People v. Espinoza Menchaca

• Decision Date: 02 August 1968
• Citation: 70 Cal.Rptr. 843,264 Cal.App.2d 642
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Louis ESPINOZA MENCHACA, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 13766.

Page 843

70 Cal.Rptr. 843

264 Cal.App.2d 642

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Louis ESPINOZA MENCHACA, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 13766.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Aug. 2, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 21, 1968.

Hearing Denied Sept. 25, 1968.

Grayson, Green & Vodnoy, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Rose-Marie Gruenwald, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

JEFFERSON, Associate Justice.

Defendant was sentenced to state prison upon his conviction by the court of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. He was also convicted of a robbery charge arising out of the same incident but no sentence was imposed for that offense in compliance with Penal Code, section 654. Appeal is from the judgment.

The single witness for the prosecution was the victim, John Lewis. During the early morning hours of September 21, 1966, he was working alone at the Western Union office on North Wilcox Avenue. Defendant walked in, pulled out a revolver, pointed it at Lewis and said 'Don't make any sudden moves. This is a stick-up.' Defendant ordered Lewis to open the counter gate and turn around. Lewis followed his instructions and defendant put the revolver up against his back and pushed him into a back room. He then pushed him into another portion of the office, forced him to lie face down on the floor and bound and gagged him. Then defendant and a confederate, to whom Lewis could hear defendant giving instructions, took the money from his wallet and the cash on hand in the office. They left by a back door when a customer entered the front office.

Defendant had an alibi. He testified that at the time of the robbery he was working on a job for a rent-a-car outfit. His testimony was corroborated by the manager of the rent-a-car business and by a fellow employee.

The victim Lewis testified that he was actually face to face with defendant only for a matter of seconds; the rest of the time his back was to defendant. ¹ About half an hour after the robbery he made a report to the police. Sonetime later at the police station, he was shown four pictures, two of one individual and two of another. He was asked 'Is this the man?' Both persons in the pictures were of Mexican extraction. Lewis thought defendant was one of the two men in the pictures but was not able to identify him 'for sure.' The police then took him to a lineup. It was composed of four or five men. Defendant was the only Mexican. Lewis was not able immediately to identify defendant. He was not sure 'until they had him turn around a couple of times.' At the trial Lewis positively identified defendant and indicated he recognized his voice.

It is now established that an unnecessarily suggestive lineup constitutes a denial of due process. (Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206; People v. Caruso, 68 A.C. 181, 183, 65 Cal.Rptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336.) As a consequence, the admission of testimony respecting an in-court identification, without a prior determination that such testimony was not tainted by an illegal lineup identification, is error. (Gilbert v. State of California, 388 U.S. 263, 272, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178, 1186; People v. Caruso, supra, 68 A.C. 181, 188, 65 Cal.Rptr. 336, 436 P.2d 336.)

In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, a companion case to Stovall v. Denno, and Gilbert v. California, the Supreme Court referred to classic examples of unnecessarily suggestive lineups in the following quote (388 U.S. at p. 232, 87 S.Ct. at p. 1935, 18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1160): 'In a Canadian case * * * the defendant had been picked out of a line-up of six men, of which he was the only Oriental. In other cases, a blackhaired suspect was placed among a group of light-haired persons, tall suspects have been made to stand with short non-suspects, and, in a case where the perpetrator of the Crime was known to be a youth, a suspect under twenty was placed in a line-up with five other persons, all of whom were forty or over. " Manifestly, the lineup in this case, being composed of only one person of Mexican extraction, namely, defendant, was unnecessarily suggestive and therefore constitutionally unfair.

The trial court was not operating under the above rules when it admitted the victim's identification testimony, the trial (in January 1967) having preceded Stovall, Wade and Gilbert (filed concurrently on June 12, 1967) and Caruso (filed January 26, 1968). At the time of the trial, the applicable rule was that, 'The manner in which the lineup was conducted affects only the weight of the witnesses' testimony, not its admissibility.' (People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 380, 33 Cal.Rptr. 497, 498, 384 P.2d 1001, 1002.) Nevertheless, plaintiff is entitled to assert a violation of the new rules. (Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 299, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1205; People v. Douglas, 259 A. C.A. 731, 734--735, fn. 7, 66 Cal.Rptr. 492.)

The record fails to show that the in-court identification of defendant was based upon the victim's recollection of defendant at the time of the robbery and not on his subsequent identification at the illegal lineup. The victim testified that he listened to defendant's trial testimony and remembered his voice as the voice of the person who robbed him. But the record does not show that this identification was not related to a voice identification at the lineup.

Since the trial preceded the decisions enunciating the rule which makes the admissibility of an in-court identification depend on a finding that it was not tainted by an identification at an unfair lineup, we cannot say that the trial court necessarily reached such a determination in finding defendant guilty.

Upon retrial, the People must establish that the courtroom identification was not the fruit of the illegal lineup, or it has no case against defendant.

The judgment is reversed.

KINGSLEY, J., concurs.

FILES, Presiding Justice (dissenting).

This was a trial before a court sitting without a jury. The question is the admissibility of the victim's testimony identifying the defendant.

The victim of the robbery, Lewis, observed the defendant's face for an appreciable period of time. Defendant entered the office, stood at the counter, displayed a gun, demanded admittance through the locked counter gate, came behind the counter, escorted Lewis into 'the maintainer's room,' said it wasn't big enough, then escorted Lewis down the hall before binding and gagging him. Later defendant returned and went through Lewis' pockets and took his money. Lewis' testimony includes this:

'Q Now, for about how long altogether would you say that you had an opportunity to observe this man's face altogether?

'A About five minutes.

'Q Approximately what would you say would be the minimum or maximum distance?

'A The maximum distance was when he walked in. About fifteen feet.

The minimum would be about two feet across the counter.'

Lewis' testimony describes 10 separate occasions...