People v. Doll

• Citation: 948 N.Y.S.2d 471,98 A.D.3d 356,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 05450
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Scott F. DOLL, Defendant–Appellant.
• Decision Date: 06 July 2012
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

98 A.D.3d 356
948 N.Y.S.2d 471
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 05450

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Scott F. DOLL, Defendant–Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

July 6, 2012.

[948 N.Y.S.2d 474]

Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria, LLP, Buffalo (Timothy P. Murphy of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.

Lawrence Friedman, District Attorney, Batavia (William G. Zickl of Counsel), for Respondent.

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, FAHEY, AND PERADOTTO, JJ.

Opinion by SMITH, J.:

[98 A.D.3d 359]This appeal requires, inter alia, that we determine whether County Court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress statements that he made, including those he made to law enforcement agents when they questioned him in the absence of Miranda warnings and after he invoked the right to counsel. Under the unique circumstances presented, we conclude that the Genesee County Sheriff's Deputies (hereafter, deputies) did not violate defendant's

[948 N.Y.S.2d 475]

rights by detaining and questioning him until they discovered the victim's body.

I

After a Genesee County grand jury issued an indictment charging defendant with murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] [intentional murder] ), he moved, inter alia, to suppress statements he made to the deputies and others prior to his arrest, as well as certain tangible evidence. The evidence at the suppression hearing establishes that, at approximately 8:51 in the evening of February 16, 2009, Genesee County Sheriff's Deputy James Diehl responded to a 911 telephone call regarding a suspicious person. The caller indicated that the person was wearing a one-piece camouflage suit and a white hood, and that he was walking near a certain intersection. Diehl stopped his patrol vehicle when he observed defendant, who fit the description, walking a short distance from that intersection. As defendant approached Diehl's patrol vehicle, he dropped a metal object that Diehl later discovered to be a car jack. Diehl nodded toward a cylindrical object in defendant's pocket, and defendant displayed the object, which was a lug wrench.

Diehl observed what appeared to be wet blood stains on the knees and thighs of defendant's camouflage suit, and on defendant's sneakers and hands. At that point, Diehl requested identification, and defendant complied. When Diehl asked defendant what he was doing, defendant responded that he was walking in order to lower his cholesterol because he had a doctor's appointment the next morning. Defendant also said [98 A.D.3d 360]that he was going to a friend's house nearby, that he had dropped a car off at a local auction house and decided to stop and walk on the way back home, and that he lived in Corfu. In addition to the internal inconsistencies in defendant's statements, Diehl knew that defendant's description of the location of the friend's house was inconsistent with the streets at issue.

While Diehl was assessing the situation, defendant asked for a ride back to his van. Diehl agreed and allowed defendant to sit in the back of the patrol vehicle. Before Diehl began driving, however, the witness who originally made the 911 telephone call approached Diehl's patrol car and told Diehl that he had seen defendant at a garage at the described intersection. The witness also told Diehl that defendant first turned away as the witness drove by, and then crouched down between two cars. Diehl told defendant that he was going to detain defendant until he could sort out the situation. Diehl then removed defendant from the patrol vehicle, frisked and handcuffed him, and returned him to the back seat. Diehl asked defendant about the blood on his clothing, and defendant replied that it was cold out so he put on the coveralls that he wore when he butchered deer.

Diehl drove to the location where defendant parked his van. Diehl observed blood in several places on both the inside and outside of the van, and on the ground next to the van. He also observed a pair of gloves, which appeared to be blood-soaked, on top of a car near the van. Other deputies arrived and noticed several additional blood spots on defendant's face, and questioned him about the blood. Defendant initially told Deputy Patrick Reeves that the blood was old, but Reeves observed that it was fresh. Reeves removed defendant from the patrol vehicle and showed him the blood on and near the van, and Reeves also pointed out that defendant's sneakers were leaving bloody footprints in the snow. Reeves and other deputies asked defendant whether the

[948 N.Y.S.2d 476]

blood was human or deer blood, and indicated that they would let him go if he could show them the deer. Defendant repeatedly stated, however, that he could not take the deputies to a deer nor could he explain the source of the blood. Although defendant invoked his right to counsel, the deputies thought that there had been an accident or assault that resulted in injuries, and that “somebody may be in need.” They therefore continued to ask defendant whether someone was in need of medical attention, and about the source of the blood on his clothing and at the scene. Defendant continued to indicate that he could not answer their questions. The People concede that [98 A.D.3d 361]the deputies did not administer Miranda warnings to defendant.

In addition to questioning defendant about the source of the blood, the deputies also took steps to locate the possible victim or victims. Deputies contacted or visited all of defendant's friends and relatives whose locations they could ascertain, to check on their welfare, and the deputies asked police officers in Akron, New York, to check on defendant's ex-wife. In addition, deputies contacted the owner of the business where the van was located, and attempted to contact others who might have information concerning the situation confronting them. Deputies walked on both sides of the road between the location where the van was parked and where defendant was found, searching for any injured person. When deputies went to the home of defendant's business partner, they found his body lying on the ground in the driveway.

After the victim's body was located, defendant's girlfriend arrived at the Sheriff's office with another woman. The other woman was defendant's friend, and they had previously worked together as correctional officers at a state correctional facility. Defendant's friend repeatedly asked the deputies if she could speak with defendant, and eventually Sheriff's Investigator Kristopher Kautz agreed to permit her to do so, but told her that any conversation was not at Kautz' request. Kautz also indicated that he was going to remain in the room while defendant spoke with his friend and that, although Kautz would not take part in their conversation, he would take notes regarding it. During the ensuing conversation, defendant told his friend that the situation did not involve an animal, that he had been “present” but did not do anything, that it was an open and shut case, that he was going to be in jail somewhere, and that he guessed that he would get what he deserved. Defendant's friend specifically asked defendant to tell her that there was not a dead body, and defendant replied, “I can't do that.” Kautz stayed in the room during the conversation, standing a few feet from defendant and his friend, within defendant's view.

Before finding the victim's body, deputies took photographs of defendant and his clothing, obtained a buccal swab from defendant for DNA testing, and towed his van to a Sheriff's facility to preserve the blood evidence. Although the record indicates that the deputies seized defendant's clothing, it does not clearly establish whether that seizure occurred before or after the victim's body was found. Pursuant to several search warrants, [98 A.D.3d 362]the deputies later seized the records from the business of defendant and the victim, bank records relating to that business, and other evidence.

Defendant moved, inter alia, to suppress the statements that he made to the deputies and to his friend, and also sought suppression of his clothing, the van, the buccal swab, another swab taken from the blood found on defendant's face, the evidence

[948 N.Y.S.2d 477]

seized pursuant to the warrants, and all other evidence derived from that evidence. After conducting a hearing, the court suppressed the buccal swab and the results of any testing performed upon it, but denied the remainder of defendant's suppression motion. In an order entered upon defendant's consent, the court later directed that defendant provide a sample of his DNA.

At trial, in addition to the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, the People introduced evidence establishing that the victim's DNA was consistent with the DNA in the blood found on defendant's clothing, the van, and the gloves. The DNA in the swab taken from defendant's face was consistent with being a mixture of his DNA and the victim's DNA. A jury convicted defendant of murder in the second degree, and he appeals.

II

Contrary to defendant's contention, the court properly denied his motion to suppress the statements that he made to the police and to his friend while in police custody. Although defendant is correct that the police continued to question him in the absence of Miranda warnings and after he requested an attorney, we conclude that the continued questioning was permitted pursuant to the emergency doctrine in these circumstances.

Initially, we reject the contention of the People that defendant was not in custody and that Miranda warnings therefore were not required. The evidence establishes that the deputies informed defendant that he would not be released until they were able to ascertain the source of the blood. In addition, defendant was frisked and kept in handcuffs while the deputies attempted to locate the injured person. A reasonable person under those circumstances would not have felt free to leave, and thus the court...