People v. Jenkins
| Decision Date | 01 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 125141. |
| Citation | 691 N.W.2d 759,472 Mich. 26 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shawn Leon JENKINS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark Kneisel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Ann Arbor, MI, for the people.
Lloyd E. Powell, Chief Public Defender, and Timothy R. Niemann, First Assistant Public Defender, Ann Arbor, MI, for the defendant.
This case requires us to consider when defendant's consensual encounter with a police officer was transformed into an investigatory stop, which gives rise to Fourth Amendment protections and must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Defendant argues that the officer seized him without reasonable suspicion to do so. The trial court agreed, granting defendant's motion to suppress the incriminating evidence later found by the officer and dismissing the pending charges. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
We conclude that defendant was not "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until after the totality of the circumstances gave the officer a reasonable suspicion that defendant had been engaged in criminal behavior. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for reinstatement of the charges brought against defendant and for further proceedings.
During the evening of August 23, 2001, the Ann Arbor Police Department received a complaint regarding a party in progress in the common area of a housing complex on North Maple Road. Officers Geoffrey Spickard and Jeff Lind were dispatched to the housing complex, which was known to the police as a high crime and drug area. Upon their arrival, they found a gathering of fifteen to twenty people drinking and talking loudly. Defendant and another man were seated on stairs leading to one of the housing units.
Officer Spickard approached defendant, and the two engaged in a general conversation about the party. At that point, a woman emerged from the attached housing unit and, using profane language, asked defendant who he was and why he was seated on her porch. After hearing this, Officer Spickard asked defendant if he lived in the housing complex. Defendant said that he did not, and Officer Spickard asked to see defendant's identification. When defendant handed over his state identification card, Officer Spickard pulled out his personal radio and started to place a call to the Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN).
Defendant's behavior immediately changed.1 He became obviously nervous and made furtive gestures toward a large pocket on the side of his pants. He began to walk away, despite the fact that Officer Spickard still held his identification card and was speaking to him.2 Several residents of the housing complex called out invitations for defendant to enter their homes.
At that point, Officer Spickard and his partner walked alongside defendant, encouraging him to wait for the results of the LEIN inquiry. When defendant did not stop, Officer Spickard placed a hand on defendant's back and told him that he was not free to leave.
The LEIN inquiry revealed an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest. As Officer Spickard was placing defendant in handcuffs, a gun fell from defendant's waistband to the ground.
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL 750.224f; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He moved to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds and sought dismissal of the charges.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which both Officer Spickard and defendant testified. The trial court considered Officer Spickard's testimony and determined that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, defendant was "seized" when he was asked for identification. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court relied on Officer Spickard's testimony that he believed that defendant was not free to leave at that point. The trial court concluded that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to support such an investigative stop. It granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence and dismissed the case.
A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed.3 The majority agreed with the trial court that Officer Spickard seized defendant when he asked defendant for identification.4 It concluded that the seizure was not supported by a reasonable suspicion because defendant was seated in a public area, was not engaged in the conduct for which the officers were summoned, and "forthrightly" answered the officer's questions. As a result, the majority held that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
The dissenting judge, on the other hand, determined that the initial encounter, including Officer Spickard's request for defendant's identification, did not constitute an investigatory stop. The dissent further concluded that subsequent events gave rise to a reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity and entitled Officer Spickard to transform the encounter into an investigatory stop.
The prosecutor seeks leave to appeal in this Court. After hearing oral argument from both parties on the prosecution's application for leave to appeal, we have determined that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed and that this matter must be remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of the charges against defendant and further proceedings.
This Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error. People v. Custer, 465 Mich. 319, 325-326, 630 N.W.2d 870 (2001). But the "[a]pplication of constitutional standards by the trial court is not entitled to the same deference as factual findings." People v. Nelson, 443 Mich. 626, 631 n. 7, 505 N.W.2d 266 (1993). Application of the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Custer, supra at 326, 630 N.W.2d 870.
The United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., Am. IV; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11.5
Under certain circumstances, a police officer may approach and temporarily detain a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to support an arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A brief detention does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Custer, supra at 327, 630 N.W.2d 870; People v. Oliver, 464 Mich. 184, 192, 627 N.W.2d 297 (2001); Terry, supra at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to make such an investigatory stop is determined case by case, on the basis of an analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances. Oliver, supra at 192, 627 N.W.2d 297. A determination regarding whether a reasonable suspicion exists "`must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.'" Id. at 197, 627 N.W.2d 297 (citation omitted).
Of course, not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen requires this level of constitutional justification. A "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.6 People v. Mamon, 435 Mich. 1, 11, 457 N.W.2d 623 (1990). When an officer approaches a person and seeks voluntary cooperation through noncoercive questioning, there is no restraint on that person's liberty, and the person is not seized. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion).
Here, Officer Spickard's initial encounter with defendant was consensual. Officer Spickard did not seize defendant when he asked whether defendant lived in the housing complex, nor did he seize defendant when he asked for identification. No evidence indicated that Officer Spickard told defendant at this juncture to remain where he was or that defendant was required to answer the officer's questions.
Asking such questions to elicit voluntary information from private citizens is an essential part of police investigations. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004). "In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment." 542 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2458, 159 L.Ed.2d at 302; see also Royer, supra at 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319. As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, "[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response." Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984).
This summary of governing Fourth Amendment principles demonstrates that the Court of Appeals majority erred when it analyzed the initial conversation between Officer Spickard and defendant, and Officer Spickard's request for identification, as if the protections of the Fourth Amendment were implicated. The Fourth Amendment was not implicated until Officer Spickard actually hindered defendant's attempt to leave the scene, thereby "seizing" him within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, this "seizure" occurred when Officer Spickard followed defendant as he tried to walk away, orally discouraged him from leaving,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Barbarich
...criminal behavior even if probable cause does not exist to arrest the person. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868; People v. Jenkins, 472 Mich. 26, 32, 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005). The scope of any search or seizure must be limited to that which is necessary to quickly confirm or dispel the offi......
-
People v. Frazier
...application of constitutional standards is not entitled to the same degree of deference as are factual findings. People v. Jenkins, 472 Mich. 26, 31, 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005). Application of the exclusionary rule to a constitutional violation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. ......
-
People v. Anthony
...officers drove down the street toward defendant’s F-150, this means defendant was seized sometime afterward. See People v. Jenkins , 472 Mich. 26, 33-34, 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005) (noting that Fourth Amendment implications do not arise until "the earliest [point] at which a reasonable person mi......
-
People v. Martin
...Finally, this Court reviews a trial court's factual findings in a ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error, People v. Jenkins, 472 Mich. 26, 31, 691 N.W.2d 759 (2005), but reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard to unco......