People v. Doane

• Citation: 145 A.D.3d 1088,2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08122,41 N.Y.S.3d 799
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lee W. DOANE, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 01 December 2016
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

145 A.D.3d 1088
41 N.Y.S.3d 799
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08122

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Lee W. DOANE, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Dec. 1, 2016.

41 N.Y.S.3d 799

Patrick A. Perfetti, Cortland, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

41 N.Y.S.3d 800

Weeden A. Wetmore, District Attorney, Elmira (Terry Northrup of counsel), for respondent.

Before: McCARTHY, J.P., LYNCH, DEVINE, MULVEY and AARONS, JJ.

AARONS, J.

145 A.D.3d 1088

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Chemung County (Buckley, J.), rendered November 2, 2009, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree.

145 A.D.3d 1089

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of murder in the second degree. Consistent with the terms of that plea agreement, County Court sentenced defendant to 23 years to life in prison. Defendant appeals. We affirm.

Defendant contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because County Court did not make an adequate inquiry into a possible intoxication defense. As an initial matter, in light of defendant's statements made during the plea colloquy concerning his alcohol consumption at the time of the crime, defendant's failure to make an appropriate postallocution motion is not fatal to his claim, which remains reviewable (see People v. McNulty, 70 A.D.3d 1127, 1128, 894 N.Y.S.2d 573 [2010] ; People v. Carter, 62 A.D.3d 1154, 1154, 881 N.Y.S.2d 181 [2009], lv. denied 13 N.Y.3d 795, 887 N.Y.S.2d 544, 916 N.E.2d 439 [2009] ; People v. Maldonado, 254 A.D.2d 574, 574, 680 N.Y.S.2d 676 [1998] ). The specific intent to cause the death of another person is an element of the crime of murder in the second degree (see Penal Law § 125.25[1] ), and such element may be negated by the potential defense of intoxication (see People v. Thomson, 279 A.D.2d 644, 644–645, 719 N.Y.S.2d 171 [2001] ). As such, defendant's awareness of the right to present such evidence is generally essential to a knowing and voluntary guilty plea (see People v. Decenzo, 132 A.D.3d 1160, 1161, 18 N.Y.S.3d 760 [2015], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 996, 38 N.Y.S.3d 106, 59 N.E.3d 1218 [2016] ; People v. Thomson, 279 A.D.2d at 645, 719 N.Y.S.2d 171 ).

During the allocution, after defendant indicated that he had consumed alcohol immediately prior to committing the crime, County Court was obligated to inquire at that time whether defendant was aware of a potential intoxication defense and ensure that defendant was knowingly and voluntarily waiving that defense (see People v. Thomson, 279 A.D.2d at 645, 719 N.Y.S.2d 171 ; People v. Osgood, 254 A.D.2d 571, 572, 681 N.Y.S.2d 365 [1998] ; People v. Braman, 136 A.D.2d 382, 384, 527 N.Y.S.2d 104 [1988], lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 911, 532 N.Y.S.2d 760, 528 N.E.2d 1233 [1988] ). Under the circumstances of this case, however, we conclude that defendant's plea was nonetheless made knowingly and voluntarily because of defendant's admissions during the allocution that obviated the need for any further inquiry by County Court. In this regard, defendant's recollection of the incident in question was not equivocal. Rather, defendant provided detailed and vivid facts of the crime, and his statements did not reveal that his mental capacity was somehow diminished when he stabbed the victim (see People v. Hampton, 142 A.D.3d 1305,...