People v. DeStefano
Decision Date | 08 November 1965 |
Docket Number | Gen. No. 50162 |
Citation | 212 N.E.2d 357,64 Ill.App.2d 389 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Sam DeSTEFANO, Appellant. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Julius Lucius Echeles, Chicago, for appellant.
Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Elmer C. Kissane, Patrick A. Tuite, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, for appellee.
Defendant appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict, finding defendant guilty 'of illegally offering to vote in manner and form as charged in the indictment.' Defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of one to three years.
Defendant was tried on a two-count indictment. Count 1 charged that on April 2, 1963, defendant 'committed the offense of illegal voting in that he knowingly offered to vote at the municipal election held in the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, and in precinct 64 of Ward 36 of the City of Chicago when the said Sam DeStefano had been convicted of the offense of rape in indictment No. 45013 in the Criminal Court of Cook County, in the State of Illinois on December 23, 1927, and when the said Sam DeStefano thereafter had never received a certificate restoring his rights of citizenship from the governor or court entitled to grant such certificate, in violation of Chapter 46, Section 29-26 Ill.Rev.Stat.1961.' Count 2 charged that on the same day the defendant 'committed the offense of illegal voting in that he knowingly voted * * *.'
Section 29-26 of Chapter 46--Elections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1961) provides:
'If any person who shall have been convicted of bribery, felony or other infamous crime under the laws of any state, and who has never received a certificate restoring his rights of citizenship from the Governor or court entitled to grant such certificate, shall thereafter vote or offer to vote at any election or primary, he shall upon conviction thereof be adjudged guilty of a felony, and, for each and every such offense shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than five years.'
Although defendant had counsel of his own choosing, he acted pro se during the entire trial.
At the conclusion of an 11-day trial from November 16, 1964, to November 27, 1964, the case was given to the jury for its consideration and verdict. After deliberating for some time, the foreman of the jury informed the court, in open court and with the jury in the jury box, that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Thereupon the court ordered that a juror be withdrawn from the jury box, and the court declared a mistrial and excused the jury. Shortly thereafter, the court reconvened the jury, reopened the case, and received a verdict of guilty on Count 1. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary. It is from this conviction defendant appeals.
Defendant's contentions are: (1) The court having declared a mistrial because of the announced inability of the jury to agree on a verdict, the subsequent order of court reopening the case and receiving a verdict as to one count was a nullity. (A) The prosecutor's communications with the jurors before the return of the so-called verdict contaminated the jury's findings. (2) The court erred in refusing to poll the jury upon demand by the defendant. (3) The Act under which defendant was indicted is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant. (4) The Act under which defendant was indicted was repealed without a saving clause before defendant was indicted. (5) There was insufficient evidence to justify the verdict. (A) No proof that defendant knowingly violated the law or that he had the requisite criminal intent. (1) The judge refused to instruct that knowledge was essential. (B) No proof that he 'offered to vote.' (C) No proof that a court did not restore defendant's rights. (6) Defendant was entitled to his discharge under the Four Term Act. (7) The court erred in failing to inquire about the prejudice of a juror who announced to another juror that 'it will be all over in five minutes.'
Initially, as defendant seeks reversal without remandment, we consider those contentions which, if considered valid, are sufficiently basic to require final judgment here.
The first considered of these contentions is, 'The Act under which defendant was indicted [or convicted] is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant.' Defendant asserts that 'knowledge of the disability to vote was essential to the proof of the State's case.' Defendant maintains that Lambert v. People of State of California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957), is controlling on this point. In that case, a Los Angeles Municipal Code provided that any person who had been convicted of a felony was required to register with the police if he remained in the city for more than five days, and that failing to do so constituted a crime. The evidence shows that a Miss Lambert had previously been convicted of forgery and failed to register. Upon such proof, defendant was convicted and sentenced. During the course of her trial she attempted to prove she had no actual knowledge of the requirement that she register. Such offer was refused by the trial court. The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional as it applied to the defendant and stated (p. 228, 78 S.Ct. p. 243):
Also, (pp. 229-230, 78 S.Ct. pp. 243-244.)
The State notes that in Lambert v. People of State of California, it was also said (p. 228, 78 S.Ct. p. 243):
'But we deal here with conduct that is wholly passive--mere failure to register. It is unlike the commission of acts * * *. The rule that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse' * * * is deep in our law, as is the principle that of all the powers of local government, the police power is 'one of the least limitable."
From this the State argues the Lambert case was concerned with punishing passive conduct, and since the complained of actions of defendant were positive, the Lambert case does not apply here. We agree.
Pronouncements made in Thompson v. State, 26 Tex.App. 94, 9 S.W. 486 (Texas) (1888), are pertinent here:
* * *. (pp. 486-487.)
See, also, Gandy v. State, 5 So. 420 (Ala.), to the same effect.
Defendant also quotes the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution:
From this, defendant argues,
Defendant further asserts, ...
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