People v. Dooley, 80SA166
| Decision Date | 06 July 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80SA166,80SA166 |
| Citation | 630 P.2d 608 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Emery DOOLEY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Morgan Rumler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
Dick Gottsegen, Colorado Springs, for defendant-appellant.
The defendant, John Emery Dooley, was convicted in El Paso County District Court of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S.1973. His appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals was transferred here pursuant to section 13-4-110, C.R.S.1973, because it raises issues concerning the constitutional validity of the habitual traffic offender statute, sections 42-2-201 to 208, C.R.S.1973. We reverse the judgment of conviction.
In People v. Roybal, Colo., 618 P.2d 1121 (1980), we explained the relationship between habitual traffic offender status and the offense of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, as follows:
The defendant's driver's license was revoked pursuant to sections 42-2-202(2) (a)(III) and 203, C.R.S.1973, based on a determination that he was an habitual traffic offender in that he had accumulated three convictions of driving under suspension during a seven-year period. He later was charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited when he operated a motor vehicle during the time the revocation remained in effect. He was convicted after a trial to the court, and brings this appeal contending that the traffic offense convictions upon which his habitual traffic offender status is based were obtained unconstitutionally. 1
During the pendency of this appeal we issued our opinion in People v. Roybal, supra. 2 In that case, we held that a defendant charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited may collaterally attack the constitutional validity of the traffic offense convictions which form the basis for the administrative determination that he is an habitual traffic offender. 3 Based on that decision, we granted the prosecution's motion for limited remand to the district court to take evidence and rule on the constitutional validity of the defendant's underlying traffic offense convictions.
Pursuant to our order, the district court held a hearing and ruled that the three traffic offense convictions used to support the revocation of the defendant's driver's license as an habitual...
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People v. Quintana
...constitutes essential proof on the issue of guilt. See also, e. g., People v. Mascarenas, Colo., 632 P.2d 1028 (1981); People v. Dooley, Colo., 630 P.2d 608 (1981); People v. Hampton, Colo., 619 P.2d 48 (1980). We extended this right of collateral attack to guilty pleas that were not "volun......
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People v. Mascarenas, 81SA164
...has a right to challenge the constitutional validity of the traffic offense convictions which underlie that charge. People v. Dooley, Colo., 630 P.2d 608 (1981); People v. Shaver, Colo., 630 P.2d 600 (1981); People v. DeLeon, Colo., 625 P.2d 1010 (1981); People v. Hampton, Colo., 619 P.2d 4......