People v. Doody
| Decision Date | 07 October 1902 |
| Citation | 64 N.E. 807,172 N.Y. 165 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. DOODY. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Third department.
Daniel Doody was convicted of perjury, and from a judgment of the appellate division (76 N. Y. Supp. 606) affirming the same he appeals. Affirmed.
Jerry A. Wernberg, for appellant.
John F. Clarke, Dist. Atty. (Martin W. Littleton, of counsel), for respondent.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of perjury, and the judgment of conviction has been affirmed in the court below after what appears to be a thorough discussion of the questions involved. These questions, and the facts out of which they arise, are so fully set forth in the report of the case below that it is not necessary to repeat the statement here. 72 App. Div. 372,76 N. Y. Supp. 606. It will be quite sufficient for every purpose of a review in this court to refer to the facts in a general way. The charge against the defendant which is set forth in the indictment is that he was called and sworn as a witness on the part of the people in a criminal case on the 19th day of December, 1899, and as such witness on the trial of the case he committed willful and corrupt perjury. The charge is based upon the testimony of the defendant as a witness in the case to the effect that he did not remember certain facts which were material and necessary for the people to prove upon the trial, and which it is alleged were well known to the defendant. The case is peculiar and exceptional in this respect: that the defendant was not charged with swearing falsely with respect to any affirmative or negative fact, but in swearing falsely that he knew nothing about them one way or the other, or, to use his own words when examined as a witness, that ‘he did not remember.’ The indictment alleges, and the record discloses in great detail, the transactions which finally culminated in the defendant's conviction. On the 14th day of March, 1898, he appeared before the grand jury of Kings county, and then and there testified to certain corrupt and criminal transactions on his part with certain public officers of the city of Brooklyn, whereby they were to award certain contracts for public work to persons to be named by him, and who were to act in his interest, and that he should divide with these officers certain fixed percentages of the money to be paid on these contracts by the city; that these corrupt and fraudulent agreements between the defendant and these city officers were completely executed. The contracts were awarded to the persons representing the defendant, and the officers were paid the share of the proceeds stipulated. It is not necessary to describe this corrupt arrangement with greater particularity. It is enough to say that the defendant, as he then stated to the grand jury, conspired with various city officers to plunder the city by means of fraudulent and corrupt contracts for public works in the city. It is important, however, to note the leading and fundamental feature of this transaction. It was impossible to carry the scheme into successful operation without the active aid and co-operation of the several city officers in the different departments. These departments, which were intended by the charter to be checks upon each other, were not only neutralized, but by means of bribery made active participants in the conspiracy to defraud the city. Each officer was to act a designated part in the consummation of a common scheme of fraud, and hence it was impossible to view the act of any one of them in the performance of his part without revealing the details of the conspiracy as a whole, since, if any one of the conspirators failed to act his part, the scheme could not be carried into effect. Therefore, in every investigation concerning the acts and conduct of these several city officers, or the acts of any one of them, it became necessary to describe the whole transaction, in order to show what the real scope and purpose of the scheme was, and the legal responsibility of each and all of the actors therein. The whole scheme was fully revealed by the defendant in his testimony before the grand jury, and the result was that indictments were found against nine of these city officers, in which they were charged with various offenses.
On the 16th of May, 1898, the indictment against Robert W. Fielding, the deputy commissioner of the city works, was brought to trial, and the defendant was sworn as a witness by the prosecution, and again testified substantially to the same facts that he had testified to before the grand jury, and the trial resulted in a conviction. Subsequently, and on April 24, 1899, some of the other city officers were brought to trial, and again the defendant was the principal witness, and revealed all the details of the corrupt and fraudulent conspiracy already described. So far the defendant's attitude was that of an informer against his confederates in crime. But about the time of the last trial referred to an event occurred which seems to have had some influence upon his mind, and revealed a desire upon his part to change his position. The judgment of conviction against Fielding was reversed in this court, and a new trial granted, not upon the merits, but upon certain exceptions taken at the trial, which related entirely to the argument of the case before the jury by the district attorney. People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 53 N. E. 497,46 L. R. A. 641, 70 Am. St. Rep. 495. The defendant expressed great satisfaction at this result, and stated openly that he was sorry to see him convicted. On the 19th day of December, 1899, Fielding was again brought to trial. While the district attorney was preparing for the trial, he sent for and had an interview with the defendant, who all along had been his principal witness, and was to be his principal witness on the new trial. The district attorney called the defendant's attention to an interview between them when the new trial was granted by this court, wherein the defendant expressed great delight at Fielding's success. He told the defendant that he knew he sympathized with the defense, but he would have to go upon the stand and testify to the facts, and proposed to refresh his memory by reading to him from printed records what he had sworn to on the several previous trials. The defendant said he would be glad to have the testimony read to him, and the district attorney then proceeded to read it, asking the defendant, after the reading, if it was correct, and as he then recollected it, to which the defendant replied that it was. Only two or three days after this interview the district attorney called the defendant as a witness to prove the facts upon the new trial to which he had testified on the former trial and before the grand jury, as well as upon the trial of the other officers engaged in the conspiracy.He propounded to him questions in various forms intended to establish the facts charged in the indictment, and to which the defendant had so often testified before, and to all these questions the defendant answered that he did not remember, and in this case these answers have been made the basis of the charge of perjury of which the defendant has been convicted. The prosecution broke down, and the trial resulted in Fielding's acquittal.
In order to sustain the charge of willful and corrupt perjury against the defendant, the prosecution was bound to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did remember that he had made the corrupt and fraudulent agreement with Fielding, whereby the latter was to award contracts to the persons designated by the defendant, and had paid to him his share of the proceeds, or the designated percentage of the contract price. It was competent for the people to sustain that issue by circumstantial evidence. The rule that prevails in case...
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