People v. Esposito

• Decision Date: 12 November 1918
• Citation: 224 N.Y. 370,121 N.E. 344
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ESPOSITO.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

224 N.Y. 370

121 N.E. 344

PEOPLE

v.ESPOSITO.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Nov. 12, 1918.

Appeal from Trial Term, Schenectady County.

Vincenzo Esposito was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.

Cuddeback, J., dissenting.

James A. Leary, of Saratoga Springs, for appellant.

John R. Parker, of Schenectady, for the People.

HISCOCK, C. J.

The defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree because he shot and killed a woman named Giovannina Pasquerella. In close sequence of time he shot and killed first her husband and then herself and wounded two other persons. All of this occurred in a building which was used on the ground floor for a store kept by the husband and in the upper stories for dwelling apartments. In furtherance of the claim that the defendant killed deceased under such circumstances as made his act murder in the first degree, it was and is asserted as a matter of inference from certain circumstances that the defendant was influenced to do what he did by the motive of robbery.

There was no dispute that the defendant killed the deceased. There was vigorous dispute that there was motive or premeditation and deliberation in his acts. On the contrary, it was claimed in his behalf, on the evidence, that as the result of natural defects or of temporary intoxication the defendant was in a condition of frenzy and of mental impairment which made him incapable of exercising those processes of mind which are essential to the commission of the crime of which he has been convicted. For the purpose of supporting these claims and this evidence in his behalf, substantial testimony was given of previous good character and peaceable disposition.

The issues thus formed were submitted to the jury for consideration and determination. There certainly was nothing in defendant's personality and situation as portrayed to us by the testimony or in the acts which he committed at the time he killed deceased which was calculated unduly to arouse any sympathy or consideration for him. On the other hand, the very savagery of his conduct was calculated involuntarily to excite in the minds of jurymen a tendency to place upon his acts the worst and most criminal construction which the evidence permitted. That the evidence, however, forced upon their minds a grave doubt whether he was guilty of murder in the first degree, is made sufficiently apparent by the fact that, after being in deliberation for 8 1/2 hours, the jury had failed to agree and returned for further instructions in respect of the difference between murder in the first and second degrees, and that it was only after another hour of deliberation that they finally returned with the verdict which is the basis of the present judgment.

Under the circumstances disclosed by the foregoing brief summary, it is manifest that the defendant was entitled to a scrupulously fair trial. It was the duty of the court and of the district attorney to see to it that his fate which hung in the balance for so long was not prejudiced or settled by any forbidden or untoward methods. It was immaterial that one might think that the defendant was guilty of the highest crime of which he could be convicted, and that there was no danger that such a conviction would result in meting out to him greater punishment than he deserved. Such thoughts as these, if they existed, had no place in the presence of that fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that a man shall not be punished for an act, however, abhorrent and criminal it may seem to be, until he has been justly and fairly convicted.

[1][2] The trial which defendant actually secured was far from being of the kind indicated. The district attorney repeatedly violated the rules of fairness and good conduct, and while the learned trial judge, when objection was made by his rulings, mildly checked the misconduct, there was utterly lacking that sternness of rebuke which alike would have stopped further repetition and would have erased from the minds of the jury any impressions produced by what had gone before. We shall not attempt to recapitulate at length all of the acts of the district attorney. Reference will be made to sufficient of them to show the basis for the view which we take, that the judgment which has been rendered should be reversed.

The defendant's name is Esposito. It is said that this means ‘bastard.’ If this be so, it certainly did not impose upon the defendant any reproach for which he was responsible. The district attorney in summing up said, ‘If any of you know what the meaning of Esposito is, I wish you would tell each other.’ Of course, there is no means of telling whether any juryman did attempt to fulfill this injunction of the district attorney and impart to his fellows information that even the name of defendant was unfavorable to his character. There can be no doubt, however, that necessarily and inevitably the remarks of the district attorney would be understood to imply that there was something in the defendant's name which, if understood would be prejudicial to him.

The defendant is an alien, and apparently he was within the draft age. On his cross-examination the district attorney attempted to show that he claimed exemption because he was a resident alien. The court permitted this inquiry, but it failed to elicit the information which the district attorney desired. Subsequently he attempted to establish the identity of a paper wherein defendant claimed such exemption but again failed. Nevertheless in summing up he said:

‘Why did not he answer about the draft questions when he was on the stand, when shown the papers in regard to the draft?’

There was no suggestion that the defendant attempted by unlawful means to secure exemption or that he acted otherwise than in accordance with the privilege...