People v. DePalma

• Decision Date: 27 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. 2-92-0179,2-92-0179
• Citation: 256 Ill.App.3d 206,627 N.E.2d 1236
• Parties: , 194 Ill.Dec. 594 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter M. DePALMA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1236

627 N.E.2d 1236

256 Ill.App.3d 206, 194 Ill.Dec. 594

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peter M. DePALMA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-92-0179.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Jan. 27, 1994.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender, Kathleen J. Hamill, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Peter M. DePalma.

James E. Ryan, DuPage County State's Atty., William L. Browers, Deputy Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n, 4th Dist., Springfield, Elliott Turpin, State's Atty. Appellate Prosecutor, for People.

Justice McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

On January 29, 1992, the defendant, Peter M. DePalma, was charged by indictment with possession of a vehicle with knowledge that the vehicle identification number (VIN) had been removed, a Class 2 felony under the anti-theft provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) ( Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103(a)(4), (b)) (now 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(4), (b) (West 1992)). The trial court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to declare the statutory provisions unconstitutional as overly broad and violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and proportional penalties.

After a stipulated bench trial on February 13, 1992, the trial court found the defendant guilty of the charge and sentenced him to 18 months' conditional discharge and 41 days confinement in the county jail; credit was given for the 41 days already served. Defendant's motion to reconsider the constitutionality of the provisions and in arrest of judgment was denied, and this timely appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant again contends that section 4-103(a)(4) of the Code is overly broad because it criminalizes innocent conduct and, in conjunction with section 4-103(b), which makes the offense a Class 2 felony, violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and proportionate penalties. (See U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11.) Among other things, defendant argues in his initial brief that his conviction should be reversed because the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the vehicle with the missing identification number with knowledge accompanied by a criminal purpose. The parties were ordered to submit supplemental briefs to further develop the issue whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt as to defendant's mental state, that is, whether defendant's conduct was accompanied by "criminal knowledge" or "knowledge plus criminal purpose" under People v. Johns (1992), 153 Ill.2d 436, 441, 180 Ill.Dec. 254, 607 N.E.2d 148, and People v. Tolliver (1992), 147 Ill.2d 397, 403, 168 Ill.Dec. 127, 589 N.E.2d 527. The State maintains that no "criminal intent" should be read into the statute defining the offense. We disagree and reverse defendant's conviction for the reasons that follow.

The record reveals that defendant was charged with the offense when he was found in possession of a gray 1985 Ford Mustang, bearing a Texas temporary buyer plate No. P-5748. According to the stipulated evidence, Officer Brian Siebrasse of the Village of Bloomingdale police department would testify that he responded to a police call on January 4, 1992, regarding a person who was sleeping in a car at the Meecham Forest Preserve. He went to the preserve and observed that the 1985 Mustang had no license plate, but had a Texas temporary buyer dashboard plate registered to Intercontinental Auto Brokers of Houston, Texas. He observed that the dashboard vehicle identification number (VIN) plate appeared to be missing. He observed defendant sleeping in the car.

Siebrasse spoke with defendant, and defendant said he knew the VIN plates on the dashboard and door jambs were missing as they were removed when the vehicle was stolen from the previous owner. Defendant said that in the past couple of weeks he had been stopped by the Elk Grove police and the Rolling Meadows police in connection with the VIN plates. Siebrasse would also testify that defendant told him he was the lawful owner of the car at the time and had been sleeping in the car. According to Siebrasse, after a thorough inspection of the car, no VIN plates were located on the door jambs or engine of the vehicle.

On January 11, 1992, after a more thorough inspection of the car, a portion of a VIN plate was located under the passenger side quarter panel. The National Insurance Crime Bureau was contacted, and that bureau was able to reconstruct the VIN using the portion of the number that was located under the passenger quarter panel. The VIN matched the VIN that was on the temporary buyer plate, and it was determined that the car had been reported stolen in Orlando, Florida, and was recovered on May 3, 1991.

The testimony of Officer Syverson of the Elk Grove police department would show that, on November 28, 1991, he observed no VINs when he had an opportunity to stop the same vehicle and would identify defendant as the driver. At that time, defendant was told to take care of the VIN problem and obtain registration for the vehicle.

On the basis of the stipulated evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of the offense charged and imposed an agreed sentence.

The offense in question is defined by section 4-103(a)(4), which provides:

"Offenses relating to motor vehicles and other vehicles--Felonies. (a) It is a violation of this Chapter for:

* * * * * *

(4) A person to buy, receive, possess, sell or dispose of a vehicle, or any essential part thereof, with knowledge that the identification number of the vehicle or any essential part thereof having an identification number has been removed or falsified." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103(a)(4) (now 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(4) (West 1992)).)

A person convicted of a violation of that section is guilty of a Class 2 felony and may be imprisoned for not less than three, but not more than seven years. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103(b) (now 625 ILCS 5/4-103(b) (West 1992)); Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(5) (now 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(5) (West 1992)).

Section 4-103(a)(4) is part of a statutory scheme of anti-theft laws found in chapter 4 of the Code whose purpose " 'is to protect automobile owners against theft and to protect the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles.' " (People v. Morris (1990), 136 Ill.2d 157, 162, 143 Ill.Dec. 300, 554 N.E.2d 235, quoting People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix Automobile (1982), 89 Ill.2d 506, 510, 60 Ill.Dec. 934, 433 N.E.2d 1301.) Grouped under section 4-103 are offenses such as knowingly possessing, concealing, selling or disposing of a stolen or converted vehicle; knowingly removing, altering, defacing, destroying or falsifying a manufacturer's vehicle identification number or an essential part thereof; knowingly concealing or misrepresenting the identity of a vehicle or essential part thereof; and knowingly possessing, buying, selling or exchanging any manufacturer's vehicle identification number plate. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 95 1/2, par. 4-103(a) (now 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a) (West 1992)).

Defendant initially points out that conduct such as affirmatively concealing or misrepresenting the identity of stolen vehicles by changing, destroying or removing their VIN plates contributes to the serious problem of vehicle theft and this more culpable conduct is justifiably criminalized as a Class 2 felony. However, he argues that section 4-103(a)(4) is overly broad and unconstitutional because it criminalizes as a Class 2 felony the conduct of one who has no connection with a vehicle theft if he does no more than come into innocent possession of a vehicle with knowledge that its identification number has been removed. The statute criminalizes the mere possession of a vehicle which is missing its VIN plate by persons who need not have had anything to do with the removal of the plate--let alone any aspect of a vehicle theft. Furthermore, the penalty is disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense because it imposes the same penalty on one who innocently possesses a car with a missing VIN plate as one whose culpability is far greater because he knowingly possesses stolen vehicles, deliberately tampers with VIN plates or engages in other knowing involvement in vehicle theft.

Defendant points out that there was no evidence that he was not lawfully in possession of the vehicle and a police report included in the common-law record stated that the car was recovered in Florida and was now "clean." Defendant urges that one who takes possession of a car should not be expected to ascertain that the VIN plates belonging on the dashboard, engine, door jambs, main body compartment and other essential parts of the vehicle will all be in place and display the correct number. It is quite possible for a person to purchase or come into possession of a car legitimately and only afterward discover that a VIN plate is gone, especially if the plate is missing from a location on the underside of the car. More importantly, defendant observes that a person who discovers that his car is missing a VIN plate would not be able to report that discovery to the Secretary of State or the State Police without admitting to the commission of a Class 2 felony.

The starting point in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes is that the statutes "are presumed constitutional and all reasonable doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding their validity." (Johns, 153 Ill.2d at 442, 180 Ill.Dec. 254, 607 N.E.2d 148.) This court must construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity if it can reasonably be done. (People v. Steffens (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 252, 258, 153 Ill.Dec. 135, 566 N.E.2d 985.) It is the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute that bears...