People v. Eggleston, Cr. 5679

• Decision Date: 24 October 1967
• Docket Number: Cr. 5679
• Citation: 63 Cal.Rptr. 104,255 Cal.App.2d 337
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Edward EGGLESTON, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 104

63 Cal.Rptr. 104

255 Cal.App.2d 337

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Edward EGGLESTON, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 5679.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

Oct. 24, 1967.

Hearing Denied Dec. 20, 1967.

Alan Saltzman, San Francisco, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien, Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

DRAPER, Presiding Justice.

A jury found defendant guilty of possession of a knife while confined in a prison (Pen.Code, § 4502). He was sentenced to a term concurrent with that he was already serving. He appeals.

Two prison-made knives were found wrapped in a rolled blanket at the foot of defendant's bed. Brought before the prison disciplinary committee, he admitted an infraction of prison rule D--1205, possession of a weapon in the prison, and was confined in an isolation unit for 29 days. The present prosecution followed. At trial, he contended that the knives were placed in his bedroll by another, but the jury, on evidence concededly sufficient, found against him.

Defendant urges that the 'punishment' of solitary confinement placed him once in jeopardy, and that this prosecution is therefore within the proscription of double jeopardy. Under the California jeopardy rule (Cal.Const., Art. 1, § 13, Pen.Code, § 1023), prison disciplinary measures do not bar subsequent prosecution in a criminal action for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the basis of the prison discipline (People v. Elliott, 221 Cal.App.2d 575, 34 Cal.Rptr. 560; People v. Mason, 200 Cal.App.2d 282, 284, 19 Cal.Rptr. 240; People v. Garmon, 177 Cal.App.2d 301, 303--304, 2 Cal.Rptr. 60; People v. Conson, 72 Cal.App. 509, 237 P. 799). Nor is such action barred by the statute (Pen.Code, § 654) proscribing double punishment (People v. Ford, 175 Cal.App.2d 37, 345 P.2d 354).

But, says defendant, the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is, by the Fourteenth Amendment, made applicable to the states, and thus the federal court interpretations of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth govern this case. Those interpretations, he says, require a holding that the present prosecution is barred. The premise that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth wholly applicable to the states has not been adopted by the United States Supreme Court (see Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288). There are, however, indications in later decisions of that court of a trend to such a rule (see cases reviewed in United States v. Wilkins, 2 Cir., 348 F.2d 844). We shall assume, for purposes of this opinion, that the double jeopardy proscription of the Fifth Amendment is fully applicable to the states. But, even upon this assumption, defendant's argument must fail. The federal cases do not support the view that administrative measures bar prosecution under a penal statute.

Defendant argues that the federal rule is not limited to successive impositions of punishment by sentence of a court in judicial proceedings. But each of the authorities he cites (Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 85 U.S. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872; Oksanen v. United States, 8 Cir., 362 F.2d 74) involves only a second sentence imposed by a court in a judicial proceeding, after the sentence first imposed had been fully executed. The opinions do refer to the rule that 'no man shall be twice punished for the same offense,' but obviously do not, in light of the facts before those courts, treat disciplinary action by an administrative body as equivalent to imposition of sentence by a court.

We find no federal case on the precise issue before us. Analogous, however, is an income tax case (Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917). There the taxpayer had been tried and acquitted upon an indictment charging that he 'unlawfully, wilfully, * * * and fraudulently did attempt to defeat and evade' an income tax. The commissioner of internal revenue then levied an additional assessment of 50% Of the deficiency in tax paid, under a statute authorizing such assessment '(i)f any part of the deficiency is due to fraud with intent to evade tax.' The taxpayer, Mitchell, contended that the assessment was not a tax, but a criminal penalty, and thus barred by the rule against double jeopardy. The court rejected this contention. It pointed out that the double jeopardy rule 'prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense,' (p. 399, 58 S.Ct. p. 633) and would apply only if the assessment proceeding were 'essentially criminal' (p. 398, 58 S.Ct. 630). It pointed out that 'remedial sanctions' may be of varying types and that one characteristically 'free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted.' The facts before us present a stronger case for denying the claim of double jeopardy.

Some summary means of implementing reasonable rules obviously is essential to the operation of a prison. Rules without sanctions of some sort would be useless even in a kindergarten or first grade class. Patently, the need is greater in a prison, whose inmates are there because they have demonstrated an inability to conform to standards deemed necessary to preserve life and order in a free community. Moreover, prompt imposition of these sanctions, quickly apparent to others of the prison population, is a necessity. If one inmate is caught openly flouting an established rule, yet retains all the privileges he had when he obeyed all rules, mass disobedience is likely to follow. Prompt imposition of sanctions in such a case may well be more important for its effect upon the other inmates than for that upon the offender. This is particularly true of possession of weapons, a rule infraction which threatens the...