People v. Daniel

• Decision Date: 16 February 1959
• Docket Number: Cr. 65379
• Citation: 168 Cal.App.2d Supp. 788,337 P.2d 247
• Court: California Superior Court
• Parties: 168 Cal.App.2d Supp. 788 PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. August Lee DANIEL, Defendant and Respondent. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Stanislaus County, California

Page 247

337 P.2d 247

168 Cal.App.2d Supp. 788

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. August Lee DANIEL, Defendant and Respondent.

Cr. 65379.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, Stanislaus County, California.

Feb. 16, 1959.

Frank S. Pierson, Dist. Atty., and Deputy Dist. Atty., Gerald R. Douglas, Modesto, for appellants and People.

George Mellis (of Mellis & Stockton), Modesto, for respondent and defendant.

CHAMBERLAIN, Judge.

The defendant August Lee Daniel hereafter called the defendant, was charged with being a 'common drunkard' in violation of Subdivision 11 of Section 647 of the California Penal Code, known as the vagrancy Statute.

He has never been arraigned. His counsel moved the court to dismiss the action upon the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction of the matter, and that the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional. The court dismissed the action, and filed a written opinion stating that he found the statute in question unconstitutional and in violation of due process of law. From that decision the People have appealed to this court pursuant to the authority of Subdivision 1(a) of Section 1466 of the Penal Code. If we should find the trial court to have been in error, the proper proceeding is to reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 70 P.2d 281; People v. Smith, 133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 777, 284 P.2d 203; People v. Sevel, 120 Cal.App.2d Supp. 907, 261 P.2d 359; People v. Garner, 120 Cal.App.2d Supp. 923, 264 P.2d 672.

The question presented for our determination is whether or not Subd. 11 of Sec. 647 Penal Code, defining Vagrancy, is so uncertain, indefinite, or ambiguous as to violate the due process provisions of the United States Constitution as set forth in the 14th amendment, or of course, similar provisions in the Constitution of the State of California, Art. 1, § 13. Subd. 11 of said section declares that every 'common drunkard' is a vagrant.

The matter has been exhaustively briefed by both parties, and so many authorities have been cited that the task of even coordinating them has been Herculean. They range in time from the delivery of the Commandments and Laws to his people by Moses as related in Deuteronomy, wherein he advises his people to take the stubborn and rebellious son without the walls of the city and stone him to death as a glutton and a drunkard (emphasis added) so that they shall purge the evil from their midst, and all Israel should hear and fear. They cover the entire English speaking world from the ancient common law to the present date. It would be tedious, and in our opinion, unnecessary to here attempt any detailed discussion of these authorities, but from them we have selected a number which should be sufficient for the determination of this question. These we will shortly cite. But we desire first to state that we realize our Appellate jurisdiction has limitations, both in territory and in authority, and that we offer our opinion and conclusion largely for whatever assistance it may be to other or higher jurisdictions in which the same or a similar question may be presented and because we consider the question to be of general and widespread interest.

First, we will refer to the learned discussion of the broad aspects of this problem in 62 Harvard Law Review page 76 published in 1949. The authorities cited there are almost exclusively decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The guilding principles stated are sound and have been followed by practically all of the cases cited from American jurisdictions, including those from California which we will hereafter mention. For brevity we will not attempt to analyze the article here, but it is recommended as basic reading. The phrase 'common drunkard' is not mentioned therein.

We will next refer to an article entitled 'Who is a Vagrant in California?' in 23 California Law Review page 506, published in 1935, which we also recommend to the reader. This article, as its title indicates, deals with the vagrancy statute of the State of California, particularly with reference to the element of uncertainty and ambiguity of the provisions of subdivisions 1, 3, 5, and 6 of Sec. 647, but offers no criticism of Subd. 11 relating to 'common drunkards', which is the subject of the present inquiry.

That article was answered by Judge Alden Ames of the San Francisco Municipal Court in an article at page 616 of the same Volume 23 California Law Review. He calls attention to the useful function which the vagrancy statute has performed in this State, even though it may have been at times subject to some abuse, and states at the end of his article, that he would personally recommend and support any proposals or suggestions which would meet the difficulties mentioned in the article which he answers, provided that the fundamental purposes and objects of the statute, which he endeavored to point out, would still remain. Again there is no mention of Subd. 11.

We will next refer to an article on vagrancy in Volume 39 California Law Review page 579 published in 1951. The author deals partly with the single offense theory, and also to some extent with some evidentiary problems, but does not mention Subdivision 11 of that Section. He concludes with the following suggestion or recommendation, to wit: 'The courts, while continuing to clarify the statute should strive to follow a philosophy and interpretation that will keep the use of this statute in the penumbra between abusive disregard of personal rights and the practical needs of police agencies in protecting society.'

We will now cite a number of California cases which set forth rules to be following in the determination of the question before us. These cases and some others we will later discuss in a little more detail. The cases are: Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 216 P.2d 859; People v. Deibert, 117 Cal.App.2d 410, 256 P.2d 355. People v. Ring, 26 Cal.App.2d Supp. 768, 70 P.2d 281; People v. Smith, 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 92 P.2d 1039; People v. De Leon, 35 Cal.App. 467, 170 P. 173; People v. Nunn, 46 Cal.2d 460, 296 P.2d 813. By examination and correlation of these articles and cases we believe that the rules to be applied can be quite fully and correctly stated.

The basic or fundamental requirement of a statute is that it should be sufficiently definite to: 1. Guide the individual in planning his own future conduct: 2. And guide (the court and counsel) in the adjudication of rights and duties. 62 Harv.Law Rev. p. 77; Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 216 P.2d 859.

To show the matters which should be considered in determining the sufficiency in a particular case, we will cite and quote from the California decisions mentioned above and some others. In quoting, we will, for brevity, omit citations.

In Lorenson v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 49, 216 P.2d 859, 865, (a leading case) defendant and others were charged with and convicted of conspiracy to commit certain named crimes and 'to prevert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.' Defendant claimed the quoted part of the charge was void for uncertainty and ambiguity. In denying the claim, the Court said, 'To comply with the constitutional requirement of due process of law, the crime for which a defendant is being prosecuted must be clearly defined, but it is only necessary that the words used in the statute be well enough known to enable those persons within its reach to understand and correctly apply them. 'To make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements, it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.' * * * Although higher standards of certainty will be required of penal than of civil statutes, * * * a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, 'notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ.' * * * For example, the courts have upheld statutes employing such terms as: 'to make diligent effort to find the owner', * * * 'unreasonable speed', * * * 'unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering' * * * 'practice law,' * * * and 'to the annoyance of any other person'. Considering the well-settled meaning at common law of the words 'to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws', the other and more specific provisions in the Penal Code concerning 'Crimes Against Public Justice', and the relative certainty of words employed in statutes which have been held valid, it cannot be said that subsection 5 of section 182 of the Penal Code is unconstitutional. For substantially the same reasons the indictment against Lorenson is not vague, indefinite, or uncertain and it complies with the statutory requirement for such an accusation. Section 952 of the Penal Code allows an indictment to be stated 'in the words of the enactment describing the offense or declaring the matter to be a public offense, or in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused.' Lorenson was indicted in the terms of the 'enactment describing the offense', and the grand jury had fairly informed him of the acts of which he is accused to the extent which will enable him to defend himself.'

There was a dissenting opinion solely on ground of insufficiency of the evidence.

People v. Deibert, 117 Cal.App.2d 410, 256 P.2d 355, 359, cites and follows the Lorenson case. The charge was contributing. The Court said: 'Defendants attack the constitutionality of section 702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code as applied in the instant case, asserting that it is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to form the basis of a criminal charge and hence invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. They contend...