People v. Dettenthaler
Decision Date | 06 December 1898 |
Citation | 118 Mich. 595,77 N.W. 450 |
Parties | PEOPLE v. DETTENTHALER. GROSVENOR, DAIRY & FOOD COM'R, v. CALKINS, POLICE JUSTICE. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Exceptions from superior court of Grand Rapids; Edwin A. Burlingame Judge.
Certiorari to circuit court, Jackson county; Erastus Peck, Judge.
Frank J. Dettenthaler was convicted of selling oleomargarine contrary to law, and he appeals; and the two cases, raising the same questions, are considered together. Order in certiorari case affirmed, and judgment against Dettenthaler reversed.
Mandamus by the people, on the relation of Elliot O. Grosvenor, dairy and food commissioner, against J. Jay Calkins, police justice of the city of Jackson, to compel respondent to issue a warrant for the arrest of one Harry A. Lincoln, charged with selling oleomargarine contrary to Act No. 76, Laws 1897. The writ was denied, and relator brings the case up on certiorari.
Fred A. Maynard, Atty. Gen., Frank A. Rodgers Pros. Atty., and Benn M. Corwin, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Rood & Hindman and Edwin F. Sweet, for respondent.
John G Hawley, for plaintiff in certiorari.
Rood & Hindman, for defendant in certiorari.
These cases involve the validity of Act No. 76, Laws 1897, which is as follows:
The validity of the law is questioned. The record shows that this was a senate bill, and passed the senate without the constitutional enacting clause. The records of the house show that the bill was reported by the committee on agriculture and the committee of the whole without amendment, and with the recommendation that it be passed. Under the head of "Third Reading of Bills upon Passage," the record of the house shows that: As this is the only time the bill was before the house, we must find that the bill passed the house without an enacting clause, unless the contrary can be shown by other evidence. Counsel undertook to show that it was amended in this particular, by the records of the senate, and the testimony of the clerk of the house. The evidence is, in brief, that previous to the passage of the bill in the house the clerk noticed the absence of the enacting clause, and brought it to the attention of the house, and said that he would enter one, and accordingly wrote the words in the original bill; i. e. the one which was then before the house. He did not testify that the house took any action upon it, or that any record was made of it. The senate record shows that the bill was subsequently returned to the senate, accompanied by a letter from the clerk of the house, reading as follows:
It further appears that the senate concurred in such amendment.
We must determine, therefore, whether the house is shown to have amended the bill by inserting an enacting clause, and, if not, whether the law is valid without it. The most that can be claimed is that there is oral testimony that the clerk announced its absence, and stated that he would supply it. Inferentially, perhaps, we may say that there was no objection made; but the evidence is silent as to what if anything, occurred. There is nothing but this inference of silence which imports acquiescence in the amendment. There is nothing to show definite action by the house, which alone had power to amend the bill before it. So that, if the clause is essential to the validity of the act, we need not discuss the propriety of admitting parol evidence to prove an amendment which should be shown by the record, if one was authorized. See Attorney General v. Rice, 64 Mich. 391, 31 N.W. 203; Hart v. McElroy, 72 Mich. 446, 40 N.W. 750; Sackrider v. Supervisors, 79 Mich. 66, 44 N.W. 165. Is the constitutional enacting clause a requisite to a valid law? This must depend upon whether the constitutional provision is to be considered a mandatory provision or directory merely. See Const. art. 4, � 48. Among the authorities cited by the relator in support of his contention is that of Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 270. The constitutional provision is similar to ours, and it was held that a substantial compliance was sufficient. In that case the style of the resolution was, "Resolved by the legislature of the state of Mississippi." The court was unable to discover a previous judicial decision of the question, but quoted Mr. Cushing to the effect that the prescribed "form must be strictly pursued, and that no equivalent language will be sufficient," and, while declining to accept his rule, said: ' The case of McPherson v. Leonard, 29 Md. 377, holds that the provision of the constitution of Maryland was directory, and that the omission of the words "by the general assembly of...
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