People v. Doan

• Decision Date: 24 April 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 74011
• Citation: 141 Mich.App. 209,366 N.W.2d 593
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald DOAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 593

366 N.W.2d 593

141 Mich.App. 209

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald DOAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 74011.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Dec. 20, 1984.

Decided March 4, 1985.

Released for Publication April 24, 1985.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Robert H. Cleland, Pros. Atty., and Peter R. George, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the People.

James, Neuhard, State Appellate Defender by John Nussbaumer, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before BRONSON, P.J., and HOOD and SHEPHERD, JJ.

SHEPHERD, Judge.

A jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. The sole issue at trial was whether defendant was insane when he stabbed the victim, his brother, several times with a steak knife. The trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment. We reverse and remand for a new trial due to the nature of a prosecution psychologist's testimony regarding the legal definitions of insanity, mental illness and mental retardation.

More specifically, we hold that:

A. Expert witnesses may not express an opinion on the Legislature's intent in adopting statutory language. It is the function of the court to state the meaning of statutes.

B. Mental illness as defined by the Legislature is not limited to psychosis.

C. The concept of mental retardation has not been quantified by the Legislature and it was error for an expert witness to testify that one may not be considered mentally retarded unless he or she has an IQ of 60 or less.

D. Legal definitions must be presented to the jury by means of judicial instructions and not through the give-and-take of direct and cross-examination. The jury may not be allowed to speculate on which portion of an expert's testimony is the legitimate expression of opinion and which is impermissible statutory construction.

E. An expert's testimony must be couched in language which is professional, clear and within the parameters of the standards set by the law. Experts may not even partially base an opinion on an insanity defense by the use of such colloquial and imprecise expressions as a defendant did or did not go "bananas" and was or was not "out in left field".

A psychologist testified for the defense regarding defendant's mental condition at the time of the killing. The witness indicated that defendant's "IQ" was in the dull normal range and that he had a limited ability to arrange and process information and to relate to meaning and symbols. According to this witness, defendant had "severe" neuropsychological problems, which might well have originated in his early childhood. The witness concluded that defendant was insane when he killed his brother.

In rebuttal, the people's expert witness testified that defendant was neither mentally ill nor retarded and, therefore, not insane. Over repeated objections by defense counsel, the judge allowed the psychologist to give his interpretation of the meaning of the terms "insanity", "mental illness" and "mental retardation", as they are used in the pertinent statutes. See, infra. The defense attorney argued that it was not the witness's function to give opinions as to what the law means. The judge replied that the witness would be subject to cross-examination and that the jury should disregard anything which they "perceive[d] as instructions from this witness".

The psychologist then proceeded to give the testimony now complained of on appeal. First, he opined that the statutory definition of mental illness was drawn from the definition of "psychosis" in a manual of the American Psychiatric Association. The manual, according to the witness, defines psychosis as "a gross distortion of reality, when someone's just out in left field". Secondly, he defined mental retardation as "an IQ of 60 or less". Finally, he gave his views on the meaning of legal insanity:

"[T]hat's what we kind of are trying to determine, what a person was thinking at the time of the alleged crime, was there any indication of mental retardation, was this behavior in their control, could they control their behavior, or were they driven by some impulse, some psychotic thought, or were they so retarded that did they pick up a gun and then it was bananas. Did they not understand that the bullets would come out of the gun."

The witness admitted on cross-examination that there are "lesser degrees" of mental disorder, but maintained that "generally mental illness is defined as a psychosis".

The Legislature has defined "legal insanity", "mental illness" and "mental retardation" as follows:

"A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness as defined in section 400a of Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974, being section 330.1400a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or as a result of mental retardation as defined in section 500(g) of Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974, being section 330.1500 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." M.C.L. Sec. 768.21a(1); M.S.A. Sec. 28.1044(1)(1).

"As used in this chapter, 'mental illness' means a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." M.C.L. Sec. 330.1400a; M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(400a).

" 'Mentally retarded' means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior." M.C.L. Sec. 330.1500(g); M.S.A. Sec. 14.800(500)(g).

Although these definitions are constructed of vague terminology, perhaps due to the imprecise nature of the subject matter, we agree with defendant's claim that expert witnesses go beyond their proper function when they give an opinion to the jury concerning the Legislature's intent. Since we find the error to be prejudicial in the context of this case, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

"Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." MRE 704; People v. Robinson, 417 Mich. 231, 331 N.W.2d 226 (1983). There is nothing wrong with psychiatrist's or psychologist's testifying that defendant was or was not insane when he performed the act. However, an expert's opinion as to the applicable law of criminal responsibility or insanity is of no aid to the jury and could possibly confuse them in light of their duty to apply the law solely as explained by the judge at the end of the case. People v. Drossart, 99 Mich.App. 66, 76, 297 N.W.2d 863 (1980), lv. den. 410 Mich. 892 (1981). "[I]t is the exclusive responsibility of the trial judge to find and interpret the applicable law." People v. Lyons, 93 Mich.App. 35, 46, 285 N.W.2d 788 (1979). While the expert may give opinions, even though couched in legal language which "embraces an ultimate issue", MRE 704, the witness's function does not extend to enlightening the court or jury on matters of law. The distinction has been consistently followed by the courts of this state. In re Powers Estate, 375 Mich. 150, 172-173, 134 N.W.2d 148 (1965), Kempsey v. McGinniss, 21 Mich. 123 (1870).

We find good reason to apply this rule to cases like this one. A psychologist has no special knowledge regarding what the Legislature meant when it defined the relevant terms. Rather, this witness appears to have drawn his opinion of the Legislature's intent by reference to a distinctly non-legislative standard, namely, a manual of the American Psychiatric Association. We do not mean to belittle the integrity of that organization, but it does not enjoy the status of a law-making body. Though the concepts of mental illness and insanity suggest reference to the medical and psychiatric sciences, "the definition used to describe those terms, at least for purposes of avoiding criminal responsibility, must come from the law". Drossart, supra, 99 Mich.App. p. 75, 297 N.W.2d 863; see also, People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 407, 420-422, 192 N.W.2d 215 (1971). "[A] basic postulate in a democratic society is the avoidance of government by experts in crucial areas of law-making and adjudication." Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed), p 465. As this Court noted in Drossart, supra, 99 Mich.App. pp. 76-77, 297 N.W.2d 863:

"The testimony is incompetent because opinions by medical experts on the correct legal standard of criminal responsibility in Michigan [are] outside the range of the witness's expertise in the field of mental diseases. Commonwealth v O'Conner, , 387 NE2d 190, 195-196 (Mass App, 1979), State v Kelly [118 NJ Super 38; 285 A2d 571 (1972) ], supra, 7 Wigmore [Evidence], supra, Sec. 1952. The testimony is also irrelevant because it is not 'otherwise admissible' under MRE 403, 701, 702. MRE 704, McCormick [Evidence], supra, Sec. 12, p 27, fn 47. Thus, even if the medical expert were competent to testify about his understanding of the applicable legal standard for insanity, the resultant 'confusion of the issues or misleading the jury' by a potentially conflicting instruction given by the trial judge would be a proper ground for excluding the testimony from trial. MRE 403. This is especially true where there is possibility that the witness might develop his own legal definition, standard, or criterion for measuring criminal insanity or mental illness."

The people urge that the error was harmless because the judge made it clear to the jury that it was his responsibility to instruct on the law. We disagree. In response to the defense attorney's objections, the judge stated that there would be an opportunity for cross-examination. This opportunity could not cure the error. The law must be presented to the jury by means of judicial instruction, not through the...