People v. Denison
| Decision Date | 23 April 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. A077542,A077542 |
| Citation | 63 Cal.App.4th 550,74 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 |
| Parties | Previously published at 63 Cal.App.4th 550 63 Cal.App.4th 550, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3092, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4227 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Brian DENISON, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Alan Siraco, for Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Gregory A. Ott, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
David Brian Denison appeals from his conviction for possession of cocaine and related drug paraphernalia. He argues the police stop of the car he was driving to conduct a probation search of his passenger violated his right, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He also argues his ensuing detention was unnecessarily prolonged and the seizure of a brown paper bag from his car, his subsequent arrest, and the search of his person and his residence were all improper, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. We conclude the stop of appellant's car was permissible incident to the stop of his passenger, who was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his probation. Moreover, the brief detention of appellant, the seizure of the bag, appellant's subsequent arrest, as well as the search of his person and residence were also proper in the circumstances of this case. We therefore shall affirm the judgment.
On February 14, 1996, a complaint was filed charging appellant with possession of cocaine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); possession of a hypodermic needle and/or syringe (former Bus. & Prof.Code, § 4149); and possession of a smoking device used for smoking a controlled substance (Health & Saf.Code, § 11364). The cocaine possession count alleged two probation ineligibility clauses (Health & Saf.Code, § 11370, subds. (a), (c); Pen.Code, § 1203, subd. (e)(4)). 1 After a preliminary hearing held on July 8 and July 11, 1996, the trial court denied appellant's motion, pursuant to section 1538.5, to suppress all evidence obtained from his car, person, and residence.
An information mirroring the complaint was filed on July 22, 1996. Appellant's motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995 was denied on October 18, 1996.
On October 29, 1996, appellant pleaded guilty as charged and admitted the probation ineligibility allegations. On January 3, 1997, the trial court struck one probation ineligibility clause, found the case to be an unusual one pursuant to section 1203, subdivision (e)(4), and California Rules of Court, rule 413(c)(2)(ii), suspended imposition of sentence, and placed appellant on probation for three years on condition he serve six months in county jail on count 1, with 30-day concurrent terms on counts 2 and 3. 2 This timely appeal followed.
At about 5:40 p.m. on February 1, 1996, Marin County Sheriff's Department officer Kami Pfeffer went to the San Rafael home of William Magner to conduct a probation search of Magner, who was on probation and had a warrantless search and seizure condition. 4 Pfeffer was accompanied by four other police officers and one probation officer. After receiving no answer to their knocks on the front and rear doors, the officers were standing in the driveway talking when they saw a gold Ford Escort drive toward the house. Pfeffer knew that such a car was "associated" with the residence and so informed the other officers. As the vehicle slowed at the residence, probation officer Broom advised the other officers that Magner was in the car. The car then accelerated and left the area of the residence.
Officer Hutchinson got into his patrol car and stopped the Ford Escort; officers Pfeffer and Broom arrived seconds later. Broom asked Magner, who was sitting in the front passenger seat, to step out of the car. Appellant, who was in the driver's seat, remained in the car while Broom pat-searched Magner. 5 Meanwhile, Pfeffer spoke with appellant in order to determine who owned the car. Appellant told her that he had just recently purchased the car from someone named Bob Barnett. A DMV check confirmed the car was registered to Bob Barnett. After Magner had exited the car, Broom saw and retrieved a crumpled brown paper bag from the floor on the passenger side of the car. Broom opened the bag and saw several Valium pills loose inside. In response to a question from Broom, both men denied that the bag was theirs.
Appellant and Magner were then arrested. During a search incident to appellant's arrest, Pfeffer found a syringe in one of appellant's jacket pockets and a small baggy of suspected cocaine in another. Pfeffer then searched appellant's car and found a glass pipe used to smoke controlled substances under the front driver's side seat.
After the arrests, the officers returned to the residence and conducted a "protective sweep" of the house to ensure, for officer safety, that no one was inside. While doing so, the officers found several syringes, another pipe, and other drug paraphernalia in appellant's bedroom; these items were visible from the entrance to the bedroom.
Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress on several grounds. In reviewing the reasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure, such as occurred here, we are bound by the trial court's factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Stoffle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1671, 1677, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 257.) However, we independently determine whether, based on those factual findings, the search and seizure were reasonable. (Ibid.)
Appellant first contends the officer's stop of his car to initiate a probation search of Magner violated appellant's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Under California law, reasonable cause is not required before officers may invoke a probation search and seizure condition, and a search pursuant to a probation search condition without reasonable cause is permissible so long as the decision to search is not arbitrary or intended to harass. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 609, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336.) Here, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that the officers harbored no impermissible motives in stopping appellant's car. Appellant does not argue that the officers were attempting to harass Magner or were using the probation search as a pretext for searching appellant or his car. (See People v. Bravo, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 609, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336; see also People v. Woods (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 246, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 511.) Rather, the officers were simply trying to effect a search of Magner pursuant to the terms of his probation.
Most courts agree that a stop of a vehicle includes a stop of all of its occupants. (See People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 761-764, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 115 [citing cases].) While acknowledging that Magner had relinquished his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of his probation, appellant contends that his own Fourth Amendment rights precluded the stop because the officer had no reasonable suspicion that either he or Magner was involved in criminal activity. (See Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1878-1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889.) 6
We have found no cases addressing the precise question presented here, although several cases have addressed relevant issues to the one before us in this case. First, in United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 224, 105 S.Ct. 675, 677-678, 83 L.Ed.2d 604, police stopped a car in reliance on information that the driver was the subject of a "wanted flyer" before confirming whether an arrest warrant had been issued. On approaching the vehicle, an officer recognized the passenger as a convicted felon and saw the butt of a revolver protruding from underneath the passenger's seat. (Ibid.) The passenger was arrested and, following a search of the car in which additional guns were found, the driver also was arrested. (Id. at pp. 224-225, 105 S.Ct. at p. 678.) The United States Supreme Court held that such a stop was justified even though it was a stop to investigate an already completed crime, which "does not necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate suspected ongoing criminal activity." (Id. at pp. 228, 232, 105 S.Ct. at pp. 680, 682.)
In determining the limits on stops to investigate past criminal activity, the court applied a test, "grounded in the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment, [which] balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." (United States v. Hensley, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 228, 105 S.Ct. at p. 680.) The court then discussed the importance of the governmental interest in investigating past crimes: (Id. at p. 229, 105 S.Ct. at p. 680.)
In In re William J. (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 72, 217 Cal.Rptr. 163, a police officer stopped the car the defendant was driving because there was an outstanding arrest warrant for the passenger. When the stop revealed the defendant...
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