People v. Escobar

• Decision Date: 16 October 1981
• Citation: 110 Misc.2d 1089,443 N.Y.S.2d 534
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Jaime ESCOBAR, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 534

443 N.Y.S.2d 534

110 Misc.2d 1089

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Jaime ESCOBAR, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Trial Term Bronx County, Part 65.

Oct. 16, 1981.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. by Philip Gaynor, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the people.

Caesar Cirigliano, New York City, for defendant; Alice Schlesinger, Alan Friedman, New York City, of counsel.

JEROME L. REINSTEIN, Justice:

An apparently still unsettled question in this State is the standard of proof which should govern the prosecutor's burden of establishing the mental condition of a criminal defendant found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect under the recently enacted Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980. (L.1980, Ch. 548). Mr. Bellacosa, in his Supplementary Practice Commentaries to amended CPL § 330.20 (Vol. 11a, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated, 1980-1981, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, P. 16), presumes that such burden is "civil in nature and therefore preponderance (of the evidence)" suffices; a view shared by one Court (People v. Plaksin, 107 Misc.2d 696, 435 N.Y.S.2d 894), but rejected by another (Matter of Rose, 109 Misc.2d 960, 441 N.Y.S.2d 161). ¹

For the reasons hereinbelow stated, this Court agrees with Rose, supra, that the clear and convincing standard of proof governs these proceedings.

Defendant was accused of the crimes of burglary in the first degree, assault in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. After a non-jury trial he was found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect.

Pursuant to the provisions of CPL § 330.20, upon entry of said verdict an examination order was issued and defendant was examined by two qualified psychiatrists, Dr. Mark Vandenbergh and Dr. Paul Chellappa. Each psychiatrist's report was submitted to the Court; and both were of the opinion that the defendant is suffering from a dangerous mental disorder. ²

An "initial hearing" in conformity with the statute (CPL § 330.20was thereafter held. Doctors Vandenbergh and Chellappa testified as did the defendant's expert, Dr. Robert Goldstein. Although not unanimous as to the precise nature of his illness, all three psychiatrists agreed that defendant is now mentally ill; but only Doctors Vandenbergh and Chellappa were of the view that he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others. Accordingly, the only real issue before the Court is whether defendant has a dangerous mental disorder and should therefore be committed under CPL § 330.20, or is only mentally ill and then civilly committed pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law (See CPL § 330.20[7]).

Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980 a person acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect who was no longer believed to be dangerous to himself or others could petition for discharge or release on condition, or such application could be made on his behalf by the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene (Former CPL § 330.20 The petitioner, under such prior law, bore the burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he could be safely released. (Matter of Torsney, 47 N.Y.2d 667, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192, 394 N.E.2d 262; Matter of Lublin v. Central Islip Psychiatric Center, 43 N.Y.2d 341, 401 N.Y.S.2d 466, 372 N.E.2d 307; but cf. Matter of Estes, 75 A.D.2d 451, 429 N.Y.S.2d 514).

In Addington v. State of Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a "clear and convincing" standard of proof to civilly commit an individual involuntarily to a state mental institution.

Since the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that defendant be afforded the same procedural and substantive rights as one whose civil commitment is sought (cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620; Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435; People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 224 N.E.2d 87; Matter of Tornsey, supra), the "clear and convincing" standard of proof is equally applicable to the instant proceeding.

In view of the fact that defendant does not seriously contest the contention that he is mentally ill, only the claim that because of such condition he currently constitutes a physical danger to himself or others, it may be argued that establishment of said condition by a lesser standard of proof would satisfy due process. This view could seemingly be further supported by the holding in Baxstrom, supra, that "of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purpose of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all." (Baxstrom v. Herold, supra, 383 U.S. 107 111, 86 S.Ct. 760, 762, 15 L.Ed.2d 620, italics in original).

However, there are several cogent reasons why a bifurcated standard of proof, one to adjudicate "mental illness" and another to determine "dangerous mental disorder", should not be established.

First, to apply two different standards in the same fact finding process would prove too unwieldy, tend to undermine the importance of the ultimate decision and undoubtedly confuse any jury which may be called upon to review a commitment order (See CPL § 330.20 Mental Hygiene Law § 9.35). As the Supreme Court aptly noted in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. supra, at pp. 424-425, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1808-1809, "suggests that, to a degree, efforts to analyze what lay jurors understand concerning the differences among these three tests (preponderance of the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt and clear and convincing) or the nuances of a judge's instructions on the law may well be largely an academic exercise; there are no directly relevant empirical studies. Indeed, the ultimate truth as to how the standards of proof affect decisionmaking may well be unknowable, given that factfinding is a process shared by countless thousands of individuals throughout...