People v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 25 July 1985
• Citation: 39 Cal.3d 107,702 P.2d 555,216 Cal.Rptr. 397
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 702 P.2d 555 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis William EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 23821.

Page 397

216 Cal.Rptr. 397

39 Cal.3d 107, 702 P.2d 555

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis William EDWARDS, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 23821.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

July 25, 1985.

Richard Power, Pleasanton, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., John W. Carney and Jay M. Bloom, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Michael D. Bradbury, Dist. Atty. Ventura, Vincent J. O'Neill, Jr., Chief Asst. Deputy Dist. Atty., and Marcia C. Levine, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

GRODIN, Justice.

Defendant Dennis Edwards appeals from convictions of furnishing and/or administering heroin (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352) and second degree murder (Pen.Code, § 187) following the accidental and fatal heroin overdose of his girlfriend, Victoria Rogers. At the close of trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed on involuntary manslaughter. The trial court, believing there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, refused to give the requested instruction. As a result, the jury was compelled either to acquit defendant outright or convict him of furnishing and/or administering heroin and second degree murder.

We conclude there was substantial evidence from which the jury could properly have found defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter and that the trial court therefore erred in refusing to give the requested instruction. We further conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that defendant could not be convicted of furnishing heroin to Rogers if he and Rogers were merely copurchasers of the heroin. As we shall explain, although the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury requires that both of defendant's convictions be reversed, the People shall have the option of accepting a modification of the judgment to reflect a conviction of involuntary manslaughter and unlawful heroin use.

Defendant and his girlfriend, Victoria Rogers (the deceased), went to San Bernardino to find work. Rogers had recently been fired from her job in another city and defendant had been unemployed for some time. Before coming to San Bernardino, Rogers had sold her car and, with the proceeds, she and defendant planned to rent an apartment in San Bernardino and purchase a cheaper car. Defendant apparently had possession of all of the couple's money.

On October 27, 1982, defendant and Rogers were hitchhiking on their way to look at an apartment for rent when they were picked up by Burt Royce and his girlfriend, Lula Nava. Royce and Nava agreed to take defendant and Rogers to view the apartment. On the way to the apartment, the four stopped at a gas station. According to Nava's testimony, while Royce was outside the car pumping gas, defendant mentioned something about hard drugs and stated that he had used heroin before. Nava testified that she asked defendant not to talk about heroin in front of Royce because Royce, who had previously used heroin, was "cooling down" and had not used heroin for about two months. When Royce returned to the car, the four went to look at the apartment for rent and then drove to the apartment shared by Royce and Nava.

After drinking beer and smoking marijuana at the couple's apartment, Royce, Rogers and defendant drove to look at a used car which defendant and Rogers were interested in purchasing. Nava, who was ill, remained at the apartment.

What followed next is taken from the tape-recorded statement defendant gave to police the day after his arrest. After looking at the used automobile and making arrangements to have it delivered that evening, Royce, Rogers and defendant visited two bars where the two men drank beer and Rogers drank rum and cokes "one after the other." According to defendant's statement, while at the second bar Royce began talking about heroin and told defendant and Rogers that he could get some "real good black stuff." Defendant and Rogers told Royce that neither of them had ever tried heroin before but, after some discussion, they agreed to "get some."

The three then left the bar, picked up another woman, Isotta Mullican, and drove to a motel to purchase the heroin. Defendant gave $50 to Mullican who apparently left the car, purchased two balloons of heroin and returned to the car. The four then drove to Mullican's house where they all congregated in the bathroom as Mullican prepared the heroin. Mullican supplied the syringe used for the injection and the spoon and cigarette lighter used to "cook" the heroin. After Royce and Mullican had each injected themselves with one-half balloon, Mullican injected Rogers and then defendant with a half-balloon each. Rogers and defendant each "tied-off" their own arms to facilitate injection.

After defendant was injected, he noticed that Rogers was slipping off the toilet seat on which she had been sitting. Defendant asked Rogers if she was all right but received no response. Upon examination, defendant was unable to detect any sign of breathing or pulse. He placed Rogers in the shower and turned on the cold water but Rogers did not respond. Royce then began giving Rogers mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but to no avail. Eventually, Royce and defendant dragged Rogers out of the house, put her into Royce's car and drove to a nearby market.

Defendant and Royce entered the market, purchased a can of beer and left. Thirty seconds later they returned and told the store clerk that she should call for paramedics because they had found a girl lying either dead or seriously ill in the dumpster outside the market. After calling the paramedics, the clerk went outside and observed Rogers, apparently unconscious, lying on the pavement beneath the passenger door of Royce's car. The clerk then observed Royce and defendant carrying Rogers closer to the door of the market.

The paramedics soon arrived and, suspecting a heroin overdose, began treating Rogers accordingly. When the police arrived they questioned Royce and defendant. Defendant gave the police a false name and told them that he and Royce had found the woman (Rogers) unconscious outside the market. The police did not believe defendant and suspected that both he and Royce were under the influence of narcotics. Defendant and Royce were arrested.

The following day, in a taped interview, defendant admitted his involvement to the police, and led them to Mullican's house where the police found two empty balloons and a spoon in the bathroom. Rogers had suffered irreversible brain damage and died a week later without ever regaining consciousness. The cause of death was heroin overdose.

Defendant was charged with furnishing and/or administering a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352, ¹ and with second degree murder under Penal Code section 187 based on the second degree felony-murder rule. Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to concurrent terms of four years for the furnishing and/or administering, and fifteen years to life for murder. ²

I.

At the close of trial, defendant requested that the jury be instructed on the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court refused to give the requested instruction, believing there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of that offense. Defendant contends the jury could have found his conduct fell short of furnishing heroin to Rogers and, instead, constituted only aiding and abetting Rogers in her use of heroin--a misdemeanor. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11550.) Therefore, defendant argues, the jury could properly have found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter based on a misdemeanor-manslaughter theory (Pen.Code, § 192, subd. (b)), and instructions on that offense should have been given. ³

Defendant relies heavily on People v. Mayfield (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 263, 37 Cal.Rptr. 340, for his contention that the jury could properly have found he did not furnish the heroin to Rogers but, rather, was guilty only of aiding and abetting Rogers' use of heroin. In Mayfield, the three defendants, during a conversation in a bar, decided to pool their funds and purchase a supply of heroin for their own use. All three men went together in search of the source and, along the way, met the deceased, Willie Ricard, who was also interested in purchasing heroin and who offered to chip in his pro rata share. Although it was unclear who actually made the purchase, two balloons of heroin were acquired and the four returned to one of their apartments where each injected himself with a half a balloon. Ricard died shortly thereafter of a heroin overdose and the defendants were convicted of violating Health and Safety Code section 11501 (the predecessor to § 11352) and of second degree murder.

The prosecution's theory at trial had been that the defendants " 'provided, feloniously, and in violation of section 11501, the deceased with [the heroin] and then aided him actually in connection with the delivery to inject that poison and substance into his body....' " (225 Cal.App.2d at p. 266, 37 Cal.Rptr. 340.) The Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's conviction stating, "We are not convinced however that section 11501 was violated or that a felony was committed. [p] Appellants did not sell narcotics to anyone or to each other. The four men involved made a group purchase of narcotics for their individual use and the purpose of the purchase was carried out." (Id., at p. 267, 37 Cal.Rptr. 340, italics added.) ⁴

The distinction drawn by the Mayfield court between one who sells or furnishes heroin and one who simply participates in a group purchase seems to us a valid one, at least where the individuals involved are truly "equal partners" in the purchase and the purchase is made strictly for each individual's personal use. Under such circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that...