People v. Ercole

• Decision Date: 25 June 1958
• Citation: 4 N.Y.2d 617,152 N.E.2d 77,176 N.Y.S.2d 649
• Parties: , 152 N.E.2d 77 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Anniello ERCOLE, Also Known as 'T', Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 649

176 N.Y.S.2d 649

4 N.Y.2d 617, 152 N.E.2d 77

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Anniello ERCOLE, Also Known as 'T', Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 25, 1958.

Edward S. Silver, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Aaron Nussbaum, Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellant.

Edward H. Levine, Abraham H. Brodsky and Vernon C. Rossner, New York City, for respondent.

CONWAY, Chief Judge.

In May of 1953 an indictment was returned against the defendant Ercole which contained four counts of larceny, the first for first degree grand larceny, and the remaining three for petit larceny. This indictment, drawn pursuant to section 276 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is commonly known as a 'long form' indictment. At the trial, after a jury had been sworn and some preliminary testimony given, the People sought to introduce evidence that the defendant accomplished the larcenies by means of false pretenses. The court sustained the defendant's objection to this evidence on the ground that it was inadmissible under the indictment which failed to meet the requirements of subdivision 1 of section 1290-a of the Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, which provides, in part: 'If, however, the defendant made use of any false or fraudulent representation or pretense in the course of accomplishing, or in aid of, or in facilitiating the theft, evidence thereof may not be received at the trial unless the indictment or information alleges such representation or pretense * * *.' To meet the situation, the People moved under section 295-j of the Code of Criminal Procedure to amend the indictment by adding four more counts, each new count corresponding to each of the original counts except that the new counts contained an added allegation that the larceny was committed by the use of false pretense. This motion war granted over the defendant's objection, and the People proceeded with their proof of larceny by false pretense. The case was submitted to the jury on only the amended fifth count which charged first degree grand larceny accomplished by false pretense, and the jury brought in a verdict of guilty. The first four counts had been withdrawn at the close of the People's case, and the sixth, seventh, and eighth counts were withdrawn at the end of the whole case. The defendant appealed his conviction and obtained a reversal and dismissal of the indictment. This court, in People v. Ercole, 308 N.Y. 425, 126 N.E.2d 543, held that section 295-j was intended to apply only to the amendment of 'simplified' indictments. Thereafter, the Grand Jury returned the instant indictment which relates to the same offense charged by the fifth count of the former amended indictment. The defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment on the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense (N.Y.Const. art. I, § 6; Code Cr.Proc. § 9). The motion was granted and the defendant's position was sustained by the Appellate Division, though by a closely divided court.

There is only one crime of larceny now in this State (Penal Law, § 1290; People v. Lobel, 298 N.Y. 243, 82 N.E.2d 145). The defendant argues, therefore, that he was in legal jeopardy of a larceny conviction under the original unamended indictment, that the error of the Trial Judge could not nullify that jeopardy, and that he may not now be tried for the same larceny on the theory that it was accomplished by false pretense. We are unable to accept this contention.

It is well-settled law in this State that when a defendant procures a reversl of his conviction and sentence for legal error at trial, he may not plead the former proceedings in bar to a second trial for the same offense. Upon reversal, the defendant is deemed to be in precisely the same position as though there had been no trial (People ex rel. Sloane v. Lawes, 255 N.Y. 112, 117, 174 N.E. 80, 81; People v. McGrath, 202 N.Y. 445, 451, 96 N.E. 92, 94; People v. Palmer, 109 N.Y. 413, 418-419, 17 N.E. 213, 214-215). As this court stated in the Palmer case: '* * * if reversal of the judgment of conviction follows, that judgment, as well as the record of the former trial, have been annulled and expunged by the judgment of the appellate court, and they are as though they never had been; while the indictment is left to stand, as to the crime of which the prisoner had been charged and convicted, as though there had been no trial' (109 N.Y. at pages 419-420, 17 N.E. at page 215; emphasis added). So thoroughly does a reversal operate to vitiate the former proceedings that the defendant may be tried upon a superseding indictment which contains a count not included in the first indictment (People v. Cocco, 3 N.Y.2d 716, 163 N.Y.S.2d 961), and he may be retried upon the original indictment even as to those higher degrees of crime of which he had been acquitted by the jury at the first trial. (People v. McGrath, supra; People v. Palmer, supra; People v. Caccamise, 187 Misc. 705, 706, 64 N.Y.S.2d 686). More particularly appropos of the case at Bar, new trials have been ordered following reversals of convictions based on indictments illegally amended during the course of trial. See People v. Bromwich, 200 N.Y. 385, 93 N.E. 933, affirming, 135 App.Div. 67, 119 N.Y.S. 833; People v. Geyer, 196 N.Y. 364, 90 N.E. 48; People v. Poucher, 30 Hun 576, appeal dismissed 99 N.Y. 610, 1 N.E. 151. The ground upon which the reversal is placed is not material (15 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 427, p. 91).

Whether, as the People suggest, the defendant was not in legal jeopardy under the original indictment because of a variance in proof is unnecessary to consider. Taking ...