People v. Douglas

• Decision Date: 28 March 1988
• Citation: 526 N.Y.S.2d 544,138 A.D.2d 731
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Hassan DOUGLAS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 544

526 N.Y.S.2d 544

138 A.D.2d 731

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Hassan DOUGLAS, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Second Department.

March 28, 1988.

George T. Dunn, New York City, for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Salvatore J. Modica, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and KUNZEMAN, WEINSTEIN and RUBIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Clabby, J.), rendered March 25, 1986, convicting him of robbery in the second degree (three counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review, the denial (Linakis, J.), after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony and statements made by him while in police custody.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the identification procedures employed by the police in conducting the lineup from which he was selected were not unduly suggestive. The mere fact that a witness is told that a possible suspect is in custody or that a suspect who fit the description will be on view does not invalidate an otherwise fair lineup ( see, People v. Rodriguez, 64 N.Y.2d 738, 740-741, 485 N.Y.S.2d 976, 475 N.E.2d 443; People v. Hammond, 131 A.D.2d 876, 877, 517 N.Y.S.2d 232, lv. denied 70 N.Y.2d 800, 522 N.Y.S.2d 117, 516 N.E.2d 1230). In any event, based upon the duration of the robbery wherein the victim had an extended opportunity to view the defendant under favorable conditions, it is evident that an independent basis existed for the victim's in-court identification ( see, People v. Magee, 122 A.D.2d 227, 228, 504 N.Y.S.2d 758; People v. Rudan, 112 A.D.2d 255, 256-257, 491 N.Y.S.2d 464). Similarly, the defendant's statements, which were not made in response to police interrogation, were properly ruled admissible ( see, People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862, rearg. denied, 57 N.Y.2d 775, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 440 N.E.2d 1343; People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41, 250 N.E.2d 329). The police are not required "to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement" ( People v. Rivers, supra, 56 N.Y.2d at 479, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862). Additionally, the defendant's arrest was based upon probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that he was the person responsible therefor ( see, People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 254, 445 N.Y.S.2d 97, 429 N.E.2d 775). "[A]s a general rule, information provided by an identified citizen accusing another individual of the commission of a specific crime is sufficient to provide the police with probable cause to arrest" ( see, People v. Sanders, 79 A.D.2d 688, 689, 433 N.Y.S.2d 854; see also, People v. Crespo, 70 A.D.2d 661, 417 N.Y.S.2d 19).

The defendant's contention that his identity as one of the perpetrators was not established by legally sufficient evidence is without merit. Viewing the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the People ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the conviction. All elements of the three counts of robbery in the second degree were clearly...