People v. Dennel
| Citation | 523 P.3d 471,2022 COA 115 M |
| Decision Date | 06 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA1007 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnny Joseph DENNEL, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
¶ 1 Defendant, Johnny Joseph Dennel, Jr., a juvenile, appeals the judgment of conviction entered by the district court after he pleaded guilty to manslaughter.
¶ 2 Dennel was charged in juvenile court with committing a delinquent act that if committed by an adult would constitute second degree murder, a class 2 felony. On the date of the alleged offense, Dennel was fifteen years old and had no prior felony adjudications or convictions. On the People's motion and after a contested hearing, the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction and transferred Dennel's case to district court for adult criminal proceedings. Once the case was transferred to district court, Dennel pleaded guilty to manslaughter, a class 4 felony, and was sentenced as an adult.
¶ 3 On appeal, Dennel contends that he wasn't statutorily eligible to have his case transferred from juvenile court to district court because he didn't have a prior felony adjudication. Relying on People v. Nelson , 2015 COA 123, ¶ 12, 369 P.3d 733, Dennel contends that, under section 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I)(B), C.R.S. 2022, a child his age charged with a felony must have a previous delinquency adjudication for a felony before the juvenile court can transfer his case to district court. He argues that because he didn't have a prior felony adjudication, the juvenile court erred by transferring his case and the district court never acquired jurisdiction over him under the transfer statute.
¶ 4 Parting ways with the division in Nelson , we conclude that the plain meaning of the transfer statute doesn't condition transfer eligibility on a previous delinquency adjudication. Because Dennel was eligible for transfer and he doesn't otherwise challenge his transfer from juvenile court to district court, we affirm the judgment.
¶ 5 This case began when the People filed a petition in juvenile court alleging that Dennel had committed a delinquent act that constituted second degree murder, a class 2 felony, and that, at the time of the alleged delinquent act, Dennel was fifteen years old. It's undisputed that when this case was filed, Dennel had no prior felony adjudications or convictions.
¶ 6 Seeking to charge Dennel as an adult, the People filed a motion requesting that the juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer the case to district court pursuant to section 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I)(B). After a four-day transfer hearing, the juvenile court found probable cause that Dennel had committed the alleged delinquent act and that it was in the best interests of the community for the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction over Dennel. Thus, over Dennel's objection, the juvenile court transferred the case to district court.
¶ 7 Rather than standing trial on the second degree murder charge, Dennel agreed to plead guilty to manslaughter, a class 4 felony. The district court accepted Dennel's guilty plea and sentenced him to a suspended ten-year term in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the condition that he complete a five-year term in the Youthful Offender System.
¶ 8 On appeal, Dennel contends that, under the transfer statute, a juvenile court can't transfer a case against a fifteen-year-old unless the child has at least one prior felony adjudication or conviction. Because he hadn't previously been adjudicated or convicted of a felony, Dennel asserts that the district court didn't acquire jurisdiction to accept his plea, enter a felony conviction against him, and impose sentence. We disagree.
¶ 9 We conclude that the transfer statute doesn't require that a juvenile have a prior felony adjudication before the court may transfer the juvenile's case to district court and, based on this interpretation, Dennel was eligible to have his case transferred to district court.
¶ 10 This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Bostelman v. People , 162 P.3d 686, 689 (Colo. 2007). Our primary task when construing a statute is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent. Id. (citing Klinger v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 50 , 130 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Colo. 2006) ). In determining the legislature's intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Id. at 690 (). When reviewing a statute's plain language, we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to their common usage, id. (citing Klinger , 130 P.3d at 1031 ), and in a manner that is harmonious with other provisions, People v. Ross , 2021 CO 9, ¶ 34, 479 P.3d 910 ().
¶ 11 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we won't engage in further statutory analysis. Bostelman , 162 P.3d at 689. Indeed, it is only when a statute is ambiguous that we may employ other tools of statutory construction, such as considering the consequences of a given construction, the end to be achieved by the statute, and legislative history. Id.
¶ 12 The Children's Code creates "a system of juvenile justice that will appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law." § 19-2.5-101(1)(a), C.R.S. 2022. Subject to certain exceptions, the juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over cases involving juveniles. § 19-2.5-103(1), C.R.S. 2022.
¶ 13 The transfer statute is one such exception. The transfer statute permits the People to request that a juvenile court waive its jurisdiction and transfer a case to district court when — and only when — a petition contains certain allegations. Specifically, the transfer statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I)-(II) (emphasis added).
¶ 14 The parties disagree about the proper interpretation of subsection (1)(a)(I)(B). Dennel argues that a juvenile fourteen years of age or older accused of committing a felony is only eligible to have his case transferred to district court if he has also previously been adjudicated delinquent for an act that constitutes a felony. See Nelson , ¶ 12. In contrast, the People argue that nothing in the statute requires a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication.
¶ 15 We agree with the People. Our conclusion rests on the plain language of the statute, which is where we turn first.
¶ 16 The statute spells out what must be "alleged" in a delinquency petition for a case to be eligible for transfer to district court. Specifically, the statute requires the delinquency petition to allege that the juvenile is at least a certain age and that the juvenile is accused of committing an offense of at least a certain seriousness. For a child aged twelve or thirteen to be eligible for transfer, the petition must allege that the juvenile committed a delinquent act that constitutes a class 1 or 2 felony or a crime of violence, § 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I)(A) ; for a juvenile fourteen years or older to be eligible for transfer, the petition must allege that the juvenile committed a delinquent act that constitutes a felony, § 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I)(B).
¶ 17 Dennel contends, however, that while the age requirements in the statute refer to the juvenile's age at the time of the charged offense, the references to the level of offense contained in subsections (1)(a)(I)(A) and (1)(a)(I)(B) describe what the petition must allege with respect to the juvenile's adjudicatory history. In other words, Dennel contends that for a child of twelve or thirteen to have his case transferred to district court, he must have been previously adjudicated for a delinquent act that constitutes a class 1 or 2 felony or a crime of violence; and for a juvenile fourteen years old or older, he must have been previously adjudicated for a delinquent act that constitutes a felony.
¶ 18 We reject Dennel's urged interpretation because it doesn't comport with the plain language of the statute. We begin our plain language analysis by highlighting the significance of the word "alleges" in the transfer statute — particularly the first use of this word (in subsection (1)(a)(I)) and its impact on subsequent language. See § 19-2.5-802(1)(a)(I) () (emphasis added).
¶ 19 Sub-subparagraphs (A) and (B) are part of, and follow the initial language of, subsection (1)(a)(I). Therefore, they simply describe the requisite — as yet, unproven — allegations that the...
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