People v. Dobylak

• Decision Date: 15 September 1943
• Docket Number: No. 27053.,27053.
• Citation: 383 Ill. 432,50 N.E.2d 465
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DOBYLAK.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

383 Ill. 432

50 N.E.2d 465

PEOPLE

v.DOBYLAK.

No. 27053.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1943.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1943.

Eugene Kobylak was convicted of operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of the state while intoxicated or under the influence of narcotic drugs, and he brings error.

Judgment affirmed.Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; Gibson E. Gorman, judge.

Ellis & Westbrooks, Claude W. B. Holman, Joseph J. Attwell, Jr., and Richard K. Cooper, all of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, and Melvin S. Rembe, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

FULTON, Justice.

On January 5, 1942, an information was filed against the plaintiff in error in the municipal court of Chicago, charging him with the offense of reckless driving, the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, in violation of section 47 of the Uniform Act RegulatingTraffic (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 95 1/2, par. 144), and also charging him with leaving the scene of an accident after having caused injury to the complainant and two other pedestrians, and without complying with section 36 of the statute. After the information was filed and the plaintiff in error arrested, he appeared by attorneys and filed a motion for discharge on the grounds that he was charged with an offense in excess of the jurisdiction of the municipal court of Chicago; that upon conviction under said section 47, the defendant was liable to punishment by fine, sentence and forfeiture or suspension of his driver's license; and that the municipal court of Chicago has no jurisdiction of any criminal offense which is punishable by fine, sentence and some additional penalties.

The plaintiff in error further claimed that the prosecution on an information instead of by indictment was a violation of his rights under sections 2 and 8 of article II of the constitution of the State of Illinois, Smith-Hurd Stats., and also a violation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution, in that it deprived the plaintiff in error of due process of law. The motion to dismiss was denied, as was also a motion to quash the information. Defendant was arraigned and stood mute whereupon the court entered a plea of not guilty. A jury trial was waived and the cause was submitted to the court without a jury. At the conclusion of the testimony the court found the defendant guilty in manner and form as charged in the information. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled. The defendant made application for probation which application was denied. The court in entering judgment against the defendant found that the defendant was guilty of the offense of operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway of this State while intoxicated or under the influence of narcotic drugs. The defendant was sentenced to confinement in the county jail of Cook county for six months. The final paragraph of said section 47 reads as follows: ‘The Secretary of State shall revoke the chauffeur's license of any person convicted under this section.’

The main question in the case and one which is argued with much emphasis by the plaintiff in error is whether or not the municipal court had jurisdiction of an offense which is punishable by fine, imprisonment, and a forfeiture or suspension of a driver's license. It is his contention that where the punishment consists of a fine and imprisonment and any additional penalty, the offense can be prosecuted only by indictment; that the prosecution of such offense by information in the municipal court is void and violates sections 2 and 8 of article II of the Illinois constitution and the fourteenth amendment of the Federal constitution. Section 8 of article II of the Illinois constitution provides that, ‘No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine, or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary,’ etc. As authority for his position he relies mainly upon People v. Russell, 245 Ill. 268, 91 N.E. 1075, and People v. Harshbarger, 296 Ill.App. 397, 16 N.E.2d 247. In the Russell case a defendant was convicted in the municipal court of Chicago on an information which charged her with petty larceny. Under the common law a conviction for larceny rendered a defendant infamous and there followed a loss of civil rights, which practically deprived the convict of his citizenship unless restored thereto by a pardon. At that time there was no distinction between grand and petty larceny. A statute has been passed since then, removing petty larceny from the class of infamous crimes. In the Russell case the deprivation of...