People v. DiFalco

• Decision Date: 25 February 1993
• Citation: 594 N.Y.S.2d 679,80 N.Y.2d 693,610 N.E.2d 352
• Parties: , 610 N.E.2d 352 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dominic J. DiFALCO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 679

594 N.Y.S.2d 679

80 N.Y.2d 693, 610 N.E.2d 352

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dominic J. DiFALCO, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Feb. 25, 1993.

Murray and Williams, Batavia (Thomas D. Williams, of counsel), for appellant.

Robert C. Noonan, Dist. Atty. of Genesee County, Batavia (Lawrence Friedman, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HANCOCK, Judge.

Based on information provided by an identified person, the police stopped the car defendant was driving, arrested defendant and a passenger, and seized cocaine found inside the car. The issue here is whether the veracity component of the Aguilar/ Spinelli test for the adequacy of probable cause may--as indicated in People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471--be satisfied by police corroboration of details that are not, if taken separately, suggestive of criminal activity. We hold that, in this case, the informant's veracity was established by such details. The order of the Appellate Division should, therefore, be affirmed.

I.

On his own initiative, the informant, Timothy Thompson, told a Genesse County Deputy Sheriff that Johnny Lee Shannon was selling cocaine. He gave the information directly to the police in a face-to-face meeting at the station house. Thompson had never previously acted as an informant for a police agency and, even though he was on probation and had sought help from the police in gaining admission to a drug treatment program, there is no indication that he was under any immediate or future threat of being charged with violating his probation. The Deputy gave Thompson $200 in police "buy" money and drove him to Shannon's house so that he could make a controlled "buy". Although he dropped Thompson off around the corner from Shannon's house, the Deputy did not see him enter or leave it. Thompson was gone for about four minutes and, upon his return, said that Shannon had taken the money. The Deputy searched him and confirmed the fact that he no longer had the $200.

According to Thompson, Shannon was going to Rochester to pick up cocaine; he would drive a white Chevrolet Impala, which the Deputy had seen in Shannon's driveway in Batavia; he would travel east to Rochester and return via Route 490; and Shannon would meet Thompson to deliver his order of cocaine in about 1 hour and 45 minutes at a specified address on Dublin Road in Bergen, a town just off Route 490, a few miles west of Rochester. Police observers soon reported that the white Chevrolet Impala had left Shannon's driveway. A few minutes later, the police located the car on College Road in Batavia heading east toward Route 490 with Shannon in the passenger seat and defendant driving. Defendant and Shannon entered Route 490 and proceeded east toward Rochester. Approximately one and a half hours later, they reappeared traveling west on Route 490. The police stopped the car on the Route 490 exit ramp leading to Bergen, arrested both occupants, and seized the cocaine which they found inside.

Defendant moved to suppress the evidence found in the car based on lack of probable cause for the warrantless arrest. After the trial court denied the motion, defendant pleaded guilty to criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that probable cause existed for the arrest based on the information provided by Thompson and that the police had corroborated sufficient details of Thompson's information to ensure its reliability 178 A.D.2d 969, 578 N.Y.S.2d 731. Two Justices dissented, arguing that corroboration by the noncriminal activities observed did not to establish the reliability of Thompson's information.

II.

Probable cause for a warrantless arrest may be based on hearsay information, but only upon a showing that both the basis of knowledge and veracity components of the Aguilar/ Spinelli test have been met (see, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637; People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 402, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 375, 465 N.Y.S.2d 857, 452 N.E.2d 1185). ¹ Only the veracity component of the test is at issue here. That component relates to the validity of the information and requires a showing either that the informant is credible and that the information supplied may, for that reason, be accepted as true or, in the absence of such showing, that the specific information given is reliable (see, Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. at 415-416, 89 S.Ct. at 588-89; Johnson, supra, 66 N.Y.2d at 402, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; Stanley v. State, 19 Md.App. 507, 313 A.2d 847, 863 [CtSpecApps1974]; see also, 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.3[a], at 613 [2d ed. 1987]. The separate basis of knowledge and veracity requirements of Aguilar/ Spinelli are analytically independent and each must be satisfied (see, Johnson, supra, 66 N.Y.2d at 402-403, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 488 N.E.2d 439; see also, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 592, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2086, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 [Harlan, J., dissenting].

Here, the People seek to satisfy the veracity requirement of Aguilar/ Spinelli not by focusing on the informant or his propensity for truth telling, but by establishing the reliability of the particular information provided by the informant. ² They contend that this may be done by corroboration through independent verification of sufficient details of that information, despite the fact that, analyzed separately, these details do not evince criminality. The People argue that permitting satisfaction of the veracity requirement with such corroboration can meet the concern for individual liberty necessarily involved in a warrantless arrest based on hearsay information from a known informant. We agree.

In People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471, supra, this Court emphasized that while the basis of knowledge for the informant's tip may, in a proper case, be "corroborated" through details, it can only be done if the details are sufficient in number and suggestive of or directly related to criminal activities (id., at 236, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 406 N.E.2d 471). The question here is whether this same insistence that the "corroborated" details evince criminality is a necessary and appropriate requirement when the veracity component of the Aguilar/ Spinelli test is being satisfied by independent verification of the informant's tip. We hold that such insistence is not necessary. This conclusion is justified by the conceptual and functional differences between the basis of knowledge and veracity components.

"Corroboration", as the word is used when the informant's basis of knowledge is established from the informant's statement alone is, in the true sense of the term, not corroboration at all; it is, in actuality, nothing more than the effect or impression on the arresting officer or issuing Magistrate created by the accumulation and quality of details in the information furnished by the informant (see, Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. at 416-417, 89 S.Ct. at 589; see also, Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 Iowa L.Rev. 551, 557-558 [1984]. Such details, if they are sufficient in number and possess the proper specificity, can "corroborate" or "self-verify" the basis for the informant's data by demonstrating that the informant must have obtained the information from firsthand observation or intimate knowledge of the criminal enterprise (see, Spinelli, supra). ³ For the veracity component, on the other hand, "corroboration" by verification of details is the traditional sort of independent corroboration by the police in checking out the truth of the informant's tip through information obtained from a source other than the informant's statement (see, Stanley, 313 A.2d, at 862-863, supra; see also, Kamisar, op. cit., at 557-558).

The protections provided by the two components of the Aguilar/ Spinelli test also differ. The purpose of the basis of knowledge inquiry is the assurance that the informant's tip does not reflect inaccurate information or rumor. When the police or issuing Magistrates ground their acceptance of the informant's basis of knowledge on the quantity and nature of the details in the informant's statement their judgment is being made solely--and without other confirmation--on an analysis of the data the informant supplied and the words used. It is reasonable, in that situation, to require that at least some of the details in the informant's statement be of criminal activities showing that the source had firsthand knowledge of the criminal endeavor.

In contrast to this method of "corroboration" through "self-verification", often used to establish the basis of knowledge, the protection provided by the veracity component is the assurance that the informant is worthy...