People v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 07 April 1988
• Docket Number: 88635,Docket Nos. 87929
• Citation: 421 N.W.2d 200,166 Mich.App. 455
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John J. STINSON, Defendant-Appellant. 166 Mich.App. 455, 421 N.W.2d 200
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 200

421 N.W.2d 200

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John J. STINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 87929, 88635.

166 Mich.App. 455, 421 N.W.2d 200

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 2, 1987.

Decided Feb. 17, 1988.

Released for Publication April 7, 1988.

[166 MICHAPP 458] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div. Research, Training and Appeals, and Rosemary A. Gordon, Asst. Pros. Atty., in Anderson, and Larry L. Roberts, Asst. Pros. Atty., in Stinson, for the People.

John D. Lazar, Royal Oak, for Robert Anderson.

George Stone, Southfield, for John Stinson.

Before HOOD, P.J., and MAHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In these consolidated appeals, codefendants Robert Anderson and John J. Stinson challenge their convictions and sentences, which [166 MICHAPP 459] were received after a joint jury trial held between August 19, 1985, and August 28, 1985. Defendant Anderson was tried on a three-count information alleging murder in the first degree for the death of Diane James, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, assault with intent to do greatly bodily harm less than murder upon Curtis McMiller, M.C.L. Sec. 750.84; M.S.A. Sec. 28.279, and assault with intent to murder Helen James, M.C.L. Sec. 750.83; M.S.A. Sec. 28.278. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree for the death of Diane James, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549, and guilty of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder as to both McMiller and Helen James, M.C.L. Sec. 750.84; M.S.A. Sec. 28.279. Defendant Anderson was sentenced to serve thirty-five to seventy-five years in prison for the second-degree murder conviction and two concurrent six- to ten-year terms on the assault convictions.

Defendant Stinson was charged with the same offenses on a theory of aiding and abetting and was found guilty of murder in the second degree for the death of Diane James, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549. He was found not guilty in the assault of McMiller and Helen James. Defendant Stinson was sentenced on September 6, 1985, to fifteen to sixty years in prison. From their convictions and sentences both defendants now appeal as of right alleging numerous errors which allegedly occurred during pretrial, trial, and in the imposition of their sentences.

The charges arose out of an incident occurring in the early morning hours of March 11, 1985. Defendants were driving on Woodward Avenue near Six Mile Road in Detroit. At approximately 3:15 a.m., Helen James was working as a prostitute near the intersection of Collingham and Woodward. She was approached by a gray automobile[166 MICHAPP 460] occupied by two males, whom she identified at both the preliminary examination and at trial as defendants. As she leaned over to speak to Stinson through the window, she was stabbed by Anderson, who had exited from the automobile. He then got back into the car, which sped away. James was able to memorize the automobile's license plate number. The automobile then approached Curtis McMiller, who was walking alone on Woodward. As he crossed the street, he heard a voice coming from the passenger side. He could not understand what was said, and proceeded to cross the street. Then, he heard a car door slam and a voice say, "Are you a boy or a girl?" When he turned towards the voice, he was stabbed in the face by Anderson, who jumped into the automobile, which again sped away. The automobile continued down Woodward, where LaKandra Thomas and Diane James were working as prostitutes. As the two were conversing with defendants, defendant Anderson stabbed James in the chest. James died shortly after being taken to a hospital.

Upon doing a LEIN check on the automobile, the owner was determined to be defendant Stinson. The automobile was discovered at approximately 8:00 a.m. at Warren High School and was impounded and searched by police. Later that evening, an evidence technician from the Detroit Police Department arrived at the Warren Police Department to process the automobile. From the outside of the automobile, the officer saw a knife on the dashboard of the passenger's side and a knife case on the passenger's seat. The officer used a slim jim to open the automobile and did a thorough search, which revealed a Schrade knife with blood on the tip, a knife case, pop and beer bottles, an empty bottle of rum, and a bottle of Rush liquid incense.

[166 MICHAPP 461] That morning, defendants were seen by individuals at Warren High School and were described as apparently drunk, having slurred speech, bloodshot eyes and staggering movements. James Devereaux, a teacher at Warren High School, testified that defendant Anderson came to see him at 12:30 that afternoon and told him that he thought he had killed a black prostitute at Six Mile and Woodward. Pamela Kapp, a friend of defendant Anderson, testified that Anderson told her that evening that he had stabbed some people.

At approximately 3:45 p.m. on March 11, 1985, defendant Stinson, accompanied by his attorney, turned himself in to the Detroit Police Department Homicide Section. On March 13, 1985, Anderson turned himself in.

Defendant Anderson raises nine issues on appeal, and defendant Stinson raises seven. We will address each issue seriatim, discussing Anderson's issues first.

DEFENDANT ANDERSON'S ISSUES

I. Was defendant denied a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel by the conduct of his attorney and the trial judge?

Numerous verbal exchanges occurred between the court and defendant's counsel. Most of these were brief exchanges regarding the court's dissatisfaction with defense counsel's tendency to interrupt witnesses when he didn't like their answers. In the two most serious exchanges, the court ordered defense counsel to sit down, prompting an argument by counsel.

An accused has a right to be represented by an attorney who is treated with the consideration due an officer of the court. Belittling observations aimed at the attorney are necessarily injurious to [166 MICHAPP 462] the one he represents. People v. Neal, 290 Mich. 123, 129, 287 N.W. 403 (1939). Trial judges who berate, scold and demean a lawyer, so as to hold him up to contempt in the eyes of the jury, destroy the balance of impartiality necessary to a fair hearing. People v. Wigfall, 160 Mich.App. 765, 773, 408 N.W.2d 551 (1987); People v. Wilson, 21 Mich.App. 36, 38, 174 N.W.2d 914 (1969). While unfair criticism of defense counsel in front of the jury is always improper, reversal is necessary only when the court's conduct denied defendant a fair and impartial trial by unduly influencing the jury. Wigfall, supra, 160 Mich.App. at p. 774, 408 N.W.2d 551.

On the other hand, ideally the judge

"... would always discreetly and circumspectly subordinate his opinions and emotions so as to display courtesy and impartiality to counsel and litigants notwithstanding their actions.

"It is not always possible; and it does not follow that every deviation from the ideal requires a new trial. Few verdicts would ever stand were that so. Rather, recognizing both human fallibility and the stress of trial, each case is to be reviewed in its entirety to determine whether an atmosphere of prejudice has crept in which may have deprived the appellant of a fair trial." People v. McIntosh, 62 Mich.App. 422, 438-439, 234 N.W.2d 157 (1975), reversed in part on other grounds 400 Mich. 1, 252 N.W.2d 779 (1977).

Upon a reading of the record as a whole, we find that reversal is not required. The incidents occurred because defense counsel repeatedly interrupted the witnesses. Defense counsel's behavior was quarrelsome and provoked the court's comments. The court's comments did not belittle and berate counsel, but were responses to counsel's remarks.

Defendant also argues that the disputes between [166 MICHAPP 463] defense counsel and the court denied him the effective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that defense counsel fought hard and conscientiously to protect his client's interests. Defendant does not contend that counsel made a big mistake but for which the outcome would have been different. Therefore, we conclude that under either People v. Garcia, 398 Mich. 250, 247 N.W.2d 547 (1976), or Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel merely because his attorney engaged in some verbal exchanges with the court.

II. Were certain expert witnesses allowed to invade the province of the court by stating opinions on the legal definitions of mental illness, insanity and diminished capacity and the legislature's intent in adopting statutory language?

At trial, defendant's defense was insanity, diminished capacity and intoxication. There was testimony that defendant suffered from alcoholism, an organic brain syndrome, and the symptoms of alcohol idiosyncratic intoxification. In addition, there was testimony that defendant had been drinking on the evening of the stabbings. The prosecutor questioned Dr. Rosalind Griffin, defendant's expert witness, and asked her whether a diagnosis of antisocial or substance abuse personality was a mental illness within the legal definition of mental illness. The prosecutor also questioned Dr. George Czertko, an expert for the people, and asked him to explain the legal concept of diminished capacity. Czertko recited in his own words his understanding of diminished capacity. Following objection by defense counsel on the ground [166 MICHAPP 464] that legal definitions are beyond the expertise of doctors, the court read aloud the statutory definitions of insanity, mental illness and mental retardation.

Expert testimony in the form of an...