People v. Easter
| Decision Date | 11 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | A148197 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Kevin Jerome EASTER, Defendant and Appellant. |
Peter F. Goldscheider, Redwood City, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General of California, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, René A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Bruce Ortega, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
A March 2014 information charged defendant Kevin Easter with the August 2013 murder of his wife. In May, his attorney expressed a doubt about his competency to stand trial, and the criminal proceeding was suspended pending resolution of the competency issue. In July and August, defendant was evaluated by two medical professionals, one finding him competent to stand trial, the other finding him incompetent. In April 2015—eight months after the evaluations—a jury found defendant competent to stand trial, and the homicide case resumed. Six months later, on the eve of trial, defense counsel again expressed a doubt regarding defendant’s present competency. Two different judges declined to reinstate competency proceedings, finding that defense counsel failed to present substantial evidence of a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence casting doubt on the prior competency finding. The criminal case proceeded, resulting in a jury verdict of guilty on the first degree murder charge with a personal use of a firearm enhancement, a bench finding of guilty on a felon in possession of a firearm charge, and a sentence of 65 years eight months to life in state prison.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to reinstate competency proceedings because his counsel had presented substantial evidence that he was experiencing new and worsened symptoms constituting a substantial change of circumstances in his mental condition. He also alleges numerous evidentiary and instructional errors, as well as sentencing issues raised in supplemental filings with the court. We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in failing to reinstate competency proceedings, and thus reverse on that ground. As such, we do not reach his evidentiary, instruction, and sentencing claims.
On the night of August 7, 2013, Janice Easter, defendant’s wife of five years, was shot to death in the living room of the home she shared with defendant. Defendant was arrested shortly after the murder. A March 26, 2014 information charged him with murder with a firearm enhancement and felon in possession of a firearm, further alleging he had three prior serious felony convictions and three prior strikes.
As will be detailed at length below, in May 2014, defense counsel declared a doubt regarding defendant’s competency to stand trial, and the criminal proceeding was suspended pending the outcome of a Penal Code section 1368 competency proceeding. In April 2015, a jury found defendant competent to stand trial, and the homicide case resumed.
In October 2015, after defense counsel twice unsuccessfully renewed the issue of defendant’s competency, defendant was tried before a jury, which found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the personal use of a firearm allegation. Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty on the firearm possession charge and found true the prior serious felony conviction allegations.1 He was sentenced to 65 years eight months to life in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in three particulars: (1) failing to reinstate competency proceedings; (2) allowing inadmissible evidence that undermined an inference that the crime was second degree, rather than first degree, murder; and (3) instructing the jury on flight and suppression of evidence.
On February 20, 2018, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Two claims pertain to his counsel’s conduct with respect to the April 2015 competency proceeding, specifically that his counsel failed to: (1) obtain extensive medical records documenting his mental health problems and provide them to the medical professionals who evaluated him and/or introduce them at the competency trial, and (2) obtain independent counsel to represent him at the competency proceeding so defense counsel himself could testify at that proceeding. The third claim asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explore with defendant his desire to enter a not guilty by reason of insanity plea.2
On October 23, 2018, defendant sought leave to file supplemental briefing, or alternatively summary remand for resentencing, based on the passage of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.), which, effective January 1, 2018, affords trial courts discretion to strike or dismiss a Penal Code section 12022.53 firearm enhancement. ( Pen. Code § 12022.53, subd. (h) ; Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2.) The Attorney General opposed defendant’s request, prompting a reply from defendant in which he argued that remand was appropriate, and also added a new claim based on Assembly Bill No. 1810, which added provisions to the Penal Code that allow for discretionary diversion of persons with qualifying mental health disorders under certain circumstances. ( Pen. Code § 1001.35 – 1001.36 ; Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 24, eff. June 27, 2018.)
On May 22, 2014, pursuant to Penal Code section 1368, deputy public defender Michael Kelly declared a doubt about defendant’s competency to stand trial, informing the court, The trial court appointed Omri Berger, M.D. to evaluate defendant. In a report dated July 17, 2014, Dr. Berger opined that defendant was incompetent to stand trial.
At a July 29 hearing, the prosecutor, Colleen Gleason, expressed her disagreement with Dr. Berger’s report, and the trial court appointed Jennifer Kirkland, Ph.D., to conduct a second evaluation of defendant. In her August 22 report, Dr. Kirkland concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.
On April 6, 2015—more than eight months after Drs. Berger and Kirkland evaluated him—the matter of defendant’s competency came on for a jury trial before the Honorable Barry Baskin. The evidence consisted of testimony from Dr. Berger on behalf of the defense, and Dr. Kirkland and Contra Costa County Deputy Sheriff Joseph Smith on behalf of the prosecution. The testimony was as follows:
Dr. Berger is a physician board-certified in psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. His private practice focuses on forensic psychiatry, and he has conducted approximately 100 Penal Code section 1368 evaluations. He is also employed by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, providing psychiatric treatment for inmates at San Quentin State Prison, and is on the clinical faculty at the University of California, San Francisco.
Prior to interviewing defendant, Dr. Berger reviewed police records in the present case and medical records for treatment defendant received in jail dating back to 2012. The records reflected a criminal history beginning in the 1980s, including convictions for robbery, assault with a firearm, and domestic violence. They also reflected a documented history of mental illness, with symptoms consistent with schizoaffective disorder
as far back as defendant’s childhood. Defendant had experienced psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and disorganized behavior, and also had a history of depression with suicide attempts.
When conducting a Penal Code section 1368 evaluation, Dr. Berger typically contacts the defendant’s attorney since one of the elements of competency is whether the defendant can rationally work with his or her attorney. Accordingly, Dr. Berger obtained information from Mr. Kelly regarding his experience with defendant. He did not contact Ms. Gleason because he has never received a response when he has contacted prosecutors in the past.
Dr. Berger interviewed defendant for one hour 50 minutes, during which time he had no significant difficulty communicating with him. Defendant was a reliable reporter in terms of providing general information about his symptoms and medications, although he was unable to recall certain specifics. Dr. Berger did not observe any shaking, fidgeting, or "physical acting out." If anything, defendant displayed "more slowing of motor activity which can sometimes be observed in some individuals with certain disorders such as depression or other psychotic disorders
." His thought process was linear and coherent though somewhat impoverished, which describes someone who "doesn’t seem to have much in the way of spontaneous thoughts ...." He did not exhibit gross cognitive impairment, or "impairments in thinking, in attention or memory ...."
Dr. Berger diagnosed defendant with schizoaffective disorder bipolar type
and polysubstance dependence. Schizoaffective disorder is a combination of schizophrenia, in which a person can experience delusions and "thinking that’s jumbled," and a mood disorder, in defendant’s case bipolar disorder, which is characterized by fluctuations between depression and hyperactivity. Polysubstance dependence occurs when an individual has used multiple types of illicit substances, leading to significant impairment.
Dr....
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People v. Tejeda
...requires reversal for a new trial. ( Rodas , supra , 6 Cal.5th at p. 241, 239 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 429 P.3d 1122 ; People v. Easter (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 226, 249, 245 Cal.Rptr.3d 854 [reversal required where defense raised doubt as to competency 13 months after expert evaluations were performe......
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People v. Cowell
...counsel presented evidence of "different" and "inconsistent" symptoms than formed the "basis for the previous competency finding." Both Easter and Tejeda rely in part People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115 (Jones) and People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219 (Rodas). In Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1......
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...counsel presented evidence of "different" and "inconsistent" symptoms than formed the "basis for the previous competency finding." Both Easter and Tejeda rely in part People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115 (Jones) and People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219 (Rodas). In Jones, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1......