People v. Edwards, Indictment No.: 17-0458-03
| Decision Date | 21 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Indictment No.: 17-0458-03 |
| Citation | 2017 NY Slip Op 33053 (U) |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. WILLIE JAMES EDWARDS, A/K/A "MAGIC", BYRON GAYNOR, A/K/A "BUZZY", GEORGE JAMISON, BERNARD PEASE, A/K/A "BAE", Defendants. |
| Court | New York County Court |
DECISION & ORDER
The defendant has been indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree allegedly committed on or about April 27, 2017 in the County of Westchester; defendant is also charged as acting in concert with his co-defendants to commit the crimes of conspiracy in the fourth degree to commit the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and conspiracy in the fourth degree to commit the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree allegedly committed on or about and between May 4, 2016 and May 3, 2017 in the County of Westchester. He now moves by notice of motion with supporting affirmation for omnibus relief1. The People's response consists ofan affirmation in opposition, a memorandum of law and exhibits 1-5 (exhibit 5 is a compact disc) as well as the May 2, 2017 search warrant and supporting affidavit, which is an unnumbered exhibit. Upon consideration of these papers, as well as review of the grand jury minutes and exhibits and the consent discovery order entered in this case, the motion is disposed of as follows:
1. MOTION TO INSPECT/DISMISS/REDUCE
This application is granted to the extent that the Court has conducted an in camera inspection of the minutes of the grand jury proceedings. Upon review of the evidence presented, this Court finds that all counts were supported by sufficient evidence and that the instructions given were appropriate. There was no other infirmity which would warrant a dismissal of the indictment. Accordingly, that branch of the motion which seeks dismissal of the indictment is denied. While the defendant argues that the People failed to submit exculpatory information to the grand jury, he entirely fails to set forth what allegedly exculpatory information should have been presented. In any event, the People have wide discretion in presenting their case to a grand jury and do not have to present all evidence in their possession that is favorable to the accused (People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 25-26 (1986)). The People must present such exculpatory evidence only where it may entirely eliminate the need for the prosecution (Id.). Given the legally sufficient evidence which was presented to the grand jury, coupled with defendant's failure to allege any specific exculpatory information which was not presented, it cannot be said that the need for defendant's prosecution would have been entirely eliminated. The Court further finds no facts which would warrant releasing any portion of the minutes of the grand jury proceedings to the defense (CPL §210.30[3]).
2. MOTION TO STRIKE THE REFERENCE TO DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED ALIAS
Defendant moves to strike any reference to his alleged alias "Ty Born" from the indictment, arguing that the alias is not sufficiently related to the commission of the crimes herein to permit the People to refer to it. Defendant further argues that the inclusion of his alias prejudices him in that it would suggest to a jury that he is known to law enforcement officials by such alias and thus, that he has a criminal background. Defendant also requests an order barring the People from referring to defendant's alias. The People oppose the motion.
Defendant's motion is denied. The use of a defendant's nickname is highly probative of defendant's identity in this matter (see People v. Caver, 302 A.D.2d 604 (2d Dept. 2003); People v. Crowder, 2 A.D.3d 454 (2d Dept. 2003)). Moreover, it cannot be said that simply because defendant has a nickname, a jury would presume he has a criminal history, especially given that defendant's nickname is unrelated to any of the charges he faces hereunder (cf. Peeple v. Carver, supra (); People v. Crowder, supra ()).
3. MOTION TO SEVER
Defendant argues that he will be unduly prejudiced if he is tried jointly with his co-defendants because he is charged with only four counts in this 19 count indictment and submits that he and his co-defendants have antagonistic defenses and there will be Bruton issues. He argues that his co-defendants will not be bound by the Court's Sandoval ruling, which would prejudice him and would result in his co-defendants' attorneys essentiallyserving as second prosecutors in this matter and thus requests that this Court apply its Sandoval ruling to the other defendants' counsels. However, as to the potential questioning of his co-defendants, defendant argues that to restrict his cross-examination would impair his right to confrontation and right to a fair trial. The People oppose the motion and argue that the charges were properly joined as all being part of the same criminal transaction and defendant's motion is premature given no Sandoval rulings have been made in this case. They also argue that defendant's claims are speculative and that a limiting instruction directing the jury to separately consider the proof as to each crime charged would eliminate any prejudice to defendant.
The defendant's claims are conclusory and do not rise to the level of the compelling reasons required to mandate severance at this time (see People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174). Defendant's motion is denied with leave to renew before the trial judge.
4. MOTION FOR A FURTHER BILL OF PARTICULARS
This motion is denied. The bill of particulars which was served pursuant to the consent order was sufficient to adequately inform the defendant of the substance of his alleged conduct and to enable him to prepare and conduct a defense (People v. Byrnes, 126 A.D.2d 735, 736; see also People v. Watts, 84 N.Y.2d 948; People v. Gargano, 222 A.D.2d 694; People v. Lopez, 175 A.D.2d 267). The information requested by the defendant need not be disclosed (People v. Sanchez, 278 A.D.2d 889).
5. MOTION TO CONTROVERT EAVESDROPPING WARRANTS, PEN REGISTER AND TRAP & TRACE AND TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO SAID WARRANTS
Defendant seeks suppression of all evidence obtained by means of the eavesdropping warrants and their extensions and the GPS, pen registers and trap andtraces warrants/orders issued in this case (which warrants and supporting affidavits have all been provided to the defense with redactions which were approved by the Court pursuant to protective orders issued on June 22 and July 12, 2017). As to the eavesdropping warrants and their extensions, defendant alleges that the evidence should be suppressed because he submits that 1) there was no probable cause for their issuance, 2) that the People failed to demonstrate that they properly minimized the intrusion on defendant's communications, 3) that the People failed to demonstrate that "normal investigative procedures" were not sufficient in this case. As to the GPS warrants, pen registers and trap and trace, defendant argues that the orders authorizing them were not supported by probable cause. To the extent that the warrant applications indicate that a confidential informant was used, defendant argues that the warrant fails to comply with the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The People oppose the motion and argue, as an initial matter that defendant lacks standing to challenge the January 13, 2017 warrant issued for GPS, cell site information and historical call data information on his co-defendant Edwards phone. They argue that in any event, that the warrants were properly issued as demonstrated by the supporting affidavits which, they submit, set forth probable cause for their issuance, and further argue that the eavesdropping was properly conducted in accordance with those warrants.
Defendant's motion is denied. As to the January 13 warrant issued for GPS, cell site information and historical call data information on Edwards phone, defendant lacks standing to challenge the issuance of the same in that he lacks any expectation of privacy in his co-defendant's phone. In any event, the Court has reviewed all of the warrants for eavesdropping, GPS, pen registers and trap and traces and the supporting affidavitstherefor and upon the review of the four corners of the affidavits the Court finds that the warrants were supported by probable cause (see People v. Keyes, 291 AD2d 571 (2d Dept. 2D02); People v. Iannello, 156 A.D.2d 469 (2d Dept. 1989), lv. denied, 75 N.Y.2d 920 (1990)). Moreover, to the extent confidential informants (CIs) were used, contrary to defendant's contention, the Aguilar - Spinelli test was met (see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969)) as the application for the warrants demonstrated both the reliability of the informant(s), and the basis of the informant(s)' knowledge. Additionally, probable cause supported the issuance of the warrant even without the CI(s)' statements, and in any event, the existence of CI-1 was confirmed by the fact that on five occasions, that person's calls to defendant were recorded; thus defendant's related request for a Darden hearing is also denied (People v. Crooks, 27 N.Y.3d 609, 613 (2016)). The Court further, finds that the warrants were also issued, executed, and reported in accordance with all statutory requirements. A review of the eavesdropping, pen register and trap and trace warrant affidavits submitted by the Detective, assigned assistant(s) and the District Attorney himself, reveals that the issuing courts were apprised in detail of the purpose of the investigation, as well as how communications intercepted pursuant to the initial warrants led to...
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