and toe, superficial abrasions, facial bruises, and a four-inch knee laceration which required 20 surface stitches and a few deeper ones to close. These injuries were serious enough to constitute bodily harm within the meaning of section 209 of the Penal Code. Unlike the trivial injuries in People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 711, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365, and People v. Jackson, 44 Cal.2d 511, 282 P.2d 898, the injuries to Stanley involved breaks in the skin which required medical treatment. A laceration requiring multiple stitches must normally be deemed bodily harm.

Defendant contends, however, that regardless of whether Stanley suffered bodily harm, the harm was not shown to have been the proximate result of the kidnapping. Stanley most probably was injured as a result of the collision which occurred when a car driven by FBI agents rammed defendant's car after a chse which involved speeds up to 100 miles an hour and an exchange of gunfire on the city streets. The situation is comparable to that in People v. Reed, 270 A.C.A. 43, 54--56, 75 Cal.Rptr. 430, where the kidnapper pointed a gun at police officers who thereupon fired at the kidnapper and fatally wounded his victim. There, as here, injury to the victim was a reasonable foreseeable consequence of defendant's intentional acts. Given the extent and nature of Stanley's injuries and the manner by which they were brought about, inclding defendant's high-speed flight and his use of a firearm, we think the proof that Stanley suffered bodily harm as a result of the kidnapping cannot be characterized as meager.

With this in mind we take up defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by certain occurrences during his trial. Defendant first claims prejudice because of a newspaper article which appeared a few days before the date of his trial. After a jury had been selected, defendant brought the article to the attention of the trial judge and moved for a mistrial. Prior to the date of the article the judge had admonished...