People v. Emanuel

• Decision Date: 16 June 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-1738
• Citation: 98 Mich.App. 163,295 N.W.2d 875
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence EMANUEL, Defendant-Appellant. 98 Mich.App. 163, 295 N.W.2d 875
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 875

295 N.W.2d 875

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence EMANUEL, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-1738.

98 Mich.App. 163, 295 N.W.2d 875

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 16, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 4, 1980.

Released for Publication Sept. 24, 1980.

[98 MICHAPP 167] James R. Nuehard, State Appellate Defender, Mardi Crawford, Asst. State Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., E. Reilly Wilson, Appellate Chief, Asst. Pros. Atty., Charles Seller, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before MAHER, P. J., and CAVANAGH and CYNAR, JJ.

CYNAR, Judge.

Following a lengthy jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548, and of arson of a dwelling house, M.C.L. § 750.72; M.S.A. § 28.267. He received the mandatory life sentence on the former conviction and a concurrent 13 to 20 year term of imprisonment on the latter. Defendant appeals as of right.

[98 MICHAPP 168]

I

The victim, one Lynn Bradfield, died of strangulation by ligature. At trial, the testimony established that defendant had met Taurus Duncan, an accomplice, some five years prior to the murder. Both knew the decedent. Duncan and the defendant became friends. At the time of the homicide, both were employed at the Chrysler Mound Road Engine Plant and often drove to and from work together. Duncan professed to being in love with defendant, who was married.

Approximately three years prior to the killing, Duncan had met the deceased. A year later, in 1975, Duncan went to California and remained domiciled there for a year. During that same period, the victim had given birth to a daughter, Renee, referred to as "Tiffany" by Ms. Duncan. When Duncan returned to Detroit, she told defendant that Renee was her child, that she had given birth to her while in California and that he (Emanuel) was the father. She claimed that she had given "Tiffany" to the victim to care for her and that the victim and her husband had adopted Renee. Defendant from that point forward saw the child frequently, lavished gifts upon her, took her and Duncan on various outings, and introduced Renee to his family as his own child.

The day prior to the murder, June 16, 1977, Duncan and defendant twice spoke with regard to killing Lynn Bradfield and taking the child, although they both testified that it began as a joke.

Finally, that same evening, defendant and Duncan drove to the victim's apartment in Taylor, Michigan, using a car owned by defendant's father to avoid being recognized, as defendant's car had been seen in the vicinity many times previously. [98 MICHAPP 169] On the way, they stopped to fill a gasoline can, which was used to douse the apartment with gasoline in order to set a fire that would destroy any evidence. ¹ Upon arriving, Duncan entered the apartment alone, leaving the gas can on the front porch.

It is at approximately this point where the stories of defendant and Ms. Duncan diverge. Defendant maintained in two statements given the police, as well as in his testimony at trial, that he never left his father's car that evening and had nothing to do with the strangulation of Lynn Bradfield or with the arson. He claimed that he fell asleep in the car and did not awaken until Duncan returned to the car with the gas can and with "Tiffany", at which time she told defendant "I killed my aunt". Defendant contended that it was Duncan alone who strangled the victim with a dog leash, spirited the baby away, and set fire to the apartment.

According to defendant's second in-custody statement, Duncan carried out a preconceived plan to first strangle the victim with the dog leash while combing her hair, then take the baby, and finally set fire to the apartment. In this statement defendant maintained that, even after driving Duncan to the apartment, he did not believe she would go through with the plan. On the witness stand at trial, and in his earlier statement to the police, defendant denied any prior knowledge of the plan.

The testimony given by Ms. Duncan, the principal prosecution witness, which was consonant with her previous custodial statement, recounted a story quite different from that told by defendant. Duncan's testimony generally accorded with defendant's[98 MICHAPP 170] until the point immediately after she put the dog leash around the decedent's neck. ² At that juncture, while she held the leash tightly, she signalled defendant to enter the apartment by flicking the porch light on and off. Defendant next entered the apartment, argued with Duncan, and then told her that they had to go through with it.

According to Duncan, defendant grabbed the victim by the hair, while simultaneously grabbing the leash, and then dragged her upstairs. Duncan took "Tiffany" and then left the apartment, leaving defendant alone with the decedent, whom Duncan said was gagging but still alive.

Duncan waited in the car for defendant. They had left another child in the apartment, as per the plan to substitute another infant for "Tiffany". As they drove away, Ms. Duncan saw flames coming from the apartment.

Defendant raises a number of issues on appeal which merit discussion. In particular, he argues against the admission into evidence at trial of the two statements he made to the police. The first was made July 25, 1977, before any statement was given the police by Taurus Duncan; the second was made the following day, July 26. The two custodial statements of defendant inconsistent with each other as well as with defendant's testimony at trial, supplied the major ammunition for the impeachment of defendant by the prosecution and served to discredit, or at least cast doubt upon, substantial portions of defendant's testimony in his own behalf on direct examination.

[98 MICHAPP 171]

II

Defendant first contends that the trial court reversibly erred in admitting his statement of July 25, as it was the product of an illegal arrest, one made in the absence of probable cause. Since the arrest, if one can be said to have occurred, was illegal, the statement should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree.

We must initially determine whether an arrest in the Fourth Amendment sense took place on July 25. The trial court ruled that one had not.

On July 25, 1977, a Lieutenant Stewart of the Detroit Police called the Taylor Police Department and gave them defendant's name and address, as well as informing them of a conversation he had had with defendant and defendant's cousin, a Detroit policeman, a few days earlier. The substance of that conversation led Stewart to believe that defendant was possibly involved in the Bradfield murder. Stewart had told defendant to go to the police, and when he called the Taylor police and learned that defendant had not contacted them, Stewart gave them the above-described information.

Acting on this lead, Taylor police went to defendant's residence, arriving before defendant. When defendant drove up, he was approached by two officers who identified themselves and informed defendant that it was their understanding he had information relating to a killing. Defendant was told that the officers wanted to talk to him at the police station.

Defendant responded that he had intended to go the Taylor Police Department and speak with someone, but that he had not yet gotten around to it. Defendant agreed to go to the police station with the officers. Defendant was given the option [98 MICHAPP 172] of riding with the police or of following in his own car, according to the officers. Defendant denied being given a choice.

Before being placed in the police car, defendant was patted down, but he was not handcuffed. Defendant claimed that he was told he was under arrest, but the officers denied telling defendant either that he was or was not under arrest. One of the officers present at that time testified that, while he did not feel that defendant had been placed under arrest, defendant would not have been allowed to leave if he asked to do so. The officer also said that if defendant had attempted to leave he would have been placed under arrest.

Arriving at the station, defendant was neither fingerprinted nor booked, but instead was taken to the detective bureau. Apprised of his Miranda ³ rights, defendant proceeded to give his first statement, which was tape recorded. He was then released.

The Michigan Supreme Court has recently re-examined the constitutional law relating to arrests in People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979). The Court quoted from Terry v. Ohio, ⁴ which quotation in relevant part declared:

" 'Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a "seizure" has occurred.' " Summers, supra, 444, 286 N.W.2d 228.

Thus, the sine qua non for an arrest or "seizure" of the person of a defendant is a significant restraint[98 MICHAPP 173] of freedom, an intrusion more severe than a Terry-type "stop and frisk". Summers, supra, 444-446, 286 N.W.2d 226. As noted by the Court in Summers, the Terry rationale is extremely limited in scope and will justify only brief on-the-street stops, with attendant questioning regarding suspicious activity, and limited weapons-frisks when necessary to insure safety. Id., 447, 286 N.W.2d 226. It is obvious, therefore, that Terry cannot be used to justify the actions of the police in the case at bar.

Plaintiff however argues that defendant voluntarily accompanied the police to the station following a request to do so, and, as such, no arrest took place. Defendant argues to the contrary, claiming that, because the police intended to exercise control over the defendant and because the circumstances indicated that...