People v. Dodson
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 354202 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBB RAY DODSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Mason Circuit Court LC No. 19-003525-FH
Before: Murray, C.J., and M. J. Kelly and O'Brien, JJ.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial conviction of assaulting resisting, or obstructing a police officer causing injury MCL 750.81d(2). We affirm.
This case arises out of a physical altercation between defendant and Sergeant John Balowski of the Mason County Sherriffs Department (MCSD). On February 13, 2019, Sergeant Balowski and Deputy Hildegardo Hinojosa, also of the MCSD, were dispatched to the parking lot of a Dollar General store in Walhalla, Michigan. The officers were to act in a peacekeeping capacity during the return of defendant's nephew from defendant to Dana Hull, the child's mother and defendant's sister. The child had been staying with defendant for approximately four days while Hull was detained for a parole violation. It was Sergeant Balowski's understanding that the child had been placed lawfully into defendant's custody, but since Hull was released, she was legally entitled to the return of the child. It was also Sergeant Balowski's understanding, based on representations by Hull, that there might be difficulty recovering the child from defendant.
In the days leading up to the incident, defendant had been in phone contact with Deputy Matt Murphy of the MCSD, and Agent Aaron Sailor of Children's Protective Services (CPS). Sergeant Balowski had likewise been in contact with Deputy Murphy and, by extension, Agent Sailor. Sergeant Balowski understood that the child was to be returned to Hull on the condition that Hull had adequate transportation and a child car seat. Sergeant Balowski arrived at the Dollar General before defendant and confirmed that Hull had adequate transportation.
Eventually, defendant arrived at the Dollar General in his truck. According to Sergeant Balowski, defendant exited his truck, approached the officers, and asked if they were looking for him. Sergeant Balowski described defendant's demeanor at this time as "agitated." Sergeant Balowski confirmed defendant's identify, then told defendant that the officers were indeed looking for him, and explained that the officers were there to oversee the return of Hull's child to her. According to Sergeant Balowski, defendant said "no" and that he wanted to talk to Agent Sailor. Sergeant Balowski told defendant that Agent Sailor was off-duty and unavailable. Defendant then walked away from Sergeant Balowski and went into the store.
While defendant was in the store, Sergeant Balowski was able to reach Agent Sailor by phone. Agent Sailor told Sergeant Balowski that he would call defendant to tell him that the child was to be returned to Hull. When defendant emerged from the store, he again approached Sergeant Balowski, who explained that he had just spoken with Agent Sailor and that Agent Sailor would call defendant soon to explain that the child should be returned to Hull. Sergeant Balowski told defendant that he needed to stay there until Agent Sailor called so that they could resolve the situation. Defendant ultimately refused to stay and walked away towards his truck. Sergeant Balowski followed defendant. At the truck, defendant opened the driver's door and placed his keys in the ignition.
At that point, Sergeant Balowski, believing that defendant was going to leave, partially entered the truck and grabbed defendant with both hands, placing one hand behind defendant's neck and the other by his shoulder. According to Sergeant Balowski, defendant responded by grabbing the back of Sergeant Balowski's neck with one hand and, with the other hand, making a fist and raising it as though he was about to strike Sergeant Balowski. Sergeant Balowski responded by striking defendant multiple times and then stepping away from the truck to disengage defendant. Sergeant Balowski and Deputy Hinojosa then removed defendant from his truck and arrested him. When Sergeant Balowski stepped away from the truck while attempting to disengage defendant, he sprained his ankle and aggravated a pre-existing abdominal injury.
After defendant was charged, he moved to dismiss, arguing that Sergeant Balowski's initial detention of defendant was an unlawful seizure, so defendant could lawfully resist. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding that the seizure was lawful because Sergeant Balowski had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant.
Afterwards, but still before trial, defendant gave notice of his intention to use prior-acts evidence under MRE 404(b). Defendant sought to admit evidence that Sergeant Balowski used excessive force at a previous law enforcement job in Dearborn, Michigan (the Dearborn Incident), and resigned because of that incident. The prior incident occurred in 2013 when Sergeant Balowski was a Dearborn police officer. In the Dearborn Incident, Sergeant Balowski came in contact with Ali Beydoun at approximately 4:00 a.m., in an area known for car break-ins. At the time, Beydoun was returning home from work when the bike chain fell off his bike, and Beydoun was attempting to repair it. Beydoun spoke limited English and suffered from a mental illness, so he did not respond to Sergeant Balowski's requests to present identification or when Sergeant Balowski said he was going to pat Beydoun down. As a result, when Sergeant Balowski attempted to pat down Beydoun, Beydoun began struggling and pulling away, saying no. Sergeant Balowski then took Beydoun to the ground, and multiple officers assisted Sergeant Balowski in handcuffing Beydoun. Sergeant Balowski submitted his resignation less than a month after the incident.
The prosecution sought to exclude this evidence as impermissible propensity evidence. In response, defendant argued that the purpose of offering the evidence was not for propensity purposes but to demonstrate Sergeant Balowski's system of doing an act or absence of a mistake when in the performance of his duty. According to defendant, the evidence showed Sergeant Balowski's system of escalating situations by manufacturing unrealistic threats and "acting first and investigating later."
After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the evidence was not substantively admissible, but may be admissible for impeachment purposes. The court explained:
[I]t does appear to be propensity evidence; however, I do also see that there could be something that comes up in trial regarding escalation and de-escalation and tactics and how an officer does this on a regular basis. So I think the door could be opened during trial and during testimony where this may become relevant or some portion of it may become relevant.
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted defendant of assaulting a police officer causing injury. Defendant now appeals as of right.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss because Sergeant Balowski lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. According to defendant, he had the right to resist the arrest because Sergeant Balowski did not have reasonable suspicion. See People v Moreno, 491 Mich. 38, 57-58; 814 N.W.2d 624 (2012). We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. People v Stephen, 262 Mich.App. 213, 218; 685 N.W.2d 213 (2004). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision "falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v Nicholson, 297 Mich.App. 191, 196; 822 N.W.2d 284 (2012). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich.App. 560, 566; 876 N.W.2d 826 (2015). This Court reviews de novo the trial court's application of Fourth Amendment principles. People v Slaughter, 489 Mich. 302, 310; 803 N.W.2d 171 (2011).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the same protections are included in the Michigan Constitution. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich. 411, 417; 605 N.W.2d 667 (2000). See also U.S. Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. In the context of police-citizen encounters, there are "three tiers" of Fourth Amendment protections. People v Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 56; 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985). The first tier consists of consensual encounters between citizens and police:" [L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"The second tier of contact is the Terry[1] stop," id. at 57, which is a brief investigative detention based on reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, People v Jenkins, 472 Mich. 26, 32; 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005). Reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion, based upon some objective manifestation, that a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in some type of criminal activity. United States v Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273; 122 S.Ct. 744; 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002); People v Champion, 452 Mich. 92, 98-99; 549 N.W.2d 849 (1996). Our Supreme Court has summarized the requirements for making a valid investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion as follows:
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