People v. Espino
| Decision Date | 24 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | H040942 |
| Citation | 247 Cal.App.4th 746,202 Cal.Rptr.3d 354 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Freddy ESPINO, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Rudolph J. Alejo, Berkeley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Acting Senior Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Ronald E. Niver, Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Márquez, J. Police stopped defendant Freddy Espino for speeding. Based on an informant's tip and other factors, the police extended the stop for further investigation. In the course of the stop, defendant consented to a search of his person, whereupon officers found an object in his pocket. Thinking the object was crack cocaine, the officers handcuffed defendant. But after examining the object, the police determined it was not crack cocaine, but a diamond. Without removing the handcuffs, police continued to question defendant and requested consent to search his car. After some hesitation, defendant gave consent for the car search, whereupon the police found several grams of methamphetamine in defendant's car.
Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5
. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant then pleaded no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a felon. He also admitted having a prior conviction for possession of cocaine for sale. The trial court imposed a total term of two years eight months.
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress. He does not dispute that the police lawfully stopped him for speeding, but he challenges the constitutionality of the seizure on two grounds. First, he contends the police lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop longer than necessary to address the traffic violation. Second, he contends he did not give valid consent for the car search because he was unlawfully under arrest when officers requested his consent.
We conclude the police had reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of the initial traffic stop beyond that necessary for traffic enforcement purposes. However, we hold defendant did not give valid consent for the car search because the police lacked probable cause to keep him under arrest when they requested his consent. We will reverse the judgment.1
Police searched defendant's vehicle after stopping him for speeding. An onboard camera in the patrol car recorded video of the stop, but not audio. In defendant's car, police found several grams of methamphetamine, a scale, and numerous small plastic bags. In a subsequent warrant search of defendant's home, police found a gun and ammunition in a safe.
At the suppression hearing, Gilroy Police Sergeant Joseph Deras testified as follows. In March 2012, he was conducting a “speed enforcement operation” near First Street and Kern Street in Gilroy. He had a civilian “ride along” in the patrol car with him. At around 7:30 p.m., Sergeant Deras stopped defendant for driving 50 to 51 miles per hour. The speed limit was 35 miles per hour. After defendant pulled over, Sergeant Deras approached defendant's car, explained the reason for the stop, and requested defendant's license, registration, and proof of insurance. Defendant supplied all three documents, and Sergeant Deras returned to his patrol car for a routine license and warrant check. He determined there were no warrants outstanding, defendant's license was valid, and he was not on probation or parole. But the check also showed defendant was registered as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290
.
Sergeant Deras testified that, in response to learning an individual is a registered sex offender, his practice was to verify that the registrant lives at the registered address. With respect to defendant, Sergeant Deras testified, “By definition, [defendant] was in compliance” as a registrant under Penal Code section 290
. However, Sergeant Deras also testified that, in the days before the stop, another officer told him certified letters had been sent to defendant's address, but police were unable to establish fact-to-face contact with defendant. Sergeant Deras inferred it was possible somebody else could have signed and returned the letters, and that defendant did not actually live at the address. Sergeant Deras made several calls to the other officer but could not reach him.
While Sergeant Deras was still in his patrol car, Gilroy Police Detective Bill Richmond called Sergeant Deras on his cell phone. Detective Richmond told Sergeant Deras to “hang on” to defendant. Detective Richmond had information from a “validated confidential informant” that defendant was selling narcotics and firearms. Sergeant Deras testified that he managed all the informants in Gilroy, he was aware of an informant “looking into” defendant, but he did not have “particulars about the exact amount of narcotics” or types of firearms involved.
At that point, Sergeant Deras decided to wait with his patrol car until other officers arrived to assist with the stop. He testified that he needed more information from Detective Richmond, and he was concerned about the possible presence of a firearm in the car. For that reason, he preferred to have other officers approach the car with him.
Around the same time, the civilian ride along told Sergeant Deras that he had seen defendant “making a very pronounced movement” to the passenger side of the car when he first pulled over. Based on the civilian's description, Sergeant Deras considered this to be a “furtive movement,” i.e., a possible attempt to conceal contraband.
After several minutes, Detective Richmond and another officer arrived. The officers approached defendant's car, ordered him to get out, and walked him to the sidewalk for questioning. Defendant told the officers he was living at the address listed in his sex offender registration, but he had never signed for any certified letters. After defendant put his hands in his pockets several times, the officers asked defendant for consent to search his pockets. Defendant consented to the search. The officers found “some type of hard, small, little object” consistent with the size and texture of crack cocaine. At that point, the officers placed defendant in handcuffs. They told him he was being detained and that he was not under arrest.
At the suppression hearing, when the prosecutor asked Sergeant Deras why they placed defendant in handcuffs, he answered, “Well, as soon as that object came out, we thought it was crack cocaine,” so “we thought he was committing a felony.” After examining the object under his patrol car spotlight, however, Sergeant Deras determined it was a diamond. Sergeant Deras estimated it took him “probably a minute” to determine the object was not contraband.
After Sergeant Deras determined the object was a diamond, he asked defendant whether there were any weapons or drugs in the car. Defendant was still handcuffed at the time, and he had been handcuffed for about two or three minutes. When Sergeant Deras asked defendant for consent to search the car, defendant “took a moment to think about it” and gave his consent, whereupon the officers began their search. On the front passenger side floorboard of the car, Sergeant Deras found a green plastic baby wipes box. He opened the box and found a number of small, clear plastic bags, an electronic scale, and several grams of methamphetamine. Based partly on this evidence, police obtained a search warrant for defendant's residence, where they found a safe containing a .22–caliber revolver and ammunition.
The video from Sergeant Deras' onboard camera establishes a rough timeline of the aforementioned events. The camera recorded the stop from behind defendant's car. Thirty seconds after defendant's car pulled over, Sergeant Deras approached the passenger's side of the car and spoke with defendant for about a minute. He then walked back to his patrol car and out of view of the camera. The video shows defendant waited in his car for the next six minutes, at which time two officers approached the car, and defendant exited the vehicle. The officers then walked defendant to the sidewalk, out of view of the camera. About four minutes later, the officers seated defendant on the curb of the sidewalk with his hands handcuffed behind him. One minute later, two officers began searching the car. About 13 minutes elapsed between the initial stop and the search of the car. The video does not show defendant making a “very pronounced motion” as described by the civilian ride along.
Defendant challenged the legality of the search and moved to suppress the seized evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5
. Defendant argued that the police prolonged the search longer than necessary to effectuate the legitimate purposes of the traffic stop. He also argued that he did not validly consent to a search of the car when police requested his consent. Furthermore, he argued that the seized drugs, as the fruits of a poisonous tree, could not support a finding of probable cause for the subsequent warrant search of his home.
The prosecution responded that the tip from a confidential informant gave officers reasonable suspicion to detain defendant longer than necessary to deal with the speeding violation. The prosecution also argued that the discovery of the object in defendant's pocket gave them probable cause to search the car. Finally, the prosecution argued that defendant gave valid consent for the search.
The trial court held a hearing at which the prosecution presented the testimony of Sergeant Deras and the civilian who accompanied him. After taking...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Reddick
...the burden to prove police conducted the search under a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.) On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's express or implied factual findings if......
-
People v. Burroughs
...the burden to prove police conducted the search under a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.) On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's express or implied factual findings if......
-
People v. Hammond
...58 Cal.4th 1013, 1054.) "'A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.'" (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756, citing Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614.) Substantial evidence supports the prelimina......
-
People v. Noujaim
... ... response to a motion to suppress evidence seized in a ... warrantless search, the prosecution bears the burden to prove ... police conducted the search under a valid exception to the ... Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." ( People ... v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.) ... "'"'There is no ready litmus test for ... determining whether ... [exigent] circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of ... an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts ... known to the officers.'"'" ( People v ... ...
-
Chapter 5 - §2. Elements for exclusion
...believes the detainee may flee or pose a physical threat. Stier, 168 Cal.App.4th at 27-28; see People v. Espino (6th Dist.2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 759. Case study 1. The police transported the defendant from his neighbor's home to the police station, placed him in an interrogation room, a......
-
Chapter 5 - §3. Exceptions to warrant requirement
...may be extended if the officer develops a reasonable suspicion on different grounds during the stop. People v. Espino (6th Dist.2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756; Russell, 81 Cal.App.4th at 101-02; see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357-58. Typically, the traffic stop ends when the police have no furt......
-
Table of Cases null
...v. Escudero, 23 Cal. 3d 800, 153 Cal. Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312 (1979)—Ch. 5-A, §3.1.2(1)(a)[3]; §3.3.1(2)(a) [2] People v. Espino, 247 Cal. App. 4th 746, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 354 (6th Dist. 2016)—Ch. 5-A, §2.2.3(2)(b)[2]; §3.2.2(2)(b); §3.3.1(4) People v. Espinoza, 23 Cal. App. 5th 317, 232 Cal......