People v. Dainty

• Decision Date: 22 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 4-97-0221,4-97-0221
• Citation: 233 Ill.Dec. 475,701 N.E.2d 118,299 Ill.App.3d 235
• Parties: , 233 Ill.Dec. 475 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lonnie C. DAINTY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 118

701 N.E.2d 118

299 Ill.App.3d 235, 233 Ill.Dec. 475

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lonnie C. DAINTY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-97-0221.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

Sept. 22, 1998.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Martin J. Ryan, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Lonnie C. Dainty.

John X. Breslin, Deputy Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, Edward Danner, State's Attorney, Lewistown, Edwin A. Parkinson, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Nancy Rink Carter, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Ottawa, for the People

Presiding Justice GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Lonnie C. Dainty, was convicted of armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1994)) and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that [Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted.] Public Act 88-680 (Pub.Act 88-680, eff. January 1, 1995) is unconstitutional because it violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d)).

FACTS

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On December 30, 1995, the defendant was charged by information with attempted murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 1994)), aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(a) (West 1994)), and armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 1994)). The information alleged that, on December 29, 1995, the defendant stabbed Steve Thornhill in the chest, head, back, and body with a knife with a blade of at least three inches in length.

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted.]

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PUBLIC ACT 88-680

We now address the defendant's argument that section 33A-3(a-5) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a-5) (West 1996)), which increased the minimum sentence for the offense of armed violence from 6 years to 10 years, is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. In support of his argument, the defendant contends that Public Act 88-680, in which the legislature enacted section 33A-3(a-5), violates the single subject rule of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, § 8(d)). The State urges us not to consider the defendant's constitutional challenge to Public Act 88-680 because this act has already been codified. See State v. Mabry, 460 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Iowa 1990). However, as noted above, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute can be raised at any time. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill.2d 448, 454, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221 (1989). We therefore turn to the merits of this issue.

1. Single Subject Rule

The single subject rule is a substantive requirement for the passage of bills and is therefore subject to judicial review. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 514, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). The rule exists to prevent the passage of legislation that, standing alone, could not muster the votes necessary for passage. People v. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d 34, 41, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376 (1998). The rule also serves to facilitate orderly legislative procedure. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 41, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376.

The term "subject" is comprehensive in scope and must be construed liberally. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 41, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376. So long as the provisions of a bill have a "natural and logical connection," the subject matter of that bill may be as broad as the legislature chooses. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 41, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376. The legislature violates the single subject rule only when it includes within a single bill incongruous and unrelated matters that by no fair intendment have any legitimate In Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago, 57 Ill.2d 193, 311 N.E.2d 116 (1974), our supreme court held that Public Act 77-1818 was unconstitutional because it violated the single subject rule. The act at issue in Fuehrmeyer purported to exclusively grant to the State the power to regulate certain professions and occupations listed in 30 separate acts, ranging from architects to funeral directors to water well contractors. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill.2d at 195, 311 N.E.2d 116. The supreme court held that this act violated the single subject rule because each of the 30 regulated professions and occupations was a separate subject. Fuehrmeyer, 57 Ill.2d at 203-05, 311 N.E.2d 116.

[233 Ill.Dec. 480] relation to each other. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 41, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376.

The supreme court recently revisited the issue of the single subject rule in Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill.2d 499, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372 (1997). At issue in Johnson was whether Public Act 89-428, which was entitled "An Act in relation to public safety," violated the single subject rule. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 503, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372. As enacted, Public Act 89-428 contained six articles and encompassed subjects including child sex offenders, employer eavesdropping, and environmental impact fees imposed on the sale of fuel. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 517, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372.

The supreme court determined that the act violated the single subject rule because the discordant provisions contained therein did not possess a natural and logical connection. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 517, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372. The court noted that the act amended a multitude of provisions in over 20 different acts and created several new laws. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 516-17, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372. In addition, the supreme court rejected the defendants' argument that the provisions of the act were confined to the single subject of public safety. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 517, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372. The court noted that, if it were to conclude that the discordant provisions contained in the act were related under the subject of public safety, it would be eliminating the single subject rule as a meaningful check on the legislature's actions. Johnson, 176 Ill.2d at 517-18, 224 Ill.Dec. 1, 680 N.E.2d 1372.

Similarly, in People v. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d 34, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376 (1998), this court found that Public Act 89-404 violated the single subject rule. In its enacted form, Public Act 89-404 contained 10 sections covering subjects such as the removal of the homestead exemption from property subject to certain civil forfeiture; the burden of proof for a criminal defendant asserting the insanity defense; truth-in-sentencing legislation; and new procedures for the perfection and attachment of hospital liens. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 42, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376. The State in Reedy argued that the act embraced the single subject of governmental matters. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 43, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376. However, after reviewing the act, this court found the alleged "subject" to be too broad to satisfy the Illinois Constitution's mandates. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 43, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376. We were unable to identify the natural and logical connection uniting civil forfeiture, criminal sentencing, and hospital liens and therefore held that the act violated the single subject rule. Reedy, 295 Ill.App.3d at 42, 229 Ill.Dec. 603, 692 N.E.2d 376.

2. Public Act 88-680

Turning to the instant case, Public Act 88-680 was introduced as Senate Bill 1153 on January 12, 1994. Entitled "A Bill for an Act to amend the Criminal Code of 1961," Senate Bill 1153 originally amended the Criminal Code to require a trial court to impose a sentence of community service on any person convicted of or placed on supervision for assault, criminal damage to property, certain weapons violations, mob action, or disorderly conduct. On April 13, 1994, the Senate amended the bill to provide that, if imprisonment is imposed upon a defendant convicted of or placed on supervision for the aforementioned crimes, a community service sentence was not required. On April 14, 1994, the Senate passed the bill as amended.

When Senate Bill 1153 reached the House of Representatives, amendment 13 was placed on the bill. Amendment 13, entitled the "Safe Neighborhoods Bill," addressed a The Senate and the House could not agree on which provisions of Amendment 13 should stand. As a result, a conference committee was formed. In its final form, the bill was entitled the "Safe Neighborhoods Law," and it covered a wide array of subjects contained in 9 articles and 161 pages.

[233 Ill.Dec. 481] different array of subjects including gun trafficking, exploitation of children, and enhanced penalties for (1) providing alcohol to minors; (2) the assault of a police officer; and (3) drive-by shootings. With this amendment, the House of Representatives passed Senate Bill 1153, and the bill was sent back to the Senate.

Specifically, article 5 of the act, entitled "Juvenile Justice," amended the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) to (1) expand the types of offenses for which a minor can be tried as an adult; (2) extend the time period that the State can continue adjudicatory hearings; (3) require imprisonment for minors adjudicated delinquent for first degree murder; and (4) extend the automatic termination date of wardship proceedings for minors.

Article 15, entitled "Gangs," amended the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) to increase the penalties for the offense of intimidation. Article 15 also amended the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) to allow extended-term sentences for defendants who commit felonies in furtherance of an organized gang and to require that defendants sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or supervision for a gang related crime perform community service.

Article 20, entitled "Alcohol Abuse," amended the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 1992)) to provide...