People v. Downer
| Decision Date | 20 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 27261,27261 |
| Citation | 557 P.2d 835,192 Colo. 264 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jerome Joseph DOWNER, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Nolan L. Brown, Dist. Atty., F. Joseph Mackey III, Deputy Dist. Atty., Golden, for plaintiff-appellant.
No appearance for defendant-appellee.
The district attorney brings this appeal solely on questions of law pursuant to section 16--12--102, C.R.S.1973. Defendant Downer was charged with the crimes of second-degree murder and first-degree arson. He pled not guilty and was tried before a jury. During the trial, the court suppressed certain statements made by the defendant immediately following the fire and later before a grand jury. At the close of the People's evidence, the defendant made a motion for judgment of acquittal which was granted by the trial court. The People appeal both the judgment of acquittal and the suppression rulings. Because the constitutional provision against double jeopardy prevents the retrial of the defendant on these charges, we can only register our disapproval of the trial court's judgment of acquittal and its suppression orders.
The People assert that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the People had presented substantial evidence which would have supported a jury verdict of guilty. We agree.
The charges against the defendant arose out of the following circumstances as established by the People's evidence considered in its most favorable light. At approximately four o'clock one Tuesday morning, a fire occurred in the Downer residence in Evergreen, Colorado. The house was already engulfed in flames by the time the firemen arrived in response to defendant's report. Several of the firemen who testified expressed surprise that the fire could have reached the proportions it did, given the short response time of the fire department after the fire was reported.
The firemen were met at the scene by the defendant. The firemen noticed that his boots were laced and his hair combed--factors which the firemen later testified were unusual in house fires that occur during the middle of the night. When one of the firemen asked the defendant if anyone was in the house, the defendant responded that he 'had got the kids out'; when further questioned, the defendant stated that he had found his wife's purse, but that he 'hadn't seen her all day' and that she might be 'downstairs.' Shortly after, the defendant told other firemen tht if his wife were in the house, she would be in a certain upstairs bedroom. As a consequence, the firemen directed their efforts at rescuing Mrs. Downer from the upstairs bedroom, but they were unable to find her there.
After the fire was extinguished, the firemen found the badly burned body of Mrs. Downer in the basement of the house. Her body was under a large workbench which was tipped over on its side and which rested over the lower half of her body.
An arson investigator testified at the trial that there were two separate fires in the house. One of the fires had its origin on or near the body of Mrs. Downer, and the other started on the stairs leading from the basement. The arson expert ruled out the possibility of an electrical fire. In his opinion, the fires were started by the use of a flammable accelerant because of the manner in which the fires started and in which they burned. The expert also believed that the fire near Mrs. Downer's body started after the table had come to rest over her because of the way the table was burned. He then testified that although several cans of flammable liquid were on the workbench and under the stairs, none of these cans had ruptured. He further theorized that the fire on the workbench could not have started from a spilled container of flammable liquid because of the location and nature of the fire burns on the surrounding floor.
A chemist confirmed that volatile hydrocarbons were found in the clothing of Mrs. Downer. Though no such flammable liquids were found in the stairwell, the arson expert explained that they could have either burned or evaporated by the time the test sample was taken.
The pathologist testified that Mrs. Downer died before the fire started because of the negligible amount of carbon monoxide in her blood and the lack of any appreciable amount of soot or smoke in her lungs. He also stated that there were deep lacerations and bruises on her head, which he conjectured could have been caused by blows from a fist and a board when she was still alive. He also testified that there were drops of blood (later confirmed by a chemist) on one of Mrs. Downer's slippers, which would indicate that Mrs. Downer received the blows to her head while in an upright position. Another chemist testified that there were no drugs or alcohol found in Mrs. Downer's blood.
Several says after the fire, the defendant told the sheriff's office his version of what occurred on the night of the fire. These statements were admitted into evidence through the testimony of a deputy sheriff. Defendant stated that, on the Sunday night before the fire, his wife left the house, at which time he agreed to take care of the children the next day. On the following day, he removed one of the children from a bedroom in which he believed his wife was asleep. He and his wife had been sleeping in separate bedrooms. He then took the children shopping and to see a movie. On returning to the house later that afternoon, he noticed that their other vehicle was in the driveway, and he assumed that his wife was at home but asleep, after having been out the night before. He answered some phone calls for his wife, but he told the callers she was asleep somewhere in the house. He then fed the children and they went to bed. During the night, he said that he was awakened by the dog's barking and he smelled smoke. He therefore dressed and took the children out to the car; one of the children he removed from the room where Mrs. Downer usually slept. He made several trips into the house to obtain clothing for the children. At one point, he opened the basement door but was met by smoke and sparks. He attempted to use the phone but it did not work. He drove the car to a nearby payphone, even though some neighbors' houses were nearby. The payphone, however, was no longer there. He therefore went back to the house and successfully used his phone to call the fire department. At this time, he noticed his wife's purse in the house. The defendant then attempted to put out the fires in the basement by shooting water from a hose through a basement window that he had broken out; eventually, however, the water pump became inoperative. He stated that he received two burns on his arm when he reached into the house to turn on the outside lights when the firemen arrived.
The prosecution called several witnesses who testified that the defendant and his wife were having marital problems; that Mrs. Downer was seeing other men; and that the Downers were on the verge of getting a divorce. One of the witnesses testified that the decedent had told her shortly before the fire that she was afraid to discuss a divorce with the defendant because she feared that he would physically harm her.
After this evidence was presented, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. Although the judge agreed that the evidence showed Mrs. Downer may have 'met her death due to a criminal agency,' he, nonetheless, concluded that the evidence failed to link the defendant with the possible arson or murder and that it would be sheer speculation for the jury to conclude otherwise.
We believe, however, that the quality and quantity of the evidence was sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal. When such a motion is before the judge, the issue is whether the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Martinez, Colo., 553 P.2d 774 (1976); People v. Bennett, 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466 (1973). Only when the evidence is such that the jury must...
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