People v. Decker
| Decision Date | 19 February 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 21002.,21002. |
| Citation | 347 Ill. 258,179 N.E. 827 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. DECKER. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Error to Circuit Court, Livingston County; Stevens R. Baker, Judge.
Willard Decker was convicted of robbery, and he brings error.
Judgment of conviction affirmed, and cause remanded, with directions.
Patrick T. Harrington, of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Robert M. Niven, State's Atty., of Pontiac, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield, for the People.
Plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of Livingston county for robbery of one R. M. Turner by taking from his person $41 in money. He, with Edward Ksiaziak, James Manning, and Daniel Moylan, who were indicted with him, entered a plea of guilty to the first count of the indictment. The second and third counts were nolle prossed. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for an indeterminate term under the statute, the sentence to begin to run on the expiration of the term of confinement of plaintiff in error in the Illinois state reformatory. He was committed at once to the state penitentiary, and has since remained there. It appears that plaintiff in error and those indicted with him were at the time of the commission of the robbery here charged escaped inmates of the Illinois state reformatory at Pontiac. They were soon after apprehended, and the indictment in this case followed.
The record shows that the court fully explained to plaintiff in error his constitutional rights and the consequences of his plea of guilty.
Numerous objections are raised on the record, some of which do not merit consideration.
Counsel for plaintiff in error argues that, as the record shows no testimony of witnesses sworn, the plea of guilty is not alone sufficient to establish the guilt of plaintiff in error or his age. A plea of guilty is an admission of every fact averred in the indictment, and enither law, reason, nor necessity requires proof thereof. People v. O'Brien, 306 Ill. 340, 137 N. E. 808;Marx v. People, 204 Ill. 248, 68 N. E. 436; Bassett on Crim. Pleading, c. 124, § 188; 1 Bishop on Crim. Proc. § 795; People v. Goldstein, 32 Cal. 432;State v. Walker, 22 La. Ann. 425;Green v. Commonwealth, 12 Allen (94 Mass.) 155.
The record shows that the court found the age of plaintiff in error to be twenty-one years. Section 4 of division 13 of the Criminal Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1931, p. 1092, c. 38, § 732) requires the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation or mitigation of offenses where there is a plea of guilty and the court possesses discretion as to the extent of the punishment. It is not necessary that evidence so heard be preserved or that the court make any special finding concerning the same. Marx v. People, supra. Where the record shows that the statutory requirements have been met on the plea of guilty, the presumption is that the finding as to the age of plaintiff in error was based on competent evidence. Marx v. People, supra; Brown v. State, 13 Ark. 96; In re Brown, 32 Cal. 48;People v. Noll, 20 Cal. 164.
Plaintiff in error also contends that the commitment is void. The record shows that the judgment entered against plaintiff in error was that he be committed, under the ordinary form of order, to the state penitentiary at Joliet for a term not to exceed the maximum term of twenty years, the sentence to begin to run upon the expiration of his present term of confinement in the Illinois state reformatory. He argues that, because he was taken to the penitentiary and not recommitted to the Illinois state reformatory to serve out his term of conviction there, the order was void. It has been the rule in this state since Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431, that a sentence for one offense may be made to commence at the expiration of a sentence for another offense when the offenses are of such nature as to permit joinder thereof in the same indictment. Such is the only practical way of meting out punishment to the same defendant for two separate offenses. To withhold sentence until the expiration of the former sentence would not only prove an inconvenience and cause of confusion, but would be of no advantage to the accused. Fitzpatrick v. People, 98 Ill. 269;Williams v. State, 18 Ohio St. 46. Jurisdiction to inflict cumulative punishment does not depend on whether both convictions shall be before the same tribunal, but whether the accused has, in fact, committed distinct violations of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People ex rel. Hesley v. Ragen
...commencement of the second and termination of the first sentence may be seen from the record, and he cites the case of People v. Decker, 347 Ill. 258, 179 N.E. 827. It is true there is some language used in that case in support of petitioner's contention, but the case there was strictly enc......
-
People v. Ferguson
...fix the day on which the successive term of imprisonment is to begin. People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N.E.2d 573; People v. Decker, 347 Ill. 258, 179 N.E. 827. To specify the day would be of no advantage and would obviously cause confusion in the event of a supersedeas, executive clemenc......
-
People v. Ledferd
...penalties. People v. Heirens, 38 Ill.2d 294 at 302, 230 N.E.2d 875; People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N.E.2d 573; People v. Decker, 347 Ill. 258, 179 N.E. 827. Reviewing court were first authorized to reduce sentences imposed by the trial court under the provisions of the Code of Criminal ......
-
People v. Vraniak
...where the accused has, in fact, committed separate and distinct violations of the law. Johnson v. People, 83 Ill. 431; People v. Decker, 347 Ill. 258, 179 N.E. 827; People v. Wooten, 392 Ill. 542, 64 N.E.2d 857; People v. Loftus, 395 Ill. 479, 70 N.E.2d 573; People v. Jazorak, 400 Ill. 447,......