People v. Edgerrin J. (In re Edgerrin J.)
| Decision Date | 20 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | D076461,D076462 |
| Citation | 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 610,57 Cal.App.5th 752 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | IN RE EDGERRIN J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edgerrin J., Defendant and Appellant. In re Jamar D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jamar D., Defendant and Appellant. |
Alex Coolman, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Edgerrin J.
Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jamar D.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers, Christopher P. Beesley, Robin Urbanski, and Genevieve Herbert, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After receiving a citizen's tip that Black males in a Mercedes were "acting shady," four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one. Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a recent robbery.
The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the charges originally filed.
In this consolidated appeal,1 two of the minors—Edgerrin J. and Jamar D.—challenge the denial of their suppression motions. They argue the juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual and claim the citizen's tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. We agree on both points. But there was conflicting evidence as to whether officers knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin's active Fourth Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary for the juvenile court to address these other issues, we reverse and remand for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual findings in the first instance.
On March 13, 2019, SDPD officer Jerrad Schnautz was on patrol with his partner Willis Short in the Encanto neighborhood of southeast San Diego. At around 6:00 p.m., the two were parked on Madera Street along with fellow officers Kyle Williams and Samuel Euler. As the four officers dealt with an unrelated issue, a driver approaching southbound on Madera stopped her car in the middle of the street and stepped out. She said she lived nearby, provided her address, and reported there were Black males in a parked black Mercedes on her street who were "acting shady." After receiving the tip, all four officers drove three blocks to the location in two separate police vehicles.
When they arrived, the officers found a legally parked black Mercedes with three young Black males inside. Williams and Euler parked directly behind the Mercedes, activating their vehicle's emergency lights; Schnautz and Short pulled up behind them but did not activate their lights. The four officers stepped out, walked over to the Mercedes, and positioned themselves at each door to prevent its three occupants from leaving.
When the officers asked the vehicle occupants for their names and information, Edgerrin (sitting in the driver's seat) initially gave a false name. Schnautz went back to his patrol vehicle to perform records checks on all three occupants. Upon learning Edgerrin's identity and confirming that he was on probation subject to a condition waiving his Fourth Amendment rights (Fourth waiver), officers searched the Mercedes and recovered a loaded firearm underneath the driver's seat, a pair of sneakers connected to a robbery, and a clear white canister containing marijuana. The minors were arrested.
The San Diego County District Attorney filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 accusing Edgerrin and Jamar of robbery ( Pen. Code,2 § 211 ), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and various weapons-related charges along with associated enhancements. Edgerrin was additionally charged with providing false information to a police officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a), count 8). Defendants moved to suppress evidence obtained from the Mercedes. ( Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.)3
The People opposed the suppression motions, arguing in their briefs that officers discovered Edgerrin's Fourth waiver during "a consent [sic ] encounter with the minors." Although Officer Williams activated his emergency lights in parking behind the Mercedes, the prosecution claimed this was done to "warn on-coming traffic of officers on foot," and all officers proceeded to the vehicle "on foot in a slow and calm walk." Alternatively, the People claimed that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the minors based on the citizen's tip. They argued that Encanto was a neighborhood where "[g]ang violence and violent crime [are] a fact of life" causing residents "to be hyper-vigilant of suspicious, or shady, activity," and it was significant that the tipster "felt the conduct she saw rose to the level of needing to flag down and tell the police."
The suppression motions were heard by Judge Willis. The People examined SDPD gang detective Amalia Sidhu and Officer Schnautz, and the court reviewed footage from Schnautz's bodyworn camera (BWC) depicting officers' encounter with the minors and the subsequent search. The principal factual dispute between the parties centered on what Schnautz and the other officers knew about Edgerrin at the time they approached the Mercedes. The prosecution relied on testimony by Sidhu and Schnautz suggesting the officers knew by then that Edgerrin was a Lincoln Park gang member in rival gang territory, driving a black Mercedes, and on probation with a Fourth waiver. Defense counsel vigorously challenged this account, questioning why such information was omitted from police reports and conflicted with the officers' behavior in the BWC footage.4
As noted, the prosecution identified two theories in its written opposition—either the encounter was consensual, or there was reasonable suspicion to detain based on the citizen tip. At the hearing, the prosecutor expanded on these theories. Relying on testimony that officers knew beforehand of Edgerrin's active Fourth waiver, he suggested it was a straightforward "Fourth waiver probation search." Alternatively, the prosecutor claimed there was reasonable suspicion to detain the minors based on officers' awareness that Edgerrin was a gang member in rival gang territory around a gang holiday—"this is reasonable suspicion, pure and simple, even without the Fourth waiver, knowing who he is, knowing when it was, knowing where he was." "And then you layer into that, we have a civilian who lives in this neighborhood actively and affirmatively approaching gang unit officers ... flagging them down, telling them that this is shady."
Edgerrin's counsel responded that the prosecution was using the ends to justify the means. Despite Sidhu's testimony about what she told patrol officers, neither of her reports disclosed what transpired before the stop, leaving the court with a "credibility issue." And the citizen tip that people were "acting shady" was too vague to create reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Although officers could have stopped to ask a few questions, they instead as the BWC video seemed to confirm.
At that point, the juvenile court interjected, asking The court rejected counsel's assertion that a stop occurred when the officers pulled up, lights on, behind the Mercedes. Instead, the judge described what transpired as a proper "consensual encounter" following a citizen tip.
After hearing from remaining defense counsel, the court denied the suppression motions, finding that no detention had occurred. As it explained, the officers had a right to be at that location and check on the vehicle after receiving the citizen tip. The court reasoned that at each step, the officers' actions were lawful—their initial investigation was justified by the tip, their encounter with the minors remained consensual, and once they confirmed that Edgerrin was subject to a Fourth waiver, they could legally search the vehicle.5
Jamar admitted to robbery ( § 211 ) and the associated gang and firearm enhancements charged in count 1, and all remaining charges were dismissed. He was adjudged a ward of the court and committed to Urban Camp, with his commitment stayed while he was placed on probation. Edgerrin admitted to assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and the associated gang enhancement charged in count 2, and the charges remaining against him were likewise dismissed. The court committed Edgerrin to the Youthful Offender Unit Program, setting his maximum custody at 12 years, 4 months with a custodial program not exceeding 480 days.
Challenging the suppression ruling, defendants argue the juvenile court erred in concluding the officers were engaged in a consensual encounter when they activated their lights, parked behind the Mercedes, and...
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