People v. Elliott

Decision Date22 April 1966
Docket NumberCr. 10615
Citation50 Cal.Rptr. 757,241 Cal.App.2d 659
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Barbara Jean ELLIOTT, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Leonard Nasatir, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Walter R. Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

FRAMPTON, Justice pro tem. *

Defendant was charged, by information, filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County with the crime of pimping, a felony, in violation of section 266h, Penal Code, in counts I, III, V, and VII thereof, and with the crime of pandering, a felony, in counts II, IV, VI and VIII thereof. The cause went to trial before a jury and on October 19, 1964, the jury returned its verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged in counts I, II, III, IV, VI, and VIII of the information, and not guilty as to counts V and VII thereof. A motion for a new trial was denied and probation was denied. The defendant was sentenced to state prison on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. The appeal is from the judgment.

The defendant asserts two grounds for reversal as follows: (1) The judgment as to counts I and III cannot stand because only a male person may be charged and convicted of the crime of pimping as defined in section 266h, Penal Code, 1 and (2) the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error in failing and refusing to instruct the jury as to the defendant's right to remain silent.

The case of the prosecution rested entirely upon the testimony of the two victims who, it was shown, were prostitutes and who were known as such by the defendant and from whose earnings the defendant was charged with having derived support and maintenance, and a landlady who had rented an apartment to a person in the presence of the defendant, and where, according to the record, the defendant sent victims A and B for the purpose of engaging in and where the latter actually engaged in acts of prostitution. The defendant did not take the witness stand and testify and no witness was called in her behalf.

A summary of the evidence shows that victim A first met the defendant in Orange County during the month of June, 1960. Victim A informed the defendant that she had no place to go whereupon the defendant told her that she could stay with the defendant in Los Angeles and keep house for the latter.

Pursuant to this invitation, the victim came to the residence of defendant in July, 1960. This residence was occupied by the defendant, her husband, Speros Steve Sarras, and a man named Joe. The first two or three weeks of her stay at the defendant's residence passed without incident. However, during this time the defendant dyed the victim's hair and bought clothing for her. Subsequently, the defendant asked victim A if she would like to go out drinking and dining with a man for money. She informed victim A that the man would pay $50 and that this rendezvous would involve having sexual intercourse with the man. The defendant gave victim A specific directions as to the time and place of the meeting and instructed her as to how she should behave. Victim A went to the designated location, met the man and engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with him for which she received the sum of $50. Victim A had not, before this incident, engaged in acts of prostitution. Upon returning to the defendant's residence she gave the latter the entire sum of $50.

It appears from the record that the man told the defendant that he was not satisfied, whereupon the defendant told victim A that in order for men to continue to return as clients, they must be properly entertained. As a result of this complaint, the defendant and Sarras (her husband), took victim A to bed with them for the purpose of instructing the latter in the methods she should use in entertaining future customers. A sexual orgy ensued, the revolting details of which are not necessary to relate here, which culminated in an act of sexual intercourse between victim A and Sarras.

Victim A engaged in three acts of sexual intercourse with three different men at the residence of defendant for which she received a total of $110, all of which was given to and kept by the defendant. In August, 1960 the defendant took victim A to another house of prostitution where the defendant introduced her to a woman occupant and asked if a girl was needed. The woman occupant replied that there would be an opening in about one week. About September 1, 1960, victim A began work, as a prostitute, at this house. Either the defendant or Sarras would drive victim A to this house three mornings a week and would pick her up in the evenings. While at this house of prostitution victim A engaged in about 35 acts of sexual intercourse a day with different men for money. When either the defendant or Sarras arrived to pick her up in the evenings she would give her total receipts to the one or the other, depending upon which one called for her. She continued to work under this arrangement for approximately four weeks. When not working at the house of prostitution, above referred to, the defendant arranged 'call dates' for victim A. These consisted of a rendezvous with men at various locations for the purpose of having sexual intercourse for money. All money was given to the defendant on the victim's return from the 'call date.'

In September, 1960, the defendant gave victim A the sum of $120 with instructions to use it to rent a specifically designated apartment on Highland Avenue in Hollywood where victim A could work 'call dates' when she was available and if not available then victims A's sister could use the apartment for a similar purpose. The apartment was rented and thereafter the defendant would send victim A there where she met men and engaged in sexual intercourse with them for money. Later she gave the money to the defendant. Thereafter the defendant would make appointments for men to have sexual intercourse with victim A either at a prearranged location or at the rented apartment. Victim A's estimate of the amount received by her from her illicit activities during this time was $1,000 per week, all of which she gave to the defendant.

During the month of September, 1960, victim A introduced her sister (victim B), to the defendant. Victim B and the defendant talked about acts of prostitution and thereafter victim B moved into the residence of the defendant. The defendant instructed victim B prior to 'her first date' on the proper procedures. The defendant demonstrated to victim B the 'wash and disease discovery technique' by using a regular male customer as a 'guinea pig.' The three of them disrobed and went to bed together. The defendant then engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with the male customer while victim B watched. The defendant was paid $20 by the male customer. Later that day the defendant sent victim B to an apartment where the latter had sexual intercourse with a man for which she received $25. Victim B had acts of sexual intercourse with two different men at the residence of the defendant, for which she received a total of $45. She gave the money received from her illegal transactions to the defendant or to Sarras, the defendant's husband. The defendant arranged additional 'dates' for victim B, explaining on each occasion where she would meet the man, who he was, and how much he would pay. Victim B continued in these activities for about two weeks during which time she engaged in approximately 100 acts of sexual intercourse with different men for which she received about $2,000, all of which she turned over to the defendant or to Sarras, the defendant's husband.

About September 24, 1960, victims A and B left the State of California. They returned to Los Angeles in 1962 and took up residence at the home of the father-in-law of victim A. The defendant came to the home of the father-in-law and there discussed with the victims the prospect of their returning to work for the defendant as prostitutes. Pursuant to this discussion the victims did return and thereafter the defendant sent victim A to an apartment located on Mariposa Street in Los Angeles where victim A, according to her instructions, would find another 'working girl' and a maid in attendance. Victim A went to this apartment where she remained for three or four days during which time she engaged in sexual intercourse with different men for money. She gave half of her earnings received here to the maid in attendance and kept half of it for herself.

The defendant on August 22, 1962, with an unidentified person, rented an apartment on Wilton Place in Los Angeles. Thereafter, the landlady of this apartment observed a Negro maid to be on the premises every day. The defendant gave the address of this apartment to victims A and B and told them to go there for the purpose of engaging in acts of prostitution. Both victims engaged in acts of sexual intercourse for money with various men at this location and turned over the money received for their services to the Negro maid. The victims were arrested at the Wilton Place apartment.

The information charged the defendant solely and as a principal with the crimes of pimping and pandering and no reference is made therein to defendant's husband, Speros Steve Sarras. There is a reference, however, in the reporter's transcript to the trial, on May 21st, 22nd and 27th, 1963, of the case of People of the State of California v. Speros Steve Sarras. 2 At the trial of the case at bench, the defendant being solely charged, the District Attorney propounded his questions to the witnesses in such manner as to focus the testimony principally on the activities of the defendant Elliott. Notwithstanding this, the testimony elicited unmistakably brought out the details of the sordid partnership which existed between the defendant Elliott and her husband,...

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  • People v. Brady
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • August 29, 1969
    ...has become a serious issue in California cases: (1) The trial judge fails to give the instruction Sua sponte (People v. Elliott, 241 Cal.App.2d 659, 667--668, 50 Cal.Rptr. 757; People v. Graham, 251 Cal.App.2d 513, 518--519, 59 Cal.Rptr. 577; People v. Horrigan, 253 Cal.App.2d 519, 522--523......
  • Com. v. Whitehead
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    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • January 30, 1980
    ...to male-to-female rape. The accessory statute (G.L. c. 274, § 2) is gender-neutral. See also State v. Carter, supra; People v. Elliott, 241 Cal.App.2d 659, 50 Cal.Rptr. 757 cert. denied, 385 U.S. 941, 87 S.Ct. 312, 17 L.Ed.2d 221 (1966); People v. Trumbley, 252 Ill. 29, 96 N.E. 573 (1911); ......
  • People v. Gardner
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    • California Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1969
    ... ... Two of them did not decide the matter but held that any error in the failure to give the instruction was not prejudicial. (People v. Graham (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 513, 518--519, 59 Cal.Rptr. 577; People v. Elliott (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 659, 669, 50 Cal.Rptr ... Page 750 ... [457 P.2d 582] 757, cert. den. 385 U.S. 941, 87 S.Ct. 312, 17 L.Ed.2d 221.) The third case held that the court is under no duty to give the instruction on its own motion. (People v. Horrigan (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 519, 521--523, 61 ... ...
  • People v. Northern
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • November 15, 1967
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