People v. English
| Decision Date | 09 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 6965,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 185 N.W.2d 139,29 Mich.App. 36 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie ENGLISH, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Carl Levin, Arthur J. Tarnow, Legal Aid and Defender Association, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Angelo A. Pentolino, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before DANHOF, P.J., and V. J. BRENNAN and KELLEY, * JJ.
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of murder in the first degree, M.C.L.A. § 750.316 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.548). He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal the defendant argues that after the defendant introduced evidence of insanity, the prosecution failed to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt as required by law. People v. Krugman (1966), 377 Mich. 559, 141 N.W.2d 33; People v. Eggleston (1915), 186 Mich. 510, 152 N.W. 944. It is the defendant's position that cross-examination of the defendant's psychiatric witnesses was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the prosecution's burden of proof. The defendant maintains that the people had to introduce affirmative testimony that the defendant was sane in order to make out a case for the jury. The defendant has cited no Michigan authority for this position and our research has disclosed none. The annotation in 17 A.L.R.3d, pp. 184, 190, § 8(a) and (b), indicates that those jurisdictions which have considered this question are about evenly divided as to whether the prosecution must introduce affirmative testimony of the defendant's sanity in order to sustain its burden of proof.
Before the trial the defendant gave notice that he intended to rely on the defense of insanity. During the trial and before the people rested the defendant presented, out of order, the testimony of two psychiatrists who had examined him. One of the defendant's psychiatrists, Dr. Caberto, was also appointed by the court to examine and report on the defendant. Dr. Caberto testified at length and gave extremely contradictory testimony which is virtually impossible to summarize. Nevertheless, we try.
Based on three one hour examinations of the defendant 8 to 9 months after the killing, Dr. Caberto testified on direct examination that at the time of his examinations, the defendant had a mental disease or mental disorder known as 'psychoneurotic and disassociative reaction amnesia'; this mental illness belongs in the category termed nonpsychotic which is not insane; this type of patient is not able to cope with this society so they disassociate; the defendant went into amnesia which is one of the defense mechanisms; defendant has a circumscribed period of time wherein he had amnesia; he used the defense mechanism just to blot out this distressful situation; amnesia is not voluntary, it is a subconscious thing; it is hard to differentiate actual amnesia and feigned amnesia; some amnesias are accounted for by organic brain disorder, but the defendant had no 'organicity' or damage to the brain; and a person who suffers from this type of mental disorder does not have any difficulty controlling his conduct to the requirements of the law.
On cross-examination Dr. Caberto testified that the defendant was given only two psychological tests, an 'IQ' test and an 'ink blot' or Rorschach test; the tests were given by someone else, although Dr. Caberto relied on the results in forming his opinion; when the doctor made his diagnosis there was no way to tell how long the reaction had been taking place; other than this blocking mechanism, the defendant's personality was normal; if the stressful situation was removed the defendant would be a normal human being; he had no opinion as to the defendant's mental state on June 10, 1967 when the killing occurred; defendant remembers some but not all of the incidents that took place on June 10, 1967; the diagnosis was based substantially on what the defendant told Dr. Caberto about his lapse of memory; it was possible that the defendant's disassociative reaction occurred after the alleged murder rather than during it; the defendant said that he could not remember what happened after a sharp blow in the groin until he was on the street; a sharp blow to the groin could not cause amnesia; and the amnesia did not occur before the alleged murder.
On redirect examination Dr. Caberto testified that the disassociative period was from the time that the defendant was kicked in the groin until he woke up on the street; during that time the defendant did not have conscious control of his actions; if the defendant shot a woman during that period he had no control of his compulsion; if he shot her, he wasn't able to conform to the requirements of law; the shooting caused the anxiety; the amnesia started with the kick in the groin; the Doctor didn't know whether or not the kick in the groin was before the shooting; and the defendant did not tell the Doctor about any shooting.
On recross-examination Dr. Caberto testified that the shooting was the real cause of the anxiety resulting in the disassociative reaction; after the shooting, the amnesia took place wiping out the period of subconscious; and that it was possibly after the shooting, that the defendant's acts were uncontrolled. The witness' final testimony in response to questions from the prosecution follows:
The defendant's second psychiatrist, Dr. Bresnahan, examined the defendant in the county jail about one year after the killing. On direct examination he testified that he had taken a 'history' from the defendant; he had reviewed Dr. Caberto's report and diagnosis and had reached the same conclusion; the disassociative period may vary in length, some lasting for weeks or months; and the defendant did not have the ability during that period to choose between one course of conduct and another.
On cross-examination Dr. Bresnahan testified that he examined the defendant verbally for approximately one and one-half hours; his diagnosis was arrived at before he saw Dr. Caberto's report; and his opinion was based on what the defendant and his lawyer told him plus his experience about psychiatric cases. Responding to questions by the prosecution, Dr. Bresnahan testified further:
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