People v. Espinoza

• Decision Date: 07 August 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. 3–12–0766,3–12–0050.,s. 3–12–0766
• Citation: 17 N.E.3d 664
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Sandro ESPINOZA, Defendant–Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant v. Angela Disera, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

17 N.E.3d 664

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Sandro ESPINOZA, Defendant–Appellee.

The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Angela Disera, Defendant–Appellee.

Nos. 3–12–0766

3–12–0050.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

Aug. 7, 2014.

James Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Colleen M. Griffin, Assistant State's Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Mark D. Fisher, of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Ottawa, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice HOLDRIDGE

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendants Sandro Espinoza and Angela Disera were charged in separate cases with domestic battery and endangering the life and health of a child, respectively. The charging instruments in each case identified the victim only as “a minor.” Espinoza was granted a motion to amend the charging instrument, but the State refused to amend the indictment. Disera was provided a bill of particulars under seal, which named the victim, but the State would not identify the victim by his or her initials in the complaint. In both cases, the trial court dismissed the complaints based on their insufficiency. The State appealed.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Defendant Sandro Espinoza was charged by information with domestic battery. 720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2)

(West 2012). The information stated, “said defendant, knowingly, without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a minor, a family or household member, in that said defendant struck a minor about the face.” At a bond hearing, the State alleged that the victim, identified as Espinoza's son, sustained a bloody nose. The State sought a “no contact order”, which the trial court entered. The “no contact order” named the victim as “D.E.”

¶ 4 At a subsequent plea hearing, despite Espinoza's willingness to enter a guilty plea, defense counsel raised concerns about the sufficiency of the information, which identified the victim only as “a minor.” Defense counsel orally moved to amend the complaint, which the trial court denied as an oral motion. However, the trial court also rejected Espinoza's plea, finding it could not accept a plea based on an insufficient complaint. At the same hearing, Espinoza sought a bond reduction and the State set forth a factual basis, which included naming the victim by his initials, D.E. ¶ 5 Espinoza thereafter filed a written motion to amend the charging instrument pursuant to section 111–5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/111–5 (West 2012)

), asking the victim to be identified in the information by his initials. The State responded to the motion to amend, arguing that the information complied with the requirements in section 111–3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/111–3 (West 2012) ) and was not deficient. It further argued that Espinoza was not prejudiced by the charging instrument, and that, if he were prejudiced, he could request a bill of particulars. The trial court granted Espinoza's motion to amend the information. The State moved for reconsideration, which the trial court heard and denied. Nevertheless, the State refused to amend the charging instrument. The State asked the court to dismiss the case as a sanction for the State's refusal to comply with the order to amend so that the State could appeal the trial court's ruling. The trial court dismissed the case. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and appealed.

¶ 6 Defendant Angela Disera was charged with endangering the life or health of a child. 720 ILCS 5/12–21.6 (West 2010)

.¹ The information stated, “said defendant willfully caused or permitted the life or health of a minor, a child under the age of 18 years, to be endangered, in that said defendant left the minor child alone at 1350 Sterling, Joliet, Will County, Illinois, without adult supervision.” Disera moved for a bill of particulars. 725 ILCS 5/114–2 (West 2012). She argued that the criminal complaint did not name the minor, and because the police reports named five different minors (three of whom were Disera's children), she was unclear about the identity of the “minor” referenced in the information. The State filed a bill of particulars under seal which stated the full name of the minor. However, the State refused to amend the complaint by adding the alleged minor victim's initials. Disera filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted based on the insufficiency of the complaint. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and appealed. People v. Espinoza, No. 3–12–0766, and People v. Disera, No. 3–12–0050, were consolidated on appeal.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred when it dismissed both criminal complaints based on the insufficiency of the charging instruments. The State argues that both complaints included the essential elements of the offenses charged and that the trial court erred in dismissing them. We disagree.

¶ 9 A defendant has a fundamental right, as set forth in section 111–3 of the Code, to be informed of the nature and cause of criminal accusations made against him. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill.2d 82, 92–93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487 (2008)

; People v. Nash, 173 Ill.2d 423, 428–29, 220 Ill.Dec. 154, 672 N.E.2d 1166 (1996). “If an indictment or information is challenged before trial in a pretrial motion, the indictment or information must strictly comply with the pleading requirements of section 111–3.”

Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487

; see also Nash, 173 Ill.2d at 429, 220 Ill.Dec. 154, 672 N.E.2d 1166 ; People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill.2d 318, 321–22, 214 Ill.Dec. 846, 662 N.E.2d 412 (1996). “ If the indictment or information does not strictly comply with the pleading requirements of section 111–3, the proper remedy is dismissal.” Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487. Accordingly, “[w]hen the sufficiency of a charging instrument is challenged in a pretrial motion, the inquiry upon review is whether the instrument strictly complies with section 111–3.” People v. Swartwout, 311 Ill.App.3d 250, 256, 243 Ill.Dec. 655, 723 N.E.2d 1256 (2000). The sufficiency of a charging instrument is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Id.

¶ 10 An indictment or information must “set[ ] forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.” 725 ILCS 5/111–3 (West 2012)

. Where an indictment or information charges an offense against persons or property, as here, “ ‘the name of the person or property injured, if known, must be stated [in the charging instrument], and the allegation must be proved as alleged.’ ” People v. Jones, 53 Ill.2d 460, 463, 292 N.E.2d 361 (1973) (quoting People v. Walker, 7 Ill.2d 158, 161, 130 N.E.2d 182 (1955) ). In other words, where the impact of the crime is “focused more directly upon an individual victim than upon society generally,” the identity of the individual victim “is an essential allegation of an indictment charging that offense” (Jones, 53 Ill.2d at 463, 292 N.E.2d 361 ), and the failure to identify the victim in the charging instrument renders it deficient (see, e.g.,

People v. Luttrell, 134 Ill.App.3d 328, 331–32, 89 Ill.Dec. 308, 480 N.E.2d 194 (1985) (indictment which purported to charge aggravated battery against police officers was insufficient because it failed to identify the individual police officers who were the alleged victims); Jones, 53 Ill.2d at 463–64, 292 N.E.2d 361 (indictment's failure to name victim of alleged armed robbery was a formal defect)).

¶ 11 Although the charging instruments at issue in this case purported to charge crimes committed against individual persons (i.e., domestic battery and endangering the life and health of a minor), neither document contained any information suggestive of the victims' identities. This defect was not cured by the State. When the trial court ordered the State to add the alleged victim's initials to the charging instrument in Espinoza's case, the State refused and asked the trial court to dismiss the charge as a sanction. The State also declined to add the victim's initials to the charging instrument in Disera's case. Under these unusual circumstances, the trial court acted properly in dismissing both criminal complaints.

¶ 12 The State argues that the trial court erred because the defendants cannot show that they were prejudiced by the charging instruments' failure to identify the alleged victims. We disagree. Contrary to the State's suggestion, neither defendant was required to demonstrate prejudice at this stage of the proceedings. “When an indictment or information is attacked for the first time posttrial, ” a defendant must show that “he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defense” in order to obtain reversal of his conviction based upon an error in the charging instrument. (Emphasis added.) Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487

. However, as noted above, a pretrial challenge to the sufficiency of a charging document necessitates strict compliance with the pleading requirement of section 111–3 of the Code. Id.; see also People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d 441, 448, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89 (1991).

Here, each defendant challenged the sufficiency of the charging instrument before trial. Accordingly, the defendants were entitled to demand strict compliance with the pleading requirements of section 111–3 of the Code without having to show prejudice. Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487

. Because the charging instruments in this case alleged crimes against individual victims, the identities of those victims were essential allegations that had to be included in the charging instruments. Jones, 53 Ill.2d at 463, 292 N.E.2d 361 ; Luttrell, 134 Ill.App.3d at 331–32, 89 Ill.Dec. 308, 480 N.E.2d 194. The State's refusal to include these essential allegations in the charging instruments justified the trial court's dismissal of the charges. See Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 93, ...