People v. Derror
| Decision Date | 06 September 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 259315.,No. 258346.,258346.,259315. |
| Citation | 706 N.W.2d 451,268 Mich. App. 67 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of The State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Delores Marie DERROR, Defendant-Appellee. People of The State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis Wayne Kurts, Defendant-Appellee (On Reconsideration). |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Alan Schneider, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert A. Cooney, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people in Docket No. 258346.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Henry C. Zavislak, Prosecuting Attorney, and Jerrold Schrotenboer, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people in Docket No. 259315.
State Appellate Defender (by Christine A. Pagac) for Delores M. Derror.
Jerry M. Engle, Jackson, for Dennis W. Kurts.
Before: COOPER, P.J., and JANSEN and HOEKSTRA, JJ.
ON RECONSIDERATION
In these consolidated appeals, the prosecution appeals by leave granted1 two trial court orders ruling that "carboxy THC"2 is not a schedule 1 controlled substance under M.C.L. § 333.7212(1)(d) for purposes of punishing violations of M.C.L. § 257.625(8), which prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of a schedule 1 controlled substance in the body. In People v. Derror, the prosecution also appeals a trial court order ruling that, pursuant to M.C.L. § 257.625(4) and M.C.L. § 257.625(5), the prosecution must prove that the presence of a controlled substance in a defendant's body is a proximate cause of an accident resulting in death or serious injury. In People v. Kurts, the prosecution appeals the dismissal of the charges against defendant, Dennis Wayne Kurts, based on the insufficiency of the evidence.
We agree with the trial courts' determinations that carboxy THC is not a schedule 1 controlled substance. However, we disagree with the trial court in Kurts that the presence of this substance in a defendant's blood is not evidence of the presence of THC,3 a schedule 1 controlled substance. Pursuant to the Michigan Supreme Court's recent decision in the companion cases of People v. Schaefer and People v. Large,4 we find that the trial court in Derror improperly determined that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's "decision to drive with any amount of a controlled substance in her body produced a change in her operation of the vehicle that was a substantial cause of the victim's death." We presume from the opinion that the Supreme Court will apply this case retroactively.5 Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's orders in Derror, and reverse the trial court's order dismissing the case against Mr. Kurts in Kurts. We, therefore, remand in both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In Derror, defendant Delores Marie Derror was charged with violating M.C.L. § 257.625(8) for driving under the influence of marijuana, a schedule 1 controlled substance, and with violating M.C.L. § 257.625(4) and M.C.L. § 257.625(5) for causing a motor vehicle accident resulting in death and serious injury. Ms. Derror was driving eastbound on a snow and slush-covered M-72 at approximately 6:00 p.m. on a snowy January 11, 2004, when she crossed into oncoming traffic and collided with another vehicle. The front-seat passenger was killed, two children riding in the back seat were paralyzed, and a third child received a broken neck and jaw. Deputy sheriffs found five marijuana cigarettes in Ms. Derror's purse while looking for identification. Ms. Derror later admitted that she had smoked one marijuana cigarette at 2:00 p.m. Two separate blood samples were analyzed for the presence of illegal substances. The first blood sample drawn contained 38 nanograms per milliliter of carboxy THC, and the second contained 31 nanograms per milliliter of the same substance.
In Kurts, Mr. Kurts was also charged with operating a motor vehicle under the influence of marijuana in violation of M.C.L. § 257.625(8). Mr. Kurts was stopped at approximately 9:45 p.m. on February 25, 2004, for driving erratically. The officer initiating that stop noted the Mr. Kurts smelled of alcohol and that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Mr. Kurts admitted to drinking two beers and was asked to exit the vehicle. After the officer discovered a marijuana pipe in Mr. Kurts's pocket during a pat-down search, Mr. Kurts admitted to smoking marijuana only a half-hour earlier.6 Mr. Kurts's blood contained eight nanograms per milliliter of carboxy THC, and 0.07 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters.
In each case, both the prosecution and the defense presented the testimony of expert witnesses at pretrial evidentiary hearings regarding the characteristics of marijuana, THC, and carboxy THC. The experts agreed that carboxy THC is a "metabolite," or byproduct of metabolism,7 created in the human body during the body's biological process of converting marijuana into a water-soluble form that can be excreted more easily. Its presence in the blood conclusively proves that a person ingested THC at some point in time. However, carboxy THC itself has no pharmacological effect on the body and its level in the blood correlates poorly, if at all, to an individual's level of THC-related impairment. In fact, carboxy THC could remain in the blood long after all THC has gone, as THC quickly leaves the blood and enters the body's tissues.8
In Derror, the trial court determined, following a pretrial evidentiary hearing, that the Legislature did not intend to include carboxy THC as a schedule 1 controlled substance because it has no pharmacological effect on the human body. The court did not dismiss the case against Ms. Derror, however, because a jury could determine from the presence of this substance in her blood that she had THC in her body at the time of the accident. Although the prosecution argued that M.C.L. § 257.625(8) is a strict liability statute, the court ordered that the prosecution would be required to establish at trial that the presence of the THC in Ms. Derror's blood was a proximate cause of the accident for purposes of M.C.L. § 257.625(4) and M.C.L. § 257.625(5).
In Kurts, the trial court granted Mr. Kurts's motion to dismiss his charged violation of M.C.L. § 257.625(8). Following an evidentiary hearing, the court determined that the Legislature did not intend to include carboxy THC as a schedule 1 controlled substance because it has no pharmacological effect or medicinal value. As the level of carboxy THC in a person's blood bears a poor correlation to the level of THC in a person's body, the court found that there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that Mr. Kurts was operating a motor vehicle with a controlled substance in his body at the time of his traffic stop. These appeals followed.
These cases present an issue of first impression — whether carboxy THC, a metabolite of a schedule 1 controlled substance, can be considered a schedule 1 controlled substance itself for purposes of proceeding against a defendant under M.C.L. § 257.625(8). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to review de novo on appeal.9 The primary goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.10 It is only when statutory language is ambiguous that we are permitted to look beyond the statute to determine the Legislature's intent.11 When construing an ambiguous statute, "[t]he court must consider the object of the statute, the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that best accomplishes the statute's purpose, but should also always use common sense."12 In this regard, courts should seek to avoid a construction that would produce absurd results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest.13
Defendants were charged with violating M.C.L. § 257.625(8), which provides:
A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway . . . within this state if the person has in his or her body any amount of a controlled substance listed in schedule 1 under section 7212 of the public health code, 1978 P.A. 368, M.C.L. § 333.7212, or a rule promulgated under that section. . . .[14]
Marijuana, spelled "marihuana" in the statute, is expressly included as a schedule 1 controlled substance in M.C.L. § 333.7212(1)(c). This statute does not expressly include carboxy THC, by any name, as a schedule 1 controlled substance. M.C.L. § 333.7212(1)(d) further provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2), synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant, or in the resinous extractives of cannabis and synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical structure or pharmacological activity, or both, such as the following, are included in schedule 1:
(i) δ1 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers.
(ii) δ6 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers.
(iii) δ3,4 cis or trans tetrahydrocannabinol, and their optical isomers.[15]
Carboxy THC does have a similar chemical structure to THC.16 However, as carboxy THC is created during the body's metabolism of that substance, it clearly is a natural, rather than synthetic, byproduct of THC.17 Accordingly, we find M.C.L. § 333.7212(1)(d) inapplicable and must determine if carboxy THC is included in the definition of marijuana as a classified schedule 1 controlled substance.
"Marijuana" is defined as "all parts of the plant Canabis sativa L., growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin. . . ."18 As a byproduct of the body's...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Derror
...blood long after all THC has gone, as THC quickly leaves the blood and enters the body's tissues. [People v. Derror (On Reconsideration), 268 Mich. App. 67, 71-72, 706 N.W.2d 451 (2005).] The prosecution expert in Derror, Dr. Michelle Glinn, further testified, without THC is taken up into t......
-
Tyson Foods v. Dept. of Treasury
...corporation to benefit from its failure to file tax returns, which, by law, it is obligated to file. People v. Derror (On Reconsideration), 268 Mich.App. 67, 73-74, 706 N.W.2d 451 (2005), rev'd on other grounds 475 Mich. 316, 715 N.W.2d 822 In addition to MCL 205.27a(2), MCL 205.21(1) also ......