People v. Deuter
Decision Date | 13 October 2022 |
Docket Number | B311353 |
Parties | THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRANDY JAMIE JORDAN DEUTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Ct. No. BA485309, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Affirmed.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Peggy Z. Huang, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Brandy Jaime Jordan Deuter (Jordan) stole a plaque from a city councilman's office and a phone from a nearby hair salon where she also tried to steal a touchscreen tablet and credit card reader that allows businesses to process credit card payments. The trial court convicted Jordan of second degree burglary for the incident at the councilman's office and attempted second degree burglary for the incident at the salon. Jordan appeals, arguing substantial evidence did not support the finding she had the requisite intent to steal when she entered the two premises. She also argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the People's case and that the abstract of judgment erroneously states she was convicted of burglary, rather than attempted burglary, for the incident at the salon.
We conclude that substantial evidence supported the verdicts and that the trial court did not err in denying Jordan's motion for judgment of acquittal. We also agree with Jordan and the People the abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment. In all other respects, we affirm.
One morning in September 2019 Sean Starkey was working at a city councilman's district office on Sunset Boulevard when he heard someone in the office screaming. He went to the front of the office and saw Jordan pacing back and forth. He asked her if she needed any assistance; she responded incoherently. Jordan grabbed a plaque off the wall, took some voter registration forms, and started to leave the office. Starkey demanded that Jordan return the plaque; Jordan again responded incoherently. She walked out the door and up Sunset Boulevard.
Jordan went to a hair salon across the street from the councilman's office and spoke with an employee. Jordan appeared lost, but became offended when asked to leave. Jordan tried to take a tablet and a credit card reader from the salon, but could not because they were mounted to a desk. She grabbed a phone instead and left the salon. (Jordan testified she asked an employee to borrow a phone or a tablet so she could contact her mother.) The owner of the salon estimated that the value of the phone was $20 and that the value of the tablet and credit card reader was $1,100.
After she left the salon, a group of people chased her, and she began to run. Eventually, someone sprayed pepper spray in her eyes. Jordan returned the phone and said, A police officer later arrested Jordan in a parking lot and retrieved the councilman's plaque. When questioned by the police, Jordan said she took the plaque to make a "motherfucking point."
The People charged Jordan with (1) assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); (2) making a criminal threat (id., § 422, subd. (a)); (3) second degree burglary of the councilman's office (id., § 459); and (4) second degree burglary of the salon (ibid.). After a court trial, the court found Jordan not guilty on counts 1 and 2, guilty on count 3, and guilty of attempted burglary as a lesser included offense of count 4. (See People v. Michaels (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 194, 196 [ ].)
On the burglary and attempted burglary convictions, the court found that Jordan intended to steal from the councilman's office and the salon and that she had the intent to steal when she entered the two premises. The court stated that the two thefts occurred "in the same temporal period" and that the temporal proximity of the two crimes was circumstantial evidence Jordan had the intent to steal upon entering the councilman's office. Regarding the salon incident, the court found Jordan had the requisite intent because upon entering the salon she unsuccessfully tried to take the tablet and the credit card reader and later "grabbed the mobile phone and departed the premises." The court also found Jordan's entering the salon "after taking the plaque from the councilman's office" was circumstantial evidence she had the intent to steal when she entered the salon.
After Jordan asked the trial court not to sentence her to probation, the court sentenced her to three years four months in county jail. Jordan filed a timely notice of appeal.
Penal Code section 459 provides that a person who enters, among other things, a house, shop, or other building "with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary." Burglary requires "not only that a defendant enter a structure, but that he do so with a particular objective in mind: larceny (or any other felony)." (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 939; see People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077 [].) Burglaries of structures other than inhabited dwelling houses and vessels, floating homes, and trailer coaches are second degree burglaries. (Pen. Code, § 460, subds. (a) & (b); Corona v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 950, 955; see People v. Maestas (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 247, 252 [ ].) A person is guilty of attempted burglary when he or she (1) has the specific intent to commit burglary and (2) commits a direct but ineffectual act toward its commission. (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 605; see People v. Clark (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [ ].)
"Specific intent '"is rarely susceptible of direct proof and usually must be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense."'" (People v. Thompkins (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 365, 403.) This is true for burglary. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643 []; People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 41 [].)
(People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302, internal quotation marks omitted.) (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) We do not, however, "reconsider the weight to be given any particular item of evidence" or ask whether the trier of fact's "judgment was the most probable interpretation of the evidence, but simply whether it was a rational one." (Navarro, at pp. 302, 307.)
Jordan argues that she did not have the intent to commit burglary before or upon entering either premises and that it was her interactions with employees at the office and the salon that provoked her to take (or try to take) the items she stole (or tried to steal).[1] Substantial circumstantial evidence, however, supported the trial court's finding Jordan had the requisite intent for burglary of the councilman's office and attempted burglary of the hair salon.
Jordan argues she entered the office to speak with the councilman not to steal anything. Substantial evidence, however, supported the trial court's contrary finding. When questioned by...
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