People v. Debenedetto

• Decision Date: 24 September 2014
• Citation: 992 N.Y.S.2d 370,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 06326,120 A.D.3d 1428
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Yvonne DeBENEDETTO, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

120 A.D.3d 1428

992 N.Y.S.2d 370

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 06326

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Yvonne DeBENEDETTO, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Sept. 24, 2014.

Marianne Karas, Thornwood, N.Y., for appellant.

Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Jacqueline Rosenblum and Rebecca L. Abensur of counsel), for respondent.

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., L. PRISCILLA HALL, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Ricigliano, J.), rendered April 8, 2013, convicting her of grand larceny in the second degree, upon her plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty, as well as the nature and extent of the fact-finding inquiry, rests largely within the sound discretion of the court and generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion ( seeCPL 220.60[3]; People v. Brown, 14 N.Y.3d 113, 116, 897 N.Y.S.2d 674, 924 N.E.2d 782; People v. Alexander, 97 N.Y.2d 482, 485, 743 N.Y.S.2d 45, 769 N.E.2d 802; People v. Bennett, 115 A.D.3d 973, 982 N.Y.S.2d 554; People v. Howard, 109 A.D.3d 487, 970 N.Y.S.2d 86). Here, the County Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw her plea of guilty without conducting a hearing. The record establishes that the defendant's plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. While the presentence report and the expert affirmation submitted in support of the defendant's motion indicated that the defendant had been diagnosed with severe depression and anxiety, and had been prescribed medication to alleviate the symptoms of those conditions, there is no basis in the record to support the conclusion that, at the time of the plea proceeding, the defendant lacked the capacity to understand the nature of the proceeding or the consequences of her plea ( see People v. Brooks, 89 A.D.3d 747, 931 N.Y.S.2d 908; People v. Miranda, 67 A.D.3d 709, 710, 886 N.Y.S.2d 890; People v. M'Lady, 59 A.D.3d 568, 873 N.Y.S.2d 331; People v. Ramos, 21 A.D.3d 1125, 801 N.Y.S.2d 155, affd.7 N.Y.3d 737, 819 N.Y.S.2d 853, 853 N.E.2d 222). During the plea colloquy, the defendant stated that her prescription medication did not affect her ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, appropriately responded to the questions asked of her, and gave no indication that she was mentally incapacitated ( seeCPL 730.10[1]; People v. Ramos, 77 A.D.3d 773, 909 N.Y.S.2d 484; People v. Godfrey, 33 A.D.3d 623, 822 N.Y.S.2d 135; People v. Ochoa, 179 A.D.2d 689, 579 N.Y.S.2d 114). Furthermore, the defendant's postplea claim of innocence, set forth in her motion papers, did not warrant...