People v. Dorn

• Decision Date: 19 September 1980
• Citation: 105 Misc.2d 244,431 N.Y.S.2d 974
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Joseph N. DORN, Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

Page 974

431 N.Y.S.2d 974

105 Misc.2d 244

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Joseph N. DORN, Defendant.

County Court, Oneida County.

Sept. 19, 1980.

Richard D. Enders, Oneida County Dist. Atty. (Timothy P. Fitzgerald, Utica, of counsel), for the People.

Donald L. Austin, Oneida County Public Defender (Esther Cohen Lee, Asst. Public Defender, Utica, of counsel), for defendant.

ARTHUR A. DARRIGRAND, Judge:

MEMORANDUM

Defendant's omnibus motion dated September 4, 1980 is determined as follows:

1. District Attorney will state with reasonable certainty the time and place of each alleged offense.

2. A hearing is granted to determine the voluntariness of defendant's alleged oral statements.

3. Defendant's motion to suppress as evidence proof of his previous misdemeanor conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol is granted.

Defendant has been indicted for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol as a felony. Section 1192 V & T Law provides that a person who operates a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision 2 or 3 of that section after having been previously convicted of either of those subdivisions in the preceding ten years shall be guilty of a felony. Otherwise, a violation of either subdivision is a misdemeanor.

Defendant herein seeks to suppress any evidence as to a prior conviction for operating under the influence of alcohol on the ground that such conviction is constitutionally invalid. A recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Baldasar v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 is cited as the ground for such relief.

The U.S. Supreme Court has had many occasions during recent years to consider that part of the 6th Amendment pertaining to a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) established that an indigent defendant charged with a felony is entitled to have counsel appointed at state expense. Later in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972) it was held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." At that time the Court did not consider Sixth Amendment requirements concerning the right to counsel in cases where no loss of liberty actually resulted.

This question did arise, however, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 decided in 1979 wherein an indigent defendant not represented by counsel was convicted of theft and fined $50.00 after a bench trial. Scott sought to reverse his conviction on the ground that since he could have been sentenced to imprisonment up to one year he was entitled to assigned counsel at his trial. The Court rejected that argument holding that the 6th and 14th Amendments require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to appointed counsel. Since Scott had not been imprisoned, his constitutional rights were held not to have been violated. For the purposes of appeal in both the state and federal courts the parties assumed that Scott was an indigent person at the time of his trial.

Shortly thereafter the Court was called upon to decide Baldasar v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) which involved the same statute as in Scott v. Illinois (supra). Baldasar was convicted of a felony since the statute provided that a second conviction for the same offense could be punished by a prison term in excess of one year. The record indicated that defendant had not been...