People v. Davis
Decision Date | 17 June 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 54790,54790 |
Citation | 97 Ill.2d 1,72 Ill. Dec. 272,452 N.E.2d 525 |
Parties | , 72 Ill.Dec. 272 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Girvies DAVIS, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Randy E. Blue, Deputy State Appellate Defender, John W. McGuire, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Fifth Judicial Dist., Mount Vernon, for appellant.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., State of Ill., Michael B. Weinstein, Darrell Panethiere, James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for appellee.
Defendant, Girvies Davis, and a codefendant, Richard Holman, were charged by information with the offense of murder in violation of section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1). Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Madison County, defendant was found guilty. Holman, who was tried by a jury in a joint proceeding with defendant, was also found guilty of murder. (Because he was under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment.) At defendant's separate bifurcated sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously determined that the necessary aggravating factors existed, and that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. The jury returned a verdict directing that defendant be sentenced to death, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant's post-trial motions were denied, and he brings a direct appeal to this court (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, sec. 4(b); 73 Ill.2d R. 603), alleging numerous errors at all stages of the proceedings.
The evidence produced at trial indicates that on Friday, July 13, 1979, the victim, 83-year-old Esther Sepmeyer, was shot to death in her home located off Route 162 in Madison County. Rodney Sepmeyer, the grandson of the deceased, testified that he discovered the victim's body, in her bedroom, at approximately 1:50 p.m. She was found in a "kneeling" position in front of her bed.
The witness identified a lawnmower and a replica antique radio as two items which were taken from the victim's home. He stated that the radio was kept in her bedroom, and the lawnmower was located in a spare bedroom. Both of these items had been recovered from defendant's home pursuant to a search warrant.
Sepmeyer further stated that a stereo, color television set, and his .22-caliber semi-automatic rifle were stolen from the home. The rifle was kept in the back of a metal cabinet in the bedroom. Latent fingerprints recovered from the cabinet, and from a hand mirror found in the home, were identified as belonging to Holman. No fingerprints were discovered which matched those of the defendant.
The State also introduced into evidence a statement defendant allegedly made to a police officer, in which he indicated his complicity in the Sepmeyer murder. The statement, with certain grammatical changes made for purposes of comprehension, reads as follows:
Additional evidence introduced by the State tended to corroborate defendant's statement in a number of particulars. For example, at defendant's direction, a police officer drew a sketch which accurately depicted the interior of the Sepmeyer residence. Defendant was aware of the items which were taken, and the location of those items in the home. He knew that the victim was an elderly woman and that she was shot in her bedroom. Further, a statement given by Holman verified certain details mentioned in defendant's statement.
Defendant called as a witness Dennis Kuba, a special agent with the Illinois Division of Criminal Investigation. He testified that Lawrence and Harris, two men with whom defendant shared a cellblock, were convicted of another crime to which defendant confessed. The theory of the defense was that defendant merely heard about the Sepmeyer murder from his cellmates and, for some reason, confessed to being one of the perpetrators.
Eric McCray, a friend of defendant, identified the lawnmower and radio taken from the Sepmeyer residence. He stated that, while he was at defendant's home, defendant bought these items from his cousin.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He essentially stated that he never made the statement regarding the Sepmeyer murder, but that he signed a number of documents because he was threatened by the police. He also indicated that he confessed to being a perpetrator of the crime for which Lawrence and Harris were convicted because they "made threats" on his life.
Since no question is raised as to a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, further facts will be recited only where necessary to a disposition of the issues.
Defendant first contends that he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial in violation of section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 103-5(a)). This section provides, in relevant part:
"Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant * * *."
On January 18, 1980, and for some time prior thereto, defendant was in custody in the St. Clair County jail awaiting trial and sentencing on certain pending murder charges. On that date, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the sheriff of St. Clair County brought defendant to Madison County, where he was served with an arrest warrant for the instant offense. That same day defendant was arraigned, a preliminary hearing was held, and an attorney was appointed to represent him. A demand for a speedy trial was filed, and the trial date was set for March 3, 1980. Defendant was then returned to St. Clair County.
For reasons not revealed in the record, the trial was rescheduled for April 29, 1980. Defendant appeared, in the custody of the St. Clair County sheriff, again pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. He indicated that he was ready for trial, but the State refused to proceed. Defendant was returned to St. Clair County. The prosecutor subsequently informed the judge that he would not prosecute defendant until the trials in St. Clair County were completed.
On December 5, 1980, proceedings on the final pending charge in that county were concluded, and defendant was transferred to Menard Correctional Center. A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was issued, directing the warden at Menard to bring defendant to Madison County for trial on March 9, 1981. Pretrial...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Romano v. Oklahoma
...may consider their own decision considerably less significant than they otherwise would.' "), quoting People v. Davis, 97 Ill.2d 1, 26, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 284, 452 N.E.2d 525, 537 (1983); West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1052-1053 (Miss.1985) ("[I]f the jury knows that the [defendant] is alread......
-
People v. Simms
...ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)). Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant's death sentence must be vacated. See People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill.2d 1, 27, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 452 N.E.2d 525; cf. United States v. Alexander (4th Cir.1984), 748 F.2d 185, 189-90 (extrinsic factors in the record made it c......
-
People v. Montanez, 1-93-4519
...not be disturbed unless it can be said that it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." (People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill.2d 1, 20, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 281, 452 N.E.2d 525, 534.) This standard of review applies to a trial court's ruling concerning the admissibility of a juvenile's co......
-
People v. Hawkins, 1-89-2699
...witnesses over those of the defendant. Questions of credibility are to be resolved by the trier of fact. (People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill.2d 1, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 452 N.E.2d 525; People v. Davis (1983), 95 Ill.2d 1, 69 Ill.Dec. 136, 447 N.E.2d 353.) As a reviewing court, we will not substitute......