People v. Daniels

Decision Date12 January 2017
Docket NumberH043202
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTHE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ZACHARY MICHAEL DANIELS, Defendant and Appellant.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F24634)

In 2013, defendant Zachary Michael Daniels entered two different Safeway grocery stores and used a stolen credit card to make purchases. He pleaded guilty to two counts of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)1 and was ordered to serve two concurrent 16-month jail sentences. After he completed his sentences, he petitioned the trial court to have his two burglary convictions reduced to misdemeanor violations of shoplifting (§ 459.5) under Proposition 47. The trial court denied his petition, finding he had entered the Safeway stores with the intent to fraudulently use a credit card or commit identity theft, which did not render him eligible for relief under Proposition 47. Defendant appealed.

For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's order. Entering a commercial establishment with the intent to use a stolen credit card to purchase merchandise worth less than $950 constitutes misdemeanor shoplifting under section 459.5.

BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2013, the Santa Cruz County District Attorney's Office filed a complaint charging defendant with a count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)) and three counts of second degree burglary (§ 459).

On May 10, 2013, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. Defendant stipulated to the following as the factual basis of his plea: "[O]n Count 2, on or about or between March 29th, 2013 and March 30th, 2013, in the county of Santa Cruz, the defendant did unlawfully enter the building of Safeway at 117 Morrissey, with the intent to commit a theft or a felony. [¶] And as to Count 3, on or between March 29th, 2013 and March 30th, 2013, in the county of Santa Cruz, he did unlawfully enter the building of Safeway at 2111 Mission Street, with the intent to commit a theft or a felony." The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of 16 months in jail and dismissed the remaining counts.

On November 12, 2015, defendant filed a petition seeking to have his two felony burglary convictions redesignated as misdemeanors under section 1170.18, subdivisions (f) and (g). Defendant's petition indicated he had completed serving his sentences. The People objected to defendant's petition, arguing he had not met his burden to prove that the amount of merchandise he took or attempted to take during the burglaries was less than $950.

Defendant filed a memorandum in support of his petition, arguing his two burglary convictions should be redesignated as misdemeanor violations of shoplifting under section 459.5. Defendant claimed that "[a]ccording to the police reports in this case (Santa Cruz Police Department case number 13S-02603), defendant entered each store during daytime business hours, while the stores were open for business and attempted to use a stolen credit card to make a purchase. The attempt in count two was unsuccessful and no theft occurred. The attempt in count three resulted in a theft of $126.51."

On January 26, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's petition. Instead of arguing that defendant failed to meet his burden to prove he took or attempted to take merchandise worth less than $950 for each of the two burglaries, the People urged the court to deny the petition because defendant had used a fraudulent credit card to commit the thefts. Therefore, the People insisted defendant had not committed larceny but had committed identity theft. Agreeing with the People, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that entering a commercial establishment and fraudulently using a credit card to make purchases was not shoplifting under section 459.5. Defendant appealed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the trial court erred when it denied his petition to redesignate his felony convictions as misdemeanors on the basis that he entered the Safeway stores with the intent to fraudulently use a credit card. We agree and reverse the trial court's denial of his petition.

1. Statutory Framework

In November 2014, the voters passed Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. Proposition 47 reduced certain nonviolent drug and theft offenses to misdemeanors. It also added section 459.5, which provides: "(a) Notwithstanding Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary . . . . [¶] (b) Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property."

Proposition 47 also enacted section 1170.18. Under section 1170.18, subdivision (f), defendants who have already completed their sentences for felonyconvictions who would have been guilty of misdemeanors had Proposition 47 been in effect at the time of their offenses may petition the trial court to have their convictions redesignated as misdemeanors. Under section 1170.18, subdivision (g), if the defendants satisfy the criteria set forth under subdivision (f), the trial court shall designate their felony convictions as misdemeanors.

2. Defendant's Eligibility Under Proposition 47

Defendant committed the two burglaries when he entered two Safeway stores and attempted to make and successfully made purchases using a stolen credit card. Defendant argues both offenses satisfy the statutory definition of shoplifting set forth under section 459.5, because he entered the stores with the intent to commit the crime of larceny, which includes theft by false pretenses. The People disagree, arguing the trial court correctly decided that since defendant entered the Safeway stores with the intent to fraudulently use the stolen credit card, he essentially committed identity theft (§ 530.5) and is ineligible for Proposition 47 relief.

To resolve these arguments, we must interpret the terms of the voter initiative. In doing so, "we apply the same principles that govern statutory construction." (People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 685.) "[O]ur primary purpose is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the voters who passed the initiative measure." (In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122, 130.) " 'In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation.] At the same time, 'we do not consider . . . statutory language in isolation.' [Citation.] Instead, we 'examine the entire substance of the statute in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its various parts.' [Citation.] Moreover, we ' "read every statute 'with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the wholemay be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' " ' " (State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043.)

The claims made by defendant here are nearly identical to the ones advanced by the defendant in this court's recent decision in People v. Garrett (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 82 (review granted Aug. 24, 2016, S236012) (Garrett).2 Garrett is factually similar. There, the defendant entered a convenience store with a stolen credit card and attempted to purchase gift cards valued at $50. (Id. at p. 84.) The defendant pleaded no contest to burglary (§ 459). He later petitioned to be resentenced under Proposition 47, but his petition was denied after the trial court determined he had entered the convenience store with the intent to commit identity theft (§ 530.5). (Garrett, supra, at p. 84.) This court reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's petition for resentencing after analyzing the statutory language of sections 459.5, 490a, and 484. We found the defendant's conduct constituted theft by false pretenses. Therefore, the defendant entered the stores with the intent to commit larceny and his conviction was eligible for redesignation as shoplifting under section 459.5. (Garrett, supra, at p. 89.) As we explain below, we find Garrett's analysis of sections 459.5, 490a, and 484 to be persuasive.

First, we reject the People's argument that defendant is presumptively ineligible for Proposition 47 relief because he entered the Safeway stores with the intent tofraudulently use a stolen credit card or to commit identity theft.3 Section 459.5 mandates that notwithstanding section 459, a person who enters a store during regular business hours with the intent to commit "larceny" shall be punished as a misdemeanant if the value of the goods intended to be taken or taken is less than $950. Subdivision (b) of section 459.5 then specifically states that any act defined as shoplifting "shall be charged as shoplifting" (italics added) and may not be charged as burglary or theft of the same property. Assuming for the sake of argument that defendant did enter the Safeway stores with the intent to commit identity theft, this intent did not negate or override his intent to purchase items from the store using the stolen credit card. A defendant can have multiple criminal intents. Section 459.5 does not require a defendant to...

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