People v. Davis

Decision Date19 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. S014636,S014636
Citation896 P.2d 119,41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826,10 Cal.4th 463
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 896 P.2d 119 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Larry David DAVIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Mark D. Greenberg, Berkeley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, William T. Harter, Susan Lee Frierson, Robert M. Snider, Elaine F. Tumonis and Sonja K. Berndt, Deputy Attorneys General, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Associate Justice.

This is an automatic appeal (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law (id., § 190 et seq.).

On April 28, 1989, the District Attorney of Ventura County filed an amended information against defendant Larry David Davis in the superior court of that county.

Count I charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant murdered Dawn Michelle Holman. (Pen.Code, § 187.) It was alleged for death eligibility that he did so under the special circumstances of (1) felony-murder kidnapping (id., §§ 207 & 209 [kidnapping for ransom/robbery] ); (2) felony-murder sodomy (id., § 286, subd. (c)); and (3) felony-murder rape (id., § 261). (Id., § 190.2, subds. (a)(17)(i), (ii), & (iv).)

Count II charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant committed forcible sodomy on Holman (Pen.Code, § 286, subd. (c).)

Count III charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant kidnapped Holman. (Pen.Code, § 207, subd. (a).)

Count IV charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant committed sexual battery on Suzanne H. (Pen.Code, § 243.4.)

Count V charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant assaulted Holman with intent to commit rape and/or sodomy. (Pen.Code, §§ 220, 261, subd. (2), & 286.)

Count VI charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant assaulted Suzanne H. with intent to commit rape and/or sodomy. (Pen.Code, §§ 220, 261, subd. (2), & 286.)

Count VII charged that, on or about August 28, 1988, defendant attempted to rape Holman. (Pen.Code, §§ 664 & 261.)

Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges and denied the allegations. He subsequently moved to set aside the information under Penal Code section 995. The trial court dismissed the count charging the attempted rape of Holman; it struck the reference to rape in the count charging assault of Holman with attempt to commit rape and/or sodomy and the special circumstance of felony-murder rape. The trial court subsequently struck the reference to section 209 in special circumstance No. 2.

Trial was by jury. The panel returned a verdict finding defendant guilty as charged of the murder of Holman and fixed the degree at the first. It found true the accompanying allegations of the felony-murder special circumstances of felony-murder sodomy and felony-murder kidnapping. It also returned verdicts and findings to the effect that he kidnapped her, assaulted her with intent to commit sodomy, and attempted to sodomize her. It returned verdicts and findings to the effect that he assaulted Suzanne H. with intent to commit rape and/or sodomy and sexually battered her. It fixed the punishment for the murder at death. The trial court denied defendant's motions for a new trial and to reduce penalty (Pen.Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)). It proceeded to enter judgment as follows.

For the murder of Holman, it imposed the sentence of death. It imposed a term of four years, consecutive to the sentence for murder, for assault with intent to rape or sodomize Suzanne H. For the sexual battery of Suzanne H., it imposed the middle term of three years. For attempted sodomy of Holman, it imposed the middle term of three years; for kidnap of Holman, it imposed the upper term of six years; for assault with intent to sodomize Holman, it imposed the upper term of six years. It stayed sentence of imprisonment temporarily, pending execution of the sentence of death, and permanently thereafter. (Pen.Code, § 654.)

As we shall explain, the judgment should be affirmed.

I. FACTS
A. Guilt Phase

The People introduced evidence to the following effect.

On the night of August 26, 1988, Suzanne H. met defendant at a bar and grill in Ventura. She initiated a conversation when she warned him that he was about to be burned by a cigarette in the crowded bar. She told him where she worked and mentioned that her birthday was the next day. Defendant suggested they have dinner the following evening. She arranged for him to stop by after she got off work at a restaurant, about 11:00 p.m. She had previously made plans to visit a friend, Sandy Camp, the same evening.

Defendant arrived at the restaurant at 7:00 p.m. the next night. Suzanne H. asked him to leave and return later, because the restaurant was busy. He returned at 9:00 p.m. and waited for her. At 11:00 p.m., they left in her car. She drove; defendant left his truck in the restaurant parking lot.

Defendant and Suzanne H. picked up Camp and went to a bar and restaurant where they had drinks. They then went to another restaurant. Suzanne H. and Camp did most of the talking; defendant appeared "distant" and "nonsocial." About 12:30 a.m., Suzanne H. said she wanted to leave because she had to make preparations for her relocation to New York in two days. She dropped Camp off at her apartment and defendant got into the front seat of the car. He told her she did not have to drive all the way to his truck in Ventura; she could drop him off at a friend's house in Oxnard instead.

Defendant gave Suzanne H. directions. At one point, when she asked where they were going, defendant said: "[I]t is just a little further." She became uneasy because they were "out in the middle of nowhere." Defendant asked to leave the car to urinate. She let him out and turned the car around; she wanted to drive off but felt she could not leave him "way out here." She told him she could not take him any farther because she did not have enough gas and did not want to be stranded. He told her it was just a little further down the road. He said his friend lived on a farm and had plenty of gas.

Suzanne H. saw a sign reading "Road ends quarter of a mile" and felt that something was "very, very wrong." It was close to 1:00 a.m. She drove to the end of the road and attempted to turn the car around. Defendant pulled the keys from the ignition and shoved his arm under her blouse and brassiere. He kissed her and "slobber[ed] all over [her] neck and just insult[ed] her." She opened her door and tried to leave, but defendant held onto her shoulder. She asked him why he was doing this to her; she was frightened and thought he was going to rape her and imagined herself dead, lying next to her car. He grabbed her crotch area and attempted to remove her pants.

Suzanne H., who had worked as a volunteer at a rape crisis unit, attempted to "talk her way out of the situation." First, she told him she was a lesbian; that seemed to excite him more. She then closed the car door, kissed him, and said she wanted to have intercourse with him, but not there. Defendant suggested a motel; she agreed. Defendant put the keys back into the ignition and she drove back towards the town.

Suzanne H. drove over the speed limit and rolled through stop lights, hoping to attract the attention of a police officer. She then pulled into a gas station. She told defendant to pump the gas while she paid. At the cashier's booth, she told the cashier that defendant had tried to rape her and asked him to call the police. She also told another customer, a "biker," that defendant tried to rape her and asked him to call the police. The "biker" pushed her away. Defendant finished pumping the gas. He came up behind her, held her under her arms, and dragged her back to the car. She struggled and screamed loudly. Crying, she ran back over to the "biker." She told defendant she was not going anywhere with him. He went over to her car and disabled her engine by removing a coil. He ran across the street and disappeared.

About 2:00 a.m., two City of Port Hueneme police officers interviewed Suzanne H. at the gas station. She reported the incident and identified her attacker as a Black male. She refused to give further details and said she did not wish to "press charges," explaining that she wanted to go back to New York. She was unable to start her car; the officers looked in the engine and discovered the coil wire was missing. She called Camp and cried during the conversation. Camp picked her up at the gas station. Suzanne H. returned to New York a few days later.

About 2:30 a.m., the police officers stopped defendant about half a mile from the gas station, as he walked toward the back of a residence. They asked him for identification. He produced a license and said he was looking for a friend at the residence. One of the officers knocked at the door and asked if the occupants knew defendant. They did not. Defendant then said that he had been going to the back of the residence to urinate. He was checked for warrants, advised not to urinate in public, and released.

About 3:00 a.m., defendant approached Emanuel Manson in the front of a Safeway store. Defendant offered Manson $10 for a ride to Ventura. Manson said he would think about it; he entered the supermarket and purchased some items. Manson observed Holman approach in a car and heard defendant ask her if she would give him a ride to Ventura. Holman had left her home to buy cigarettes, telling her boyfriend and a guest that she would be right back.

Holman went into the supermarket and purchased cigarettes. She told Moses Vargas, a clerk at the supermarket, that a man had asked her for a ride to Ventura and asked Vargas if she should give him one. He asked which man, and she pointed to defendant outside. Vargas told her she should not give him a...

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