People v. Dennis

• Citation: 91 A.D.3d 1277,937 N.Y.S.2d 496,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 00548
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Brandon DENNIS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 00548
91 A.D.3d 1277
937 N.Y.S.2d 496

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Brandon DENNIS, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Jan. 31, 2012.

[937 N.Y.S.2d 497]

Mark D. Funk, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant.

Michael J. Violante, District Attorney, Lockport (Laura T. Bittner of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND GORSKI, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

[91 A.D.3d 1278] Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of, inter alia, three counts each of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1], [3] [intentional and felony murder] ) and robbery in the first degree (§ 160.15[2]-[4] ). We reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in giving a jury instruction on consciousness of guilt. According to the evidence presented by the People at trial, defendant became a suspect in the murder approximately one month after it occurred, and the police

[937 N.Y.S.2d 498]

attempted to locate him at the address listed on his driver's license, as well as at the addresses of his former and current girlfriend. The police also informed defendant's family members that they were looking for him. Defendant was arrested almost six months later, when the police received information concerning his whereabouts. Defendant was driving his current girlfriend's vehicle and rammed it into a police vehicle before surrendering. We conclude that the People thereby presented evidence warranting the instruction on consciousness of guilt ( see People v. Solimini, 69 A.D.3d 657, 892 N.Y.S.2d 480, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 893, 903 N.Y.S.2d 781, 929 N.E.2d 1016; People v. Young, 51 A.D.3d 1055, 1056–1057, 856 N.Y.S.2d 711, lv. denied 11 N.Y.3d 796, 866 N.Y.S.2d 622, 896 N.E.2d 108) and, contrary to defendant's contention, the People were not required to prove that defendant was aware that the police were searching for him.

Defendant did not preserve for our review his further contention that the admission of his codefendant's statement violated the Confrontation Clause ( see People v. Pearson, 82 A.D.3d 475, 918 N.Y.S.2d 409, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 809, 929 N.Y.S.2d 568, 953 N.E.2d 806). In any event, that contention is without merit. The codefendant's statement did not implicate defendant in any wrongdoing and thus did not deprive defendant of his U.S. Constitution Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him ( see People v. Mack, 89 A.D.3d 864, 865–866, 932 N.Y.S.2d 163; People v. Lewis, 83 A.D.3d 1206, 1208–1209, 920 N.Y.S.2d 846, lv. denied 17 N.Y.3d 797, 929 N.Y.S.2d 105, 952 N.E.2d 1100). We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in allowing a police investigator to testify for the People that he saw defendant and the codefendant together earlier on the day of the murder. Inasmuch as the court prohibited the police investigator from [91 A.D.3d 1279] testifying that he purchased drugs from the codefendant during that encounter, we reject defendant's contention that the testimony constituted evidence of a prior bad act of defendant. Even assuming, arguendo, that the jury would infer that defendant had committed a prior bad act based on the investigator's...