People v. Finley

• Citation: 21 Ill.App.3d 335,315 N.E.2d 229
• Decision Date: 31 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73--311,73--311
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William FINLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 229

315 N.E.2d 229

21 Ill.App.3d 335

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William FINLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 73--311.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

July 31, 1974.

Stanley L. Tucker, Hartzell, Glidden & Tucker, Carthage, for defendant-appellant.

Patrick J. Corcoran, Asst. State's Atty., Carthage, for plaintiff-appellee.

ALLOY, Justice.

An interlocutory appeal was filed by defendant William Finley pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 110A, § 308). A review was sought of the order of the Circuit Court of Hancock County which struck defendant's jury demand together with defendant's subpoena for discovery deposition and interrogatories which were filed prior to an implied consent hearing under Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, ch. 95 1/2, § 11--501.1(d).

The issue before this Court on appeal is whether a jury trial is required at an 'implied consent' hearing under the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act and whether expansive pretrial civil discovery was properly denied by the trial court. We note that under the provisions of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 95 1/2, § 11--501.1(a)), an individual who is arrested and charged with the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 'impliedly consents' to take and complete a test or chemical analysis of his breath to determine the alcoholic content of his breath. If the arrested individual fails to submit to a breath test, further procedure is under the terms of Section 11--501.1(d) of the Act which reads as follows:

'The Clerk shall thereupon notify such person in writing that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle will be suspended unless, within 28 days from the date of mailing of the notice, he shall request in writing a hearing thereon. If such person fails to request a hearing within such 28 day period, the Clerk shall so notify the Secretary of State who shall automatically suspend such person's driver's license, the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on highways of this State given to a nonresident, or the privilege which an unlicensed person might have to obtain a license under the Driver's License Act, as provided in Paragraph (a) of this Section.

If such person desires a hearing, he shall petition the Circuit Court for and in the county in which he was arrested for such hearing. Such hearing shall proceed in the Court in the same manner as other civil proceedings, except that the scope of such proceedings shall cover only the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11--501 of this Act or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.

Immediately upon the termination of the Court proceedings, the Clerk shall notify the Secretary of State of the Court's decision. The Secretary of State shall thereupon suspend the driver's license . . . if that be the decision of the court * * *.' (emphasis added)

In the cause before us, the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor on October 10, 1973. On October 11, 1973, the Circuit Clerk of Hancock County, issued a written notice to him as prescribed by the Act. Defendant filed a petition for an implied consent hearing under the Act and, also, made a jury demand. Defendant likewise filed a subpoena for a deposition directed to the arresting officer and further filed written interrogatories directed to the State to be answered under oath. The People filed a motion to strike defendant's jury demand and such motion was granted. A motion was also filed by the People to striek the written interrogatories and to quash the subpoena for the deposition of the arresting officer. The court entered an order striking defendant's subpoena for discovery deposition and the interrogatories filed by the defendant.

On appeal to this court, defendant contends that an 'implied consent hearing' is a civil proceeding in which a person is entitled, as a matter of right, to a jury trial, and also to the benefit of pretrial discovery under the terms of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. Both parties agree that the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. In Section 11--501.1(d) of the Act in pertinent part it is provided:

'If such person desires a hearing * * * Such hearing shall proceed in the Court * * *. Immediately upon the termination of the Court proceedings, the Clerk shall notify the Secretary of State of the Court's decision. * * *'

Defendant claims on appeal that the words 'in the Court' should be interpreted to mean that a jury trial was thereby authorized by the Act. The State contends that the language of the statute unequivocally means a hearing conducted and determined by a judge. It is pointed out that under 1973 Illinois Revised Statutes, ch. 38, § 1005-1--6, where 'court' is defined, it is stated to mean a Circuit Court of Illinois and includes a judge thereof.

It is pointed out by the State that under the Constitution of the State of Illinois in both the 1870 Constitution (Section 5, Article II) and in the 1970 Constitution (Section 13, Article I) S.H.A., the right to trial by jury is secured in all tribunals, 'as it had heretofore been enjoyed'. It is asserted that it was not intended in the constitutional provisions to confer the right in any class of cases where a right to jury trial had not previously existed. The conclusion of the State is that a trial by jury is not, therefore, guaranteed in a special statutory proceeding unknown to common law. (People v. Hill, 163 Ill. 186, 46 N.E. 796 (1896); Maynard v. Richards, 166 Ill. 466, 46 N.E. 1138 (1897); Keith v. Henkleman, 173 Ill. 137, 50 N.E. 692 (1898); Moody v. Found, 208 Ill. 78, 69 N.E. 831 (1904); Research Hospital v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company, 352 Ill. 510, 186 N.E. 170 (1933); People v. Niesman, 356 Ill. 322, 190 N.E. 668 (1934); People ex rel. Keith v. Keith, 38 Ill.2d 405, 231 N.E.2d 387, 389 (1967); Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Ill.App.3d 711, 292 N.E.2d 540, 545 (3rd Dist.1973)).

The Section of the Motor Vehicle Act under consideration is a statutory proceeding of recent origin and was unknown at common law. It would, therefore, logically follow that a trial by jury of the implied consent issues is not guaranteed in such proceeding by the Illinois Constitution and the question arises as to whether it is guaranteed by statutory provision. It is clear that the statute in question does not specifically prescribe the right to a jury trial. Defendant claims, however, that since a trial by jury is guaranteed for a simple traffic violation it should likewise be mandated in an 'implied consent' hearing. We do not believe that this is a sound contention. People v. Woerly, 50 Ill.2d 327, 278 N.E.2d 787 (1972) and People v. Manion, 3 Ill.App.3d 621, 278 N.E.2d 175 (1970), cited by defendant as authority for such argument, are distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. In both Woerly and Manion, the defendants were charged with simple traffic violations. The trial court in each case denied the defendant's timely demand for a jury trial. On appeal, both cases were reversed. Section 103--6 of Chapter 38, 1973 Illinois Revised Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that 'Every person accused of an offense shall have the right to a trial by jury * * *'. Section 102--15 of said Chapter 38 provides that an 'offense' is a violation of any penal statute of this State. Section 16--104 of Chapter 95 1/2 provides that it is a misdemeanor for any person to violate any provision of the Act. It is, therefore, apparent that the statutes prescribe a right to trial by jury to a person charged with violating a penal statute.

The question, therefore, arises as to whether the implied consent statute in question before us is a penal statute. A suspension of a driver's license is a purely administrative function of the Secretary of State and is not penal in nature. (See: People v. Quinn, 17 Ill.App.3d 1058, 309 N.E.2d 249 (4th Dist.1974)). People v. Kobylak, 383 Ill. 432, 50 N.E.2d 465, 467, indicates that the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a revocation of a driver's license for a conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor was not part of the punishment for that offense, but merely a regulatory measure. In People v. Jenkins, 128 Ill.App.2d 351, 262 N.E.2d 105, 107, the Appellate Court in citing People v. Kobylak, said that a revocation of a driver's license for one year by the Secretary of State is part of a regulatory measure under the police power of the State governing traffic upon the highways but is not part of any punishment imposed by the Court and does not constitute the loss of any property or civil rights. (See also: People v. Smith, 7 Ill.App.3d 143, 287 N.E.2d 174).

In the 'implied consent' hearing, the Court does not suspend the driver's license. The function of suspending a driver's license is vested solely with the Secretary of State. The purpose of the court proceeding is merely to comply with the due process clause to provide defendant with a forum and to afford him a meaningful hearing to determine if he refused to consent to a breath test after being lawfully arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. (Cf. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287). In the implied consent hearing, it is sought to determine (1) whether the...