People v. Davis

• Decision Date: 09 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-374,80-374
• Citation: 50 Ill.Dec. 616,419 N.E.2d 724,94 Ill.App.3d 809
• Parties: , 50 Ill.Dec. 616 PEOPLE of State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosetta DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 724

419 N.E.2d 724

94 Ill.App.3d 809, 50 Ill.Dec. 616

PEOPLE of State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rosetta DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-374.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

April 9, 1981.

Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.

Gerry R. Arnold, John X. Breslin, State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, Ottawa, Gary L. Peterlin, State's Atty., LaSalle County, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.

HEIPLE, Justice:

On October 17, 1979 Rosetta Davis, the defendant, was indicted for the murder of Harold Johnson. Subsequently, as a result of a plea agreement, she pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 9-2(b).) After a sentencing hearing, defendant moved to modify her sentence and vacate her guilty plea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d).) (73 Ill.2d R. 604(d).) The LaSalle County Circuit Court denied both motions.

On appeal, Ms. Davis contends her guilty plea was the product of a prosecutor's promise during plea negotiations. Since he failed to perform consistent with that promise, she maintains, her plea of guilty was involuntary. Secondly, she maintains her five and one-half year penitentiary sentence is excessive.

The pertinent facts are the conditions of the plea agreement. Therefore, we need not dwell on the extreme details relative to Harold Johnson's death. The record establishes that on January 4, 1980 Ms. Davis made an offer to plead guilty to a criminal information charging her with voluntary manslaughter of Mr. Johnson. In consideration for this promise the People made two assurances: the State would dismiss the indictment charging her with murder; and, the prosecutor would make no specific sentencing recommendation. The trial judge recited the agreement before the parties in open court. He also, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule, determined Ms. Davis realized the nature of the charge, that her plea was voluntary, and she understood the constitutional rights she was relinquishing by pleading guilty. The People presented facts showing that on September 28, 1979 in LaSalle County at approximately 3:00 in the morning, Ms. Davis, under aggravating circumstances, shot and killed Harold Johnson. The plea was accepted and judgment entered thereon.

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, nine witnesses testified in behalf of the defendant. The bulk of the testimony consists of Ms. Davis' version of the events preceding, and resulting in, Harold Johnson's death. Other witnesses testified to the irreparable effect the imprisonment of Rosetta Davis would have on her minor children. Photographic evidence, introduced by the defense, showed that subsequent to the offense, Ms. Davis had scratches and abrasions on private parts of her anatomy.

During this hearing the prosecutor conducted an adept cross-examination of Ms. Davis. He highlighted various inconsistencies between her testimony and an earlier statement made to the police. She admitted theft of a pistol from the body of the deceased after shooting him. In addressing her past criminal convictions the prosecutor stated he did not believe Ms. Davis was a "probationable person." He also said:

"Defense counsel argues that this is a person likely not to commit more offenses and likely to successfully complete the terms of probation. I think, your Honor, all you have to do is look at the record of convictions."

Finally, the prosecutor maintained, "an individual (the defendant) like that is not likely to comply with the terms of probation." Conversely, in her argument, the defendant fervently urged the judge to consider a sentence of only probation.

Where a guilty plea rests to any significant degree on the promise of a prosecutor, so that the promise is a component for the inducement of that plea, the promise must be fulfilled. Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427. The concept of plea bargaining and its attendant benefits for both parties is a necessary element of criminal justice administration. See Blackledge v. Allison (1977), 431 U.S. 63, 65, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1624, 52 L.Ed.2d 136. While plea negotiations exist in the criminal justice structure, they are governed by contract law principles. A plea agreement results where the prosecutor and the accused exchange promises to do or refrain from doing certain acts. The test of the breach of such an agreement is an objective one. Motives and justifications of the parties are largely irrelevant under such a theory.

When the...