People v. Edgar, 77-178
| Decision Date | 09 February 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-178,77-178 |
| Citation | 40 Colo.App. 377,578 P.2d 666 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Glenn Eugene EDGAR, Defendant-Appellant. . I |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., David W. Robbins, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., James S. Russell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.
DiManna, Eklund, Ciancio & Jackson, Michael F. DiManna, Gene A. Ciancio, Denver, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant Glenn Eugene Edgar was convicted by a jury of first and third degree arson and conspiracy. Because we find reversible error with respect to one of his several contentions of error, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Edgar, his wife and her parents owned a Greeley restaurant and lounge which Edgar managed. In the early morning hours of December 22, 1975, the building was damaged by fire. It was undisputed that the cause of the fire was arson because, among other things, at least 27 separate fires caused the damage. The dispute at the trial was whether Edgar was one of those involved in the arson.
The People's theory of the case was that because of financial problems he was having, Edgar tried to burn down the building to collect insurance money. One Adkins, who worked for Edgar as a musician, testified that Edgar asked him if he knew anyone who would set the fire. Adkins recommended a long-time friend, Owen, saying that, "He would do about anything for enough money." Adkins testified that he arranged for Owen to come to Greeley and that Edgar agreed to and did pay money to Owen to set the fire.
On the other hand, Edgar's theory of the case was that Adkins and Owen had burned the building without his knowledge or consent. Edgar contended that because he had complained to Adkins that the latter's music was deteriorating and had told him that his New Year's Eve performance would be his last, Adkins alone had hired Owen to burn the building.
Adkins, Owen and Edgar were charged with the crime. Adkins pled guilty in exchange for a deferred sentence and testified against Edgar. Owen did not testify, and his trial was set for a later date.
Edgar seeks reversal because the trial court granted neither his motion to suppress testimony of the People's witnesses Dykes and Tognari and evidence consisting of two Western Union money orders, nor alternatively, his motion for a continuance. In order to facilitate an understanding of this contention, it is necessary to set forth in some detail the chronology of events relating to discovery.
The trial in this case was set for January 24, 1977, and, pursuant to Edgar's motions under Crim.P. 16, the People were ordered to disclose by November 1, 1976, names and addresses of prospective witnesses, together with summaries of their testimony. When the People did not meet this deadline Edgar's counsel moved to force compliance with the order. Following a hearing on December 22, 1976, the date for compliance was extended to January 6, 1977, 18 days prior to the trial date. On January 6, the People partially complied when they endorsed 72 additional witnesses, but no summaries of testimony or copies of written or recorded statements were provided. The California addresses of witnesses Dykes and Tognari were listed by city only and turned out to be incorrect. Also, Tognari had since married, taking a different name. On January 6, 1977, the court extended the time for compliance with its order to January 14, 1977.
On January 14, having received nothing further from the People, Edgar's counsel telephoned the district attorney and asked whether any other materials were to be made available to him. He was told that a packet was being mailed that day. On January 17, the promised packet not having arrived, defense counsel again called the district attorney and in response to that call, some material was hand-delivered that day. The district attorney called defense counsel on January 18 and agreed to meet with him on January 19. That meeting was delayed until January 20 at the district attorney's request, when he made his file available for inspection, but a tape recording of the most recent conversation with witness Tognari was not included. According to the People's representative, that conversation contained statements at variance with those on other recordings that had been provided. On the missing tape Tognari indicated for the first time that she could testify about a direct contact between Edgar and Owen. At the conclusion of that conference on January 20 defense counsel prepared...
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People v. Hamrick
...424 P.2d 766 (1967), or to disclose which of the endorsed witnesses it will call for rebuttal. Nor is this a case like People v. Edgar, Colo.App., 578 P.2d 666 (1978), where there was "massive non-compliance" with proper discovery procedures by the prosecution. Thus there was no presumption......
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People v. Janke, 83CA0810
...of noncompliance by the prosecution with its disclosure duty and the court's discovery order lack merit. Cf. People v. Edgar, 40 Colo.App. 377, 578 P.2d 666 (1978). Initially, when defense counsel became aware of the recomparisons, he sought a continuance which was denied. Later, upon recei......
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People v. Arapahoe County Court, 02CA0060.
...prior to trial, the rules also promote fairness in the criminal process by reducing the risk of trial by ambush."); People v. Edgar, 40 Colo.App. 377, 578 P.2d 666 (1978)(pretrial discovery rules aid accuracy and efficiency in the search for truth). In the words of the county court, the Peo......